Pensions reforms, redistribution and welfare by Thakoor, Jeevendranath
PENSIONS REFORMS, REDISTRIBUTION AND WELFARE
by
JEEVENDRANATH (VIMAL) THAKOOR
A thesis submitted to
The University of Birmingham
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Economics
School of Social Sciences
The University of Birmingham
May 2009
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. 
The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work 
are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by 
any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of 
the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
Dedicated to my parents,
Arvind & Tara Thakoor
for everything...
Table of Contents
Abstract
Acknowledgements
1 INTRODUCTION 1
2 OPTIMAL SOCIAL SECURITY - A GENERAL 17
EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH
2.1 Introduction 17
2.2 The Economy 21
2.3 Competitive Equilibrium 28
2.4 Planners Problem 33
2.5 Conclusions 50
Appendix 2.1 52
3 PENSIONS OR INCOME SUPPORT: WHICH IS 53
THE OPTIMAL REDISTRIBUTION INSTRUMENT?
3.1 Introduction 53
3.2 The Economy 62
3.3 Competitive Equilibrium 68
3.4 The Planners Problem 75
3.5 An Application 103
3.6 Conclusions and Extensions 106
Appendix 3.1 109
Appendix 3.2 115
4 REDISTRIBUTION-TILTING WITH PLANNER 118
INEQUALITY AVERSION
4.1 Introduction 118
4.2 The Economy 124
4.3 Competitive Equilibrium 130
4.4 The Planners Problem 134
4.5 An Application 150
4.6 Conclusions 153
Appendix 4.1 156
5 THE THREE PILLARS OF PENSIONS AND 157
WELFARE
5.1 Introduction 157
5.2 The Economy 166
5.3 Competitive Equilibrium 174
5.4 The Planners Problem 179
5.5 An Application 197
5.6 Conclusions 200
Appendix 5.1 202
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE EXTENSIONS 207
6.1 Conclusions 207
6.2 Future Extensions 212
Bibliography 218
Abstract
This thesis deals with the optimal design of pensions systems in the face of
demographic changes. Though the chapters di¤er in terms of the key ques-
tions addressed, the unifying theme remains which pensions system yields
the highest welfare under di¤ering economic conditions. We use a standard
overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents to address the var-
ious questions. The role of the pensions system varies between consumption
smoothing and redistribution, or a combination of both. The provision of
pensions, whether universal or targeted, has a signicant impact on capital
formation and by extension on a host of economic aggregates and welfare.
Capital is always higher under a fully-funded scheme. Under certain condi-
tions, it is optimal to have no pay-as-you-go pensions in place and a fully-
funded scheme is thus optimal. With a redistributive pensions system, the
welfare gain of the poor exceeds the fall in the welfare of the rich thereby
resulting in an increase in aggregate welfare. This thesis thus brings together
the issues involved in pensions design in a theoretical framework and aims
to provide an insight into the various channels at work.
Keywords: Pensions; Ageing Population, Pensions Reforms; Pay-As-You-
Go Pensions; Fully Funded Pensions;Redistribution; Income Support; Over-
lapping Generations Model (OLG); General Equilibrium; Heterogeneous Agents;
Dynamic E¢ ciency; Dynamic Ine¢ ciency; Welfare.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The post-war baby boom coupled with an increasing life expectancy and
declines in fertility rates have resulted in the ageing of the population of
many countries. While it was initially a phenomenon restricted to industrial
nations, developing countries have also started to experience this transition,
and at a relatively faster pace. An ageing population poses a number of policy
conundrums for policymakers. These span the provision of pensions and
health care coupled with implications for the macroeconomy and nancial
stability. One of the prominent challenges of an ageing population is the
provision of pensions for the elderly so as to ensure they have a su¢ cient
amount of income during their retirement. Fears about the long term scal-
nancial sustainability of pensions schemes operated under the Pay-As-You-
Go (PAYG)1 have been raised as the dependency ratio increases. Without
reforms, some of the PAYG schemes are expected to go bust. While it makes
economic sense to reform unsustainable systems, attempts for reform have
often encountered severe (political) resistance. Though the initial policy
1In a PAYG pensions system, there is intergenerational transfers such that the current
cohort of workers pay for the pensions of the current cohort of retirees. In a FF system,
each generation save for its own retirement.
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proposals suggested a shift from the PAYG to a Fully-Funded (FF) system,
the transition has be hindered by several factors. This includes the high
transition cost of shifting from the PAYG to a FF system. Moreover, most
developing countries do not have the capabilities to manage such a transition
on their own. There is also the no less important issue of coverage whereby
people living in the rural areas or working in the informal sector would not be
covered by the FF system. As such, they risk being in poverty during their
retirement. One of the main perceived benets of a FF system is that the
assets are privately managed and yield a higher rate of return than the PAYG.
However, this view has come under challenge, especially in light of the recent
developments in the nancial markets which has resulted in pensions funds
losing a signicant proportion of their portfolio and thereby jeopardising the
income of a cohort of retirees. Moreover, there is an ongoing debate about
whether the rate of return of the FF is no more higher than the PAYG once
the risk elements have been taken into account.
In a bid to prepare their economies to cope better with the ageing of
their population, most countries have initiated, or thought of initiating, the
reforms of their pensions system. These reforms have been parametric or
fundamental. The most well known example of fundamental reform is that
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of Chile, which was the rst country to move from a PAYG to a FF system
in 1981. Since then, there has been a wave of pensions reform which has
swept through Latin America. However, fundamental reform often encoun-
ters signicant resistance. To circumvent this problem, most countries have
emphasised parametric reforms whereby the PAYG pensions is maintained
but to deal with ageing, the retirement age is extended or the generosity of
the system reduced. There is now a general consensus that an optimal pen-
sions system will have a combination of both the PAYG and the FF schemes.
This will ensure a better diversication of risks that could potentially arise
if only one system was adhered to.
Pensions were initially introduced in the US and Europe to ensure that
the elderly do not live in poverty. This was based on paternalistic and equity
considerations since some individuals would not be able to save enough for
their retirement. Though pensions was initially provided universally, this
cannot be sustained with an ageing population. As such, the question of
equity versus e¢ ciency arises. There is an emerging view that a "means-
tested" policy, whereby only the poor benet most from pensions, is more
resilient to ageing than one where pensions is universally provided. Moreover,
though the paternalistic motive for the provision of pensions should still be
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there, a pensions policy based on targeting will be more e¢ cient. An ageing
population thus has major ramications for pensions policy and the overall
economy.
In this thesis "Pensions Reforms, Redistribution and Welfare" we focus
on the optimal design of pensions systems. Though the chapters di¤er in
terms of the key question addressed, the unifying theme throughout remains
which pensions system yields the highest welfare under di¤ering economic
conditions. The role of the pensions system varies between consumption
smoothing and redistribution or a combination of both. The di¤erences in
the design of the pensions system lead to di¤erences in a range of economic
aggregates and by extension welfare. One of the key channels through which
this operates is the di¤erence in capital formation. In a FF system capital is
always higher than a PAYG scheme. This has implications for other aggre-
gates such as output, wages, consumption and the interest rate which all play
an important role in determining the welfare of the di¤erent agents. This
thesis brings together the issues involved in pensions design in a theoretical
framework and aims to provide an insight into the various channels at work.
This thesis consists of 4 core chapters. We use a standard Samuelson-
Diamond overlapping generations model initiated by Samuelson (1958) and
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extended by Diamond (1965) to address the questions posed. At any point in
time, two generations, the young and old live simultaneously. Agents max-
imise utility by maximising consumption and for ease of manipulation, the
utility function is assumed to be loglinear. Abstracting from any adverse im-
pact of social security we assume that the young provide one unit of labour
inelastically. The old live in retirement. We allow the agents to di¤er through
a combination of either myopia and/or productivity. The high (low) produc-
tivity agents are termed as rich (poor). In line with Becker (1990), we assume
that the poor can potentially discount the future at a higher rate than the
rich. To allow for the potential adverse impact of pensions on savings, we
allow for endogenous capital formation. To complete the general equilibrium
set up, the economy consists of prot maximising rms and a welfare max-
imising planner. Firms produce a homogeneous good using a Cobb-Douglas
production function. The analysis is carried out in steady state and as such
we do not consider the transition cost in switching from a PAYG to a FF
scheme. Following Galor (1992), the steady state can be considered as the
representative framework within which innitely many generations evolve.
The key question deals with how the agents fund for their consumption in
retirement. Some of the possibilities we consider are: (i) pensions is FF and
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all agents are responsible for the provision of their own pensions (Ch: 2-4);
(ii) pensions is in the form of intergenerational transfers (PAYG) (Ch: 2-5);
(iii) there is a multipillar pensions system in place where part is FF and
part operates under PAYG (Ch: 3-5). The part that operates under PAYG
also has an element of redistribution from the rich to the poor (Ch: 5). In
chapters 3-5, we estimate some parameter values for a sample of countries,
developed and developing, and try to nd out what it the optimal level of tax
that would be imposed in those economies. Since OLG models are inherently
hard to calibrate to real world data, we also use sensitivity analysis to show
how the tax rate behaves as the parameter values change. The results remain
robust for a whole set of plausible parameters.
Chapter 2 provides a comparison between a FF and a PAYG scheme
in a general equilibrium framework. This is an extension of a paper by
Feldstein (1985) who nds a positive optimal level of social security aimed
at smoothing consumption in a dynamically e¢ cient economy characterised
by myopia. This is counter to the Aaron condition (1966) which builds on
work by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965). Samuelson (1958) proved
the existence of an optimal biologicalinterest rate equal to the population
growth rate and Diamond (1965) showed that it is possible for there to be
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overaccumulation of capital in OLG models thereby leading to dynamic in-
e¢ ciency. The Aaron condition suggests that if the interest rate is greater
than the growth of the population and wage rate, then a PAYG leads to a
further decline in capital and is not optimal. Feldsteins work relies on a
xed rate of interest of 11.4 percent. However, this is counter to Lerners
(1959) criticism of Samuelsons constant interest rate. Lerner suggests that
the interest rate will in fact vary from one period to another based on the
extent of pensions a higher (lower) pensions at retirement will encourage
(discourage) people to consume more (less) during their working years and
thereby increase (decrease) the interest rates. However, most of the criticisms
of the PAYG initially started from the Chicago School with Friedman (1962)
one of the most ardent critiques suggesting social security programmes are
inappropriate because they infringe individual liberty.
We extend Feldsteins (1985) paper in two ways: Firstly we allow for en-
dogenous capital formation to take into account the distortionary impact of a
PAYG on savings and secondly, we compare the PAYG with a FF scheme to
see which is the optimal pensions system. Consistent with Feldstein (1985),
the agents su¤er from myopia and this hinders their ability to give a su¢ cient
weight to the future and fully anticipate the amount of pensions they will re-
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ceive. Whilst we derive analytical results we also have recourse to simulations
to show the full general equilibrium e¤ects of the pensions systems.
Our results on PAYG are consistent with Feldstein (1985) and we show
that capital is always higher under the FF system than the PAYG. This is in
line with previous empirical results by Feldstein (1974, 1996). When myopia
a¤ects the expected amount of pensions to be received, the crowding is only
partial and there is a convergence between capital under the two schemes.
Feldstein (1985) showed the existence of a positive level of PAYG pen-
sions. However, for all the sets of simulations we undertake, the results show
that, in a dynamically e¢ cient economy, a FF system always yields a higher
level of welfare than the PAYG. This is consistent with the Aaron (1966)
condition. Moreover, the greater the myopia and the less the weight the
agents attach to the second period of their lifetime, the higher the tax rate.
This is in line with consumption smoothing. However, if myopia leads agents
to expect a smaller pensions than they actually receive, there is a fall in
the tax rate and convergence in welfare between the PAYG and FF systems.
Nonetheless, the FF system remains optimal for all positive PAYG taxes.
We also nd that beyond a certain level of myopia, it is optimal to have no
PAYG pensions in place. In such cases, a FF scheme is the only option.
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One of the reasons pensions was initially provided was to ensure that the
elderly do not live in poverty during retirement. However, with population
ageing, there have been calls to "means-test" the provision of PAYG pensions.
As such, only the elderly will receive such a payment and the rich will have
to fund for their own pensions. Pensions would thus provide some form of
social insurance and help alleviate poverty and/or reduce inequality. This is
the crux of Chapter 3. The agents are heterogeneous both in terms of their
productivity and the weight they attach to the future. We consider what is
the optimal way to redistribute from the rich to the poor, i.e., whether it
should be in the form of income support or PAYG pensions. If redistribution
is intragenerational, a FF pensions system is in place. However, if there is
intergenerational redistribution a hybrid system is in place where part is FF
and part operates as a PAYG.
The issue of redistribution is not new and remains controversial. A grow-
ing literature has emphasised the various channels through which inequality
can a¤ect politico-economic stability (Persson and Tabellini (1994); Alesina
and Rodrik (1994); Alesina and Perrotti (1996)). Redistribution is often con-
sidered as one of the routes through which social justice and e¢ ciency can be
promoted by reducing inequality and supporting those at the lower end of the
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economy. Though intragenerational redistribution has been the main tool,
the redistributive role of pensions is gaining increasing prominence (Krueger
and Kubler (2006)). Our paper comes closest to Conde-Ruiz and Galasso
(2005) who nd that with su¢ cient inequality in earnings and elderly in the
economy, there is an equilibrium that supports the existence of both intra
and intergenerational redistribution.
Our theoretical analysis provides further evidence of the distortionary
impact of redistribution on capital. With income support, the impact on
capital is smaller than with pensions. This is consistent with our earlier result
pertaining to capital being higher under the FF scheme than a PAYG. Our
results on intragenerational transfers suggest that a richer and more equal
economy, characterised by a high proportion of rich and productivity, will
require a smaller tax rate than an economy characterised by high inequality.
The poor prefer higher taxes since this means the redistribution is more
generous whilst the rich prefer lower taxes. In the same line, we nd that
welfare is higher in a richer economy.
Our simulations results suggest that although redistribution is costly, it
almost always leads to an increase in welfare except for a small range of
parameter values where the feasible optimal tax rate is zero. Redistribution
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increases aggregate welfare because the gain in the utility of the poor is higher
than the loss to the utility of the poor. We also nd that there is a potential
for dynamic ine¢ ciency to arise in the economy. This becomes a possibility
when there is a high proportion of rich or productivity is fairly high. Under
those circumstances, we nd that redistribution through pensions is optimal.
Redistributing through pensions in a dynamically ine¢ cient economy leads to
a lower capital and can move the economy to a dynamically e¢ cient position.
On the other hand, if the economy is in a dynamically e¢ cient position,
then income support is the preferred redistribution instrument. An economy
is more likely to be dynamically e¢ cient if there is a high proportion of
poor agents with low productivity. These results are consistent with the
Aaron condition and remain robust to population ageing. However, there is
a small range of parameters in a dynamically e¢ cient economy where the
interest rate is greater than but very close to the population growth rate. In
such a situation, pensions is an optimal redistribution instrument even in a
dynamically e¢ cient economy. We suggest the PAYG pensions ensure the
economy remains dynamically e¢ cient.
Chapter 4 addresses the same question as in Chapter 3, i.e., how to
redistribute from the rich to the poor. However, there are two fundamental
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di¤erences: (i) the planner has the option of redistributing both intergen-
erationally and intragenerationally; and (ii) we allow for the planner to po-
tentially have some degree of inequality aversion whereby he gives a higher
weight to the welfare of the poor. Additionally, the agents have the same
discount factor and di¤er only in terms of their productivity. We investi-
gate what determines which proportion is allocated to the young in the form
of income support and which proportion goes to the elderly in the form of
pensions. If everything is allocated to the young, we have a FF system,
otherwise a hybrid system emerges. This paper is thus analogous to Conde-
Ruiz and Galasso (2005) who investigated both inter and intragenerational
redistribution simultaneously.
The analytical results are in line with those in Chapter 3. We nd that
the adverse impact of redistribution on capital still persists. The higher the
intergenerational redistribution, the greater the crowding out. Moreover, we
also nd that richer economies consisting of a high proportion of rich and
productivity need less redistribution and therefore lower taxes. The higher
the inequality aversion of the planner, the greater the extent of redistribution
and hence the higher the tax rate.
To consider the general equilibrium impact of the two instruments simul-
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taneously, we resort to simulations. We nd that the tax rate and the timing
of redistribution change in such a way so as to ensure that capital does not
change signicantly and the economy remains dynamically e¢ cient. We note
that an increase in the tax rate would lead to a move in favour of intragener-
ational redistribution. Conversely, in a rich economy characterised by a high
proportion of rich and productivity, the tax rate would tend to be low and
intergenerational transfers would be favoured. When the agents su¤er from
myopia, intragenerational transfers are favoured since this reverses some of
the decline in capital that is induced by myopia. We also nd that with
population ageing, intergenerational transfer is optimal. Consistent with our
previous results, we nd that both inter and intragenerational redistribution
are supported only within a range. Outside this range, only one of the two
is favoured. If an economy is poor intragenerational redistribution will be
favoured whilst in a rich economy intergenerational redistribution will be
optimal.
Finally, in Chapter 5 we consider a multi-pillar pensions system. The
predominant view that prevailed through most of Latin America after the
privatisation of the Chilean transition to a FF scheme has changed drastically
since the publication of the World Banks "Averting the Old Age Crisis"
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(1994). According to that report, a pensions system would ideally have
three pillars so as to diversify the risks of both the FF and PAYG as well as
ensuring all individuals, especially the poor, are catered for in retirement. It
has to be acknowledged that "Averting the Old Age Crisis" has had its fair
share of criticism. For instance, Gillion et al. (2000) suggest there are more
reform options that are possible, than just the ones suggested by the Bank.
Even the Bank in its subsequent work has pointed out that issues of coverage
and the management of the privatised pensions funds had to be given due
attention (Gill et al. (2004); World Bank (2005)). They thus suggested the
design of a ve-pillar pensions system with greater exibility to adjust to
di¤erent economic environments.
In Chapter 5 we consider a three-pillar pensions system whereby we aim
to formalise the intuition behind the World Bank model. We consider some
of the redistributive issues and the channels through which the three-pillars
a¤ect the macroeconomic aggregates and welfare. The agents in this model
di¤er both in terms of their productivity and discount factor. The main dif-
ference with the models in the previous chapters is that pensions is provided
to all the agents and there are three pillars. Pillar 1 is entirely redistributive
and can be considered as a Beveridgean system since the pensions the agents
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get is independent of their contribution. Pillar 1 thus promotes an element of
intragenerational redistribution. Pillar 2 is Bismarckian in that the pensions
the agents get is a function of their contribution rate (which is equal to their
ability). We di¤er from the World Bank in that we assume the same rate of
return on both Pillars 1 and 2. However, as we have discussed earlier, there
is no reason to assume that a privately managed Pillar 2 will undoubtedly
yield a higher return than a publicly managed Pillar 1. Pillar 3 is entirely
voluntary in this set up and it represents the savings the agents undertake
irrespective of Pillars 1 and 2. The weight the planner attaches to Pillar 1
determines the extent of redistribution that takes place through pensions.
The poor will favour a higher weight on Pillar 1 whilst the rich will favour
Pillar 2.
The analytical ndings remain consistent in so far as the redistributive
impact of Pillar 1 is concerned. Capital is lower the higher the weight at-
tached to Pillar 1. The higher the weight attached to Pillar 1, the higher
(lower) the welfare of the poor (rich). Welfare is higher in a richer economy
resulting from a combination of either higher proportion of rich and/or pro-
ductivity. We also nd that population ageing leads to a marginally lower
level of welfare.
15
The key simulations results suggest that, for some plausible range of
parameters, whether the planner decides to attach a higher weight to Pillar
1 or to Pillar 2 makes a marginal di¤erence to the optimal tax rate. Our
other simulations results suggest an increase in the weight attached to Pillar
1 leads to a marginally higher tax rate (and lower capital). However, since
the welfare of the poor increases by more than that of the rich, aggregate
welfare increases. We also nd that richer economies characterised by a high
proportion of rich are able to a¤ord more generous pensions and have a
higher welfare. However, the impact of productivity is non-linear, though a
high levels of productivity, a higher pensions can be paid out. We suggest
that the increase in the tax rate as the economies get richer ensures the
economy remains dynamically e¢ cient. Though the impact of population
ageing on the tax rate is innitesimal, it leads to a lower welfare.
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2 OPTIMAL SOCIAL SECURITY - AGEN-
ERAL EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH
2.1 Introduction
The optimal level of social security has attracted signicant academic in-
terest since Samuelson (1958). Much is based on the premise that if an
economy is dynamically e¢ cient such that the prevailing rate of interest is
greater than the population growth rate, then a fully-funded (FF) pensions
system is optimal. On the other hand, if the population growth rate exceeds
the interest rate, then a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions system can be wel-
fare improving. This concept is formalised in the Aaron condition whereby
Aaron (1966) suggests that if the growth rate of population and real earnings
per head exceeds the market rate of interest, then a PAYG system yields a
higher welfare than a FF system. However, in an inuential paper, Feldstein
(1985) shows the existence of an optimal level of PAYG social security in a
dynamically e¢ cient economy characterised by myopia. Pensions thus aim
to achieve consumption smoothing.
In this paper, we aim to extend2 Feldsteins paper in two ways: Firstly,
2Whilst we try to adhere to the parameters used by Feldstein as closely as possible, we
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Feldstein does not consider capital formation and his simulations results are
based on an exogenous interest rate of 11.4 percent, which is the marginal
product of capital in the US for the period 1950-1980. However, this po-
tentially has two problems in that the general equilibrium e¤ects are not
accounted for and taking a xed interest rate misses out on the distortions
induced in capital formation when a PAYG pensions is provided. We include
capital formation and endogenise the interest rate to overcome these prob-
lems. Secondly, for comparative purposes, we include a FF system as well.
This enables us to consider which of the FF or PAYG deliver higher welfare.
Whilst we are able to derive some analytical results, consistent with Feld-
stein we also have recourse to simulations to show the full general equilibrium
e¤ects of the pensions systems.
Like Feldstein, we use a Samuelson-Diamond overlapping generations
model where two agents, young and old live simultaneously. The agents
di¤er according to their level of myopia. The myopia can take two forms:
rstly, it reduces the weight the agents attach to the second period of their
divert in some instances to attribute the parameters their more conventional usage. Feld-
stein uses  as a myopia parameter. In this paper,  is the share of capital in production.
Feldsteins  is now replaced with : At is used for the number of retirees at time t, here
we use it for technology at time t.
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life and thus fail to save enough. Secondly, the agents may not be able
to fully anticipate the amount of pensions they are going to receive. The
economy also consists of prot-maximising perfectly competitive rms and a
welfare-maximising planner.
The analytical results in so far as the PAYG is concerned are consistent
with Feldstein. The key ndings can be summarised as:
1. Capital is always higher under the FF system than the PAYG;
2. Whilst PAYG pensions causes crowding out, if myopia also a¤ects the
expected level of pensions to be received, then the crowding out is not
complete;
3. A reduction in myopia leads to an increase in capital whilst an increase
in the tax rate or the rate of population growth leads to a fall in capital.
Feldstein showed the existence of a positive level of PAYG pensions. How-
ever, once we take into account the impact of pensions on capital formation,
the simulations results show that in a dynamically e¢ cient economy a FF
system always yields a higher welfare than the PAYG. This is consistent with
the Aaron condition. The other simulations results can be summed up as:
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1. The ndings on capital remain as before and capital remains higher
under the PAYG;
2. The higher the myopia, the higher the tax rate. This is consistent with
Feldstein and consumption smoothing;
3. If myopia leads agents to expect smaller pensions than they actually
receive, there is a convergence in welfare between the PAYG and FF
systems. However, in such a situation, as myopia increases, the tax
rate falls. The FF system still remains optimal for all positive PAYG
taxes;
4. Consistent with Feldstein, beyond a certain point it is optimal to have
no pensions in place.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we describe the
set up of the economy. Section 3 derives the competitive equilibrium whilst
Section 4 considers the planners problem in terms of nding the optimal level
of social security and considers a set of simulations. Section 5 concludes.
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2.2 The Economy
The economy consists of prot-maximising rms operating in competitive
markets, utility-maximising agents and a welfare-maximising benevolent plan-
ner. Economic activity takes place over innite discrete time t 2 f0; 1:::;1g:
At time t, there are two generations in place, the young and the old. The
young provide are economically active whilst the old live in retirement. The
agents are similar in all other aspects except for the degree of their myopia.
Population grows at a constant rate n such that at any point in time there
are (1 + n) more workers than retirees. This can be expressed as:
Lt = (1 + n)Lt 1 (1)
where Lt is the number of agents born at time t. Technology grows at a
constant rate g and hence
At = (1 + g)At 1 (2)
where At is the technology prevailing in the current period.
The economy also consists of prot maximising perfectly competitive
rms and a welfare maximising social planner. The planner maximises the
21
welfare of all agents born at time t. Two factors, an amount of capital (k)
and labour (l) are available as inputs to production and a homogeneous good
(y) is produced.
2.2.1 Households
At time t; two generations live simultaneously. In line with Samuelson (1958),
the distribution of the population is considered to be stationary such that
the proportions and types of individuals remain the same across generations.
Each young agent is endowed with one unit of labour and, abstracting from
the potentially negative impact of social security on labour supply, we assume
that each young agent supplies one unit of labour inelastically. Agents di¤er
only in terms of their myopia which hinders their ability to anticipate their
retirement and potentially save enough for the second period of their lifetime.
Myopia may also result in agents not being able to fully anticipate the amount
of pensions they are going to receive. In line with Feldstein, we assume that
the population consists of a component of "life-cyclers", that is, those who
base their economic decision on the two periods of their lifetime, and the
remainder are myopes.
Agents are utility-maximising and utility is derived out of consumption
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u(ct; ct+1) in the two periods of lifetime. We abstract from bequests such
that people are born without any initial asset endowment, other than their
labour supply, and they consume all the income they generate within their
lifetime such that they bequeath nothing to the next generation. Agents thus
choose their levels of consumption and savings to maximise their utility.
In line with Feldstein, we assume that utility derived out of maximising
consumption subject to the budget constraint can be expressed additively
such that: U = u(c1) + v(c2) where U represents total utility over the life-
time of the agent and u(c1) and v(c2) represent the utility derived out of
consumption in the rst period and second periods of life respectively. For
ease of manipulation, the intertemporally additive lifetime utility function
is taken to be log-linear and satises all the usual conditions in the form of
strict concavity such that u0(c) > 0 and u00(c) < 0. The function also satis-
es lim
c!0
u0(c) = 1 such that subject to its disposable income, the household
will always choose a positive level of consumption when maximising life-cycle
utility. The agentsproblem can be thus expressed as:
Max
fcyt ;cot+1;stg
: U = ln cyt + 
h ln cot+1 (3)
subject to:
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cyt = w
y
t (1  )  syt (4)
cot+1 = Rt+1s
y
t + 
hbt+1 (5)
Eqn.(3) represents the agents maximisation problem pertaining to con-
sumption in the two periods of his lifetime. h represents the level of myopia
such that an individual with  = 1 is a life cycler who values all periods
the same, whilst an individual with  = 0 values consumption only in the
rst period . For the vast majority of agents,  2 (0; 1) such that at least a
positive weight, small or large, is given to consumption in the second period
of lifetime.
Eqns. (4)-(5) represent the consumption of the individual during the
two periods of lifetime. cyt is the level of consumption in the rst period
suggesting that any disposal income, after the payment of a proportional
tax ; is allocated à la Diamond (1965) between present consumption and
savings (s). The second period consumption, cot+1, consists of the savings
plus the interest received and any pensions (b) received. h is the degree
of myopia of the individual in forecasting the expected level of pensions.
Following Feldstein,  2 [0; 1] :
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2.2.2 Firms
We assume that economy-wide production is determined by a Cobb Douglas
of the form:
Yt = (AtLt)
1 Kt (6)
where  is the share of capital in output. Yt represents aggregate output
of a homogeneous good and this is determined by the amount of labour, L,
and capital, K, available at time t. For ease of manipulation, we assume that
technology, At, is labour enhancing. We abstract from the impact of social
security on the labour supply decision and instead assume that all agents
supply one unit of labour inelastically. The economy is endowed with an
initial capital stock K0 > 0 and capital depreciates fully from one period to
the next. Dividing the production function by AtLt; in intensive form the
production function is given by:
y = k (7)
where k is the unit of capital per e¤ective unit of labour. The production
function satises the usual conditions such that f(0) = 0, f 0(k) > 0, f 00(k) <
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0 and the Inada conditions: lim
k!0
f 0(k) =1 and lim
k!1
f 0(k) = 0.
Prot maximising perfectly competitive rms pay labour and capital their
respective marginal products which for the Cobb-Douglas function is given
by:
w = (1  ) k (8)
R = k 1 (9)
where R  (1 + r) is the gross rate of interest. By endogenising w(k) and
R(k), we now depart from Feldstein who had no capital in his model.
2.2.3 Planner
The role of the planner at a given point in time is restricted to that of
maximising the welfare of all individuals living at that point in time. To
achieve its objective, the planner operates a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pen-
sions scheme which is in place to ensure that myopic individuals have some
income on which they can rely on in their old age. The PAYG scheme op-
erates by taxing those currently active and transferring it to those currently
living in retirement. To nance the PAYG scheme, the planner imposes a
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proportional tax  on the wage w of the workers. However, though there is a
need to protect people who fail to save for their retirement because of myopia,
the knowledge that the planner will "bail-out" the myopics out introduces
a distortion in the behaviour of the economic agents. As such, the optimal
level of pensions will balance the need for protection whilst mitigating the
economic costs (Feldstein, 1985). The aggregate amount of tax raised by the
planner can thus be expressed as:
Tt = twt (AtLt) (10)
and this is then redistributed as benet bt to those in retirement. In
aggregate form this is:
Bt = bt (At 1Lt 1) (11)
Given AtLt = (1 + g) (1 + n)At 1Lt 1; the benet received by each agent
in retirement is:
bt = (1 + ) twt (12)
where (1 + )  (1 + n) (1 + g) : It can be deduced that the level of pen-
sions received by the retirees is a function of the wage, the tax rate and the
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rate of population growth and technological improvement.
2.3 Competitive Equilibrium
Given the householdsand the rmsobjectives, a competitive equilibrium
for the economy can be dened as a sequence of consumption fcyt ; cotg1t=0
such that:
1. A given sequence of taxes and transfers, fwt; btg1t=0, and the prevailing
competitive wages, wt, and interest rate, Rt, solves the individuals
optimisation problem subject to satisfying the Euler equation;
2. Factors of production are paid their marginal products (wt = (1  
)kt ;Rt = k
 1
t ) and labour and capital markets clear such that
LDt = Lt and St = Kt+1;
With complete depreciation3, St = Kt+1 is a standard condition sug-
gesting that the capital stock in a given period is the savings of the
elderly from the previous period.;
3We are not referring to depreciation in the normal sense: rather, the old consume
capital and the young replenish it.
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3. The planners budget is always balanced hence taxes raised is distrib-
uted as benets in the same period Tt = Bt;
4. The economys resource constraint is always satised. In intensive form,
the constraint which is dened as the allocation of current output, yt,
yt = c
y
t +
cot
(1 + )
+ (1 + )kt+1 (13)
The resource constraint suggests that output at any time is divided be-
tween consumption and capital formation. Consumption consists of that of
the young and the old.
(1)-(4) dene the competitive equilibrium. We can now write the in-
tertemporal budget constraint (IBC) of the agent. The IBC suggests the
lifetime consumption of the agents equals their income.
cyt +
cot+1
Rt+1
= wt(1  ) + 
hbt+1
Rt+1
(14)
The Lagrangian and the rst order conditions can now be expressed as:
Max
fcyt ;cot+1g
: ` = ln cyt +
h ln cot+1  %[cot+1 Rt+1fwyt (1  )  cyt g+ hbt+1] (15)
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@`
@cyt
: %Rt+1c
y
t = 1 (16)
@`
@cot+1
: cot+1 = % (17)
where % represents the Lagrangian multiplier. Combining the two rst or-
der conditions leads us to the Euler equation, which is the optimal allocation
of consumption during the two life periods of the agents:
cot+1 = 
hRt+1c
y
t (18)
Based on the Euler equation, the optimal level of consumption and savings
of the agents can be expressed as:
cy;ht =

1
1 + h

wt(1  ) + 
hbt+1
Rt+1

(19)
co;ht+1 =

hRt+1
1 + h

wt(1  ) + 
hbt+1
Rt+1

(20)
sy;ht =

1
1 + h

hwt(1  )  
hbt+1
Rt+1

(21)
Eqns. (19)-(20) refer to the optimal level of consumption of the young and
old during the two periods of their lifetime. This is based on their income and
pensions transfers. If the agents have perfect foresight such that  =  = 1;
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then the agents consume half of their income in each period of their lifetime.
In the limit that  ! 0 and  = 1, most of the consumption takes place
in the rst period. One of the criticisms levelled against a PAYG pensions
system is that it can potentially crowd out (private) savings. This can be
seen in Eqn. (21) where savings is lower by the extent of the discounted
value of pensions. However, the fact that  relates to the myopia pertaining
to the expected level of pensions implies that if  < 1; the crowding out is
not complete.
Based on denition 2 of the competitive equilibrium and the other condi-
tion that capital is crucial for production in that f(0) = 0 (and lim
k!0
f 0(k) =
1), we discard Feldsteins notion about the entire population su¤ering from
complete myopia. Instead we assume that myopia is (at worst) partial such
that  > 0: This is important to ensure there is capital formation in the
economy from one period to the next.
Let us assume that the population consists of two types of agents which
can be classied according to the level of their myopia, low
 
l

or high
 
h

where 1 > l > h > 0: We assume the agents with a low myopia (life-
cyclers) make up a proportion  of the economy and the agents with a high
myopia (myopes) make up the remaining (1  ) : Capital in the economy is
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thus made up of the savings of the young born in the previous period. With
complete depreciation from one period to the next, capital formation can be
described by the following4:
(1 + )kt+1 = s
l
t + (1  )sht (22)
We can immediately infer that if all the agents have a low myopia ( = 1)
then, (1+)kt+1 = slt. On the other hand, if all the agents su¤er from a high
degree of myopia ( = 0), (1 + )kt+1 = sht : Since s
l
t > s
h
t , the two equations
imply that the capital stock available to an economy is higher the lower the
degree of myopia. Given the above considerations, the steady state capital
without pensions (k0) and with pensions (k1) can be described by:
k0 =

(1 )
(1+)
h
l
1+l

+

(1 )h
1+h
i 1
(1 )
k1 =

(1 )(1 )
(1+)

[(1+h)l+(1 )(1+l)h]
(1+l)(1+h)+(1 )[(1+h)l+(1 )(1+l)h]
 1
(1 )
We can nd that k0 depends on ; ;  and  whilst k1 depends on
two additional parameters  and . Let us simplify the analysis such that
l = h =  and l = h = : In that case the steady-state capital is given
as:
4This is part 2 of the denition of competitive equilibrium written in intensive form.
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k0 =

(1  )
(1 + ) (1 + )
 1
(1 )
(23)
k1 =

(1  )(1  )
(1 + ) [ (1 + ) + (1  )]
 1
(1 )
(24)
Proposition 1 (a) Capital is higher under FF than PAYG
(b) An increase in  (i.e, a reduction in myopia), increases k
(c) An increase in  (i.e., less myopia on expected pensions) reduces k
(d) An increase in  (i.e, higher PAYG pensions ) reduces k
(e) An increase in  (e.g, higher population growth rate) reduces k
Proof. The Proof is in Appendix 2.1.
2.4 Planners Problem
Given the competitive equilibrium, the planner chooses  to maximise the
"true" welfare function fcyt ; cot ; kt+1g1t=0 subject to the allocation fytg1t=0. All
agents are given an equal weight. We assume that the utility function remains
the same across generations. In steady state, the planners problem can thus
be expressed as maximising the welfare of the young and old, with varying
levels of myopia simultaneously. The welfare function can be written as:
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V = (1 + )

 ln(cy;l) + (1  ) ln(cy;h) (25)
+

 ln(co;l) + (1  ) ln(co;h)
The welfare function has two parts: the rst part refers to the young
whilst the second refers to the old. With population growth and labour-
augmenting technological growth, there are (1+ ) more young than elderly.
The welfare function also reects the element of heterogeneity in the form of
one group having a higher level of myopia than the other.
The current approach could be considered as another departure from
Feldstein. Whilst Feldstein simply considered the optimal level of social se-
curity, by not considering the full general equilibrium e¤ects and comparing
the results with the competitive equilibrium, his results could not suggest
whether it was optimal to have a social security scheme at all times. Indeed,
there might be circumstances, when it might be optimal to have no social
security benets. People are then responsible for the funding of their own
retirement. So, we now aim to nd out the optimal level of social security in
a general setting before considering specic conditions pertaining to myopia
and heterogeneity. For ease of notation, let us denote V0 as the welfare func-
tion under competitive equilibrium (without pensions) and V1 with PAYG
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pensions. The decision rule is straight forward:
 If V0 > V1 : It is optimal to have no old age pensions. The pensions
system is then FF;
 If V0 = V1 : Having or not having old age pensions does not matter;
 If V1 > V0 : Having old age pensions is optimal. The pensions system
is a PAYG scheme.
Case 1: l = h = ;l = h = 
The special case that all the agents have the same level of myopia elimi-
nates the heterogeneity in the model. This means that the welfare function
is simply the sum of the utility of the young and the old: V = (1+) ln(cy)+
ln(co)
V0 = (1 + ) ln

wt
1 + 

+ ln

Rtwt 1
1 + 

(26)
V1 = (1 + ) ln

1
1 + 

wt(1  ) + bt+1
Rt+1

+ ln

Rt
1 + 

wt 1(1  ) + bt
Rt

(27)
where bt = (1 + ) wt:
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We now consider a simplifying case to derive some analytical results. We
assume  = 0 such that people do not reduce their savings as a result of the
provision of pensions.
Case 1a:   0
If the agents do not reduce their savings as a result of pensions, then eqn.
(24) reduces to k01 =

(1 )(1 )
(1+)(1+)
 1
(1 )
: Hence, the young consume wt(1 )
1+
:
Whilst the elderly planned to consume Rtwt 1(1 )
1+
; they end up consuming
an extra bt in the form of pensions. The "real" function of the planner can
now be written as:
V 01 = (1 + ) ln

(wt(1  ))
1 + 

+ ln

Rt (wt 1(1  ))
1 + 
+ bt

(28)
where the rst part refers to the consumption of the young and the second
part to the consumption of the old including the pensions. We can now
proceed to nd the optimal level of tax by setting @V
0
1
@
= 0: Assuming
 = 0; this yields:
 =
[  ( (+ 1))]
 [1 + (1  2)] (29)
For the simplifying case, we can nd that the optimal level of tax is a
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function of  and . We nd that for  > 0 we require  >  (+ 1) : If the
level of myopia increases beyond a certain level such that  <  (+ 1) ; then
the feasible optimal level of social security is  = 0: Hence, at high levels of
myopia, it is optimal to have no PAYG pensions and the FF scheme prevails.
Proposition 2 The higher the myopia on pensions, the lower the optimal
PAYG.
This is conrmed by @
@
= (1+)
2[1+(1 2)] > 0 suggesting that as  falls, that
is myopia on pensions increases, the optimal tax rate falls. This suggests that
if there is minimum dissaving as a result of the provision of pensions, then
the consumption smoothing role of the PAYG is no longer as important. We
have to note that this result is being derived under a very strong assumption
whereby the PAYG system is causing minimal disruption to capital forma-
tion.
Case 1b: General  6= 0
One of the main criticisms that has been advanced against PAYG schemes
is that it acts as a disincentive to save. As such,  > 0 might be a more
sensible approach. We can then rewrite eqn. (27) as V 1 where:
37
V 1 = (2 + ) ln [+ (1  )] +
+ (1 + )
(1  ) ln(1  ) (30)
 

+ (1 + )
(1  )

ln [ (1 + ) + (1  )] + Z1
where Z1 is a set of parameters independent of the policy term. We nd
the optimal tax by setting @V

1
@
= 0 and this yields:
(2 + ) (1  )
[+ (1  )]  
+ (1 + )
(1  )

1
(1  ) +
(1  )
[ (1 + ) + (1  )]

= 0
(31)
Let us assume  = 0:25;  = 0 and  = 1 such that there is maximum
crowding out from the provision of pensions. If  = 0; that is the agents
are completely myopic, then  = 0:299. On the other hand, if the agents
are "life-cyclers" and  = 1; then  = 0:179: Thus, there is a need for a
lower tax rate if the agents are life-cyclers. This is in line with Feldstein who
suggests that complete myopia sets the upper bound on the optimal tax (and
benet) levels.
Impact of myopia on welfare Let us consider eqn. (26) for the FF
pensions system. For  = 0 :
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@V0
@
=

(3  1)
(1  )

 

(1 + )
(1  ) (1 + )

Hence, an increase in myopia results in a fall in welfare if @V0
@
< 0: This
requires

3 1
1+

<


1+

: This condition is satised for all  < 1
3
: Hereunder
we show the critical values of  that ensure an increase in myopia leads to a
fall in welfare.
 1 0:75 0:5 0:25 0
 < 3
5
5
9
1
2
3
7
1
3
Critical Value of  for increasing myopia to lower welfare
2.4.1 Optimal Pensions with Heterogeneity
In the previous section, we have assumed that all individuals have the same
discount factor. We now consider a situation of "total" heterogeneity, that is,
where the agents vary in terms of their myopia
 
l > h

and the anticipated
level of pensions
 
l 6= h 6= 0 : The welfare function, V , can be expressed
as hereunder with  reecting the heterogeneity in terms of the proportion
of myopes:
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V = (1 + )

 ln(cy;l) + (1  ) ln(cy;h) (32)
+

 ln(co;l) + (1  ) ln(co;h)
The steady-state capital follows from eqn. (24) and can be expressed as
k1 =

a(1 )
b+c
 1
(1 )
. To nd the optimal tax rate, we set @V
@
= 0 and this
results in:
@V
@
= (2 + )
"


c+ al (1 + )

[ (b+ c) + al (1 + ) ]
+
(1  ) c+ ah (1 + )
[ (b+ c) + ah (1 + ) ]
#
+
(3 + )  (5 + 2)
(1  )

1
(1  ) +
c
(b+ c)

= 0 (33)
where a; b and c are non-policy parameters5: Given the nature of eqn.
(33), we have recourse to simulations to nd the optimal tax rate under a
general setting. This is done in the next section.
5a = (1  )
h


1 + h

l + (1  )

1 + l

h
i
b = 

1 + l

1 + h

(1 + )
c = (1  )(1 + )
h


1 + h

l + (1  )

1 + l

h
i
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2.4.2 Simulations Results and Sensitivity Analysis
Since within a general equilibrium framework the model loses analytical
tractability fairly quickly, we resort to simulations to consider the various
implications of myopia for the provision of social security. It might be appro-
priate to highlight at the outset that we would like to consider the simulation
results more in terms of giving an indication of the various e¤ects of the ex-
istence of social security on some of the key macro economic aggregates of
interest. As such, it would be more appropriate to consider the results as
giving an indication of the direction in which the variables are moving, rather
than the exact magnitude thereof.
The main parameters of interest are h; which determines the level of
myopia in the economy; h, which determines the response of savings to the
provision of old age pensions; and ; which determines the proportions of
agents with "perfect foresight" and "myopic" agents in the economy. We
consider two situations, one with pensions and another without pensions.
The one with pensions will be a PAYG scheme, whereas without pensions,
there would be a FF scheme in place. We are thus able to compare which of
the two schemes yields the highest welfare.
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Parameter values The main value for the purpose of these simulation is
; which we set to 0.35. This is in line with the range of parameter values
for the share of capital in output-and is driven mainly by the consideration
to avoid a situation of dynamic ine¢ ciency for the case when all the agents
have foresight. The latter yields the lowest interest rate and with values of
 < 0:35 could potentially be dynamically ine¢ cient such that r < : We
assume the population growth rate to be 1% whilst the rate of technological
progress is set at 2:5%: Hence,  = 3:53%:
Simulation Set 1
 
Baseline : l = 1;h ! 0; = 1 : We initially set all
agents to have perfect foresight and then allow one proportion to su¤er from
myopia. We allow for the degree of myopia to increase. We intially set the
proportion of myopes to  = 0:25 but also compare with values of  = 0:5
and 0:75, i.e., allowing a greater proportion of life-cyclers in the economy. In
the rst set of results, we assume that all agents reduce their savings by the
full amount of the pensions. We compare the results from the PAYG scheme
with the FF scheme to consider which one yields the highest welfare.
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Figure 1: Impact of Increasing Myopia (Sim 1)
Impact on capital and interest rate: The preliminary results in so
far as capital is concerned still hold. For any level of myopia, steady-state
capital is higher under the FF scheme than the PAYG scheme. The higher
the proportion of myopes in the economy, the lower the capital and hence
the higher the interest rate. When the agents have perfect foresight, the
level of capital is the same. However, as myopia sets in, as the proportion
of myopes increase, there is a wedge between the various capital levels that
widens. The result can thus be summed up as follows: the higher the myopia
and the proportion of myopes, the lower the capital.
Impact on tax rate and Welfare: With perfect foresight, the tax
rate is around 30 percent. As the proportion of myopes increases, the tax rate
increases as expected; however the increase is relatively small. For instance,
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when 25 percent of the agents su¤er from a high level of myopia whereby they
allocate only a 5 percent weight to the future, the tax rate is around 31.6
percent. Allowing the proportion of myopes to increase to 50 percent and
75 percent leads to increase in the tax rate to around 33.3 and 34.8 percent,
respectively. This is consistent with Feldstein who suggests that myopia sets
the upper-bound for the tax rate.
Welfare is unambiguously higher at all levels under the FF scheme than
under the PAYG scheme. As myopia increases and the proportion of myopes
increases, welfare falls. This can be rationalised on account of several factors:
rstly, the adverse impact of myopia on capital stock which results in lower
output and wages (hence consumption) and higher interest rates. On the
other hand, for the PAYG scheme, over and above myopia,  = 1 leads to a
full reduction in savings and hence a lower capital stock. Moreover, the tax
rate increase as well. All these combine to yield a lower welfare.
Simulation Set 2
 
l = 1;h ! 0; = 0:5 : We now consider a situation
whereby the agents do not reduce their savings by the full amount of the
pensions. One of the key arguments against PAYG pensions schemes is that
it a¤ects capital formation adversely and as a result inhibits growth. In this
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model, we can control for this distortion through the parameter : Instead,
we assume that  = 0:5, such that they reduce their savings by only half the
level of pensions. The experiment is thus similar to experiment 1 except for
 = 0:5.
Impact on capital and interest rate: The rst nding suggests that
none of the values under the FF scheme change compared to the baseline.
This can be rationalised on the account that the  parameter only relates to
the distortion to savings resulting from pensions. Since this parameter does
not a¤ect the FF scheme, the values for the FF scheme do not change.
As in the baseline, the capital stock is lower under the PAYG system as
opposed to the FF scheme resulting in lower output and wages and higher
interest rates. However, the resulting fall in capital stock is now only mar-
ginally lower compared to the FF scheme and as a result compared to the
baseline PAYG, output and wages are higher and the interest rate is lower.
The same dynamics as previously apply in that as the level of myopia and
the proportion of myopes increase, capital falls.
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Figure 2: Impact of Increasing Myopia (inc. pensions) (Sim 2)
Impact on tax rate and welfare: The tax rate falls considerably.
For the case when all the agents have perfect foresight, the tax rate stands
at around 3.09 percent only. As the proportion of myopes increases and
the level of myopia increases, the tax rate increases. When 25 percent of
the agents su¤er from near full myopia, the tax rate is around 5.6 percent.
When 75 percent su¤er from the same level, the tax rate is around 11 percent.
Hence, we nd that when the tax rate is lower when individuals save a higher
proportion of their income when working - and the result is consistent with
consumption smoothing in the sense that if the agents are already saving,
then the importance of pensions falls. The results remain consistent with
Feldstein in that the higher the level of myopia, the higher the tax rate.
Welfare is unchanged under the FF scheme but is still higher than the
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PAYG scheme. Compared to the baseline, welfare under the PAYG is now
higher at all levels. The same ndings hold in that as the level of myopia
and the proportion of myopes increase, welfare falls.
Simulation Set 3
 
l = 1; l = 1;h = h ! 0; = 0:5 : We now con-
sider a case where the agents with perfect foresight make their decisions
incorporating the full amount of their pensions (hence reducing their savings
by an equal amount). On the other hand, the proportion of myopes reduce
their savings by the same extent as their myopia. Hence, as their myopia
increases, they expect a lower level of pensions and dissave less. We assume
that half of the agents are myopes and the other half are lifecyclers ( = 0:5).
Impact on capital and interest rate: There are two key results that
emerge in so far as capital is concerned. Though FF capital remains higher
than the PAYG, we note that the FF capital falls as the level of myopia
increases thereby resulting in an increase in the interest rate. However, under
the PAYG scheme, capital remains more or less constant. This suggests that
the fall in  results in a lower reduction in savings as a result of the provision
of pensions and as such capital does not fall, as in the baseline case. We note
that the capital under the FF and PAYG schemes are almost the same when
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Figure 3: Myopia on both counts (Sim 3)
h = h = 0:0643: This is due to the fact that for h = h = 0:0643; the
optimal tax rate is zero. Hence, k0 = k1:
Impact on tax rate and welfare: The tax rate falls gradually as the
level of myopia increases. When all the agents have perfect foresight, the
tax rate is around 30 percent. However as myopia sets in, the tax rate falls
such that for h = h = 0:0643; the tax rate is zero. Beyond this level a FF
scheme is optimal since the feasible optimal tax rate is zero. We also note
that in the above simulations, there is a fall in welfare as myopia increases
but there is a convergence in welfare under FF and PAYG such that for
h = h = 0:0643 the welfare under the two schemes are the same. But this
is to be expected since the tax rate at this level is zero.
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Figure 4: Myopia on Pensions by both Agents (Sim 4)
Simulation Set 4
 
l = 1; l = h ! 0;h ! 0; = 0:5 : We now con-
sider the case where the agents with perfect foresight face a level of myopia
as regard to pensions which is similar to that faced by the myopes. As a
result, they do not reduce their savings by the full amount of the pensions.
Impact on capital stock,output, wages and interest rate Capital
under the PAYG scheme is now higher than in the baseline. We note a
convergence in capital such that FF capital falls as myopia increases whilst
it increases in the case of PAYG since as  falls, the dissaving from pensions
falls as well. This explains the convergence in the interest rates as well.
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Impact on tax rate and welfare The tax rate falls rather sharply
such that beyond  = h = 0:46; the optimal tax is zero. There is also a
convergence in welfare but FF dominates. Whilst welfare falls in the FF case
as myopia increases, it increases in the case of PAYG. In part this is due
to the increasing capital (and falling tax rate). Welfare is the same around
 = h = 0:46 but at this level, the tax rate is nearly zero.
2.5 Conclusions
With the decline in the fertility rates combined with an increase in longevity,
the long term sustainability of the PAYG system has come under threat.
Indeed, various countries have undertaken a reform of their pensions system
or are considering ways to deal with an ageing population. In this paper we
have extended the ndings of Feldstein whereby the full general equilibrium
e¤ects of the PAYG pensions are captured. We depart from Feldstein in two
key ways: rstly, we allow for capital formation and the distortionary cost
of capital formation on it and secondly we also compare our ndings with
a FF scheme. Thus, we are able to see which of the FF or PAYG yields a
higher welfare. Our main results in so far as the PAYG is concerned remain
consistent with Feldstein. We nd that the PAYG leads to a reduction in
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capital and that the higher the myopia, the higher the tax rate. However, if
the myopia also a¤ects the agents ability to anticipate the exact amount of
pensions he receives, then the crowding out with the PAYG is not complete.
In such cases, the less the crowding out, the lower the tax rate. We also
nd that there is a range of parameters for which it is not optimal to have a
social security system in place for consumption smoothing. Under such cir-
cumstances, a FF system will operate whereby all the agents are responsible
for the provision of their own pensions. Consistent with Aaron (1966), we
also nd that in a dynamically e¢ cient economy, a FF system yields a higher
welfare than a PAYG.
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Appendix 2.1
Proof for proposition 1
(1a): The condition for k0 > k1 [Eqn: (23)  (24)] reduces to:
 (1 + ) + (1  ) > 0:
This is always satised.
(1b): @k0
@
= 1
(1 )
h
(1 )
(1+)(1+)2
i 
(1 )
> 0
(1c): @k1
@
= 1
(1 )
h
 (1 )2(1 )
(1+)[(1+)+(1 )]2
i 
(1 )
< 0
(1d): @k1
@
= 1
(1 )
h
 (1 )(1 )[(1+)+(1 )]
(1+)[(1+)+(1 )]2
i 
(1 )
< 0
(1e): @k1
@
= 1
(1 )
h
 (1 )(1 )[(1+)+(1 )]
(1+)[(1+)+(1 )]2
i 
(1 )
< 0
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3 PENSIONSOR INCOME SUPPORT:WHICH
IS THEOPTIMALREDISTRIBUTION IN-
STRUMENT?
3.1 Introduction
The role of governments in economies has been widely debated by the various
schools of thought. However, there is some agreement that there are some
basic functions that a government needs to undertake to ensure a smooth
running of an economy. Whilst the need to address pervasive market failures
in terms of externalities and ine¢ ciencies are among the most important,
redistribution has also been at the fore of the policy debate. The need for
redistribution can be traced back at least to Adam Smith (1776) who sug-
gested, in The Wealth of Nations, "No society can surely be ourishing and
happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable".
In this paper we consider what is the optimal way to redistribute from
high productivity individuals (the rich) to low productivity individuals (the
poor). We aim to investigate whether redistribution should be in the form of
income support, that is given to people when they are young or in the form
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of a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions. Although the term PAYG is used, in a
somewhat general sense, the pensions system is in fact "means tested" where
only the poor receive pensions. Pensions thus provide some form of social
insurance and help alleviate poverty and/or reduce inequality.
To answer the questions posed, we develop a two-period overlapping gen-
erations (OLG) general equilibrium model for a steady state economy with
endogenous capital formation to take account of some of the distortionary
elements of redistribution. Following Galor (1992), the steady state can be
considered as the representative framework within which innitely many gen-
erations evolve. Our model also provides for a richer analytical framework,
in that we do not restrict our work to the existence of an optimal level of
transfer in a PAYG system, but also consider the instances where a fully
funded system yields a higher level of welfare. Crucial to our redistribution
argument is an element of heterogeneity in the form of productivity of the
poor relative to the rich. In this setting, the rich fund for their own pensions
and they pay a constant proportion of their wages to the planner in the form
of taxes. The planner is then faced with the problem of deciding how best
to allocate a non-negative transfer to the poor. We assume this can take
the form of either income support or alternatively a pay-as-you-go (PAYG)
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pensions scheme6. By denition, if the means of redistribution is taken to be
income support, then the poor have to save for their own retirement and the
system would be fully funded (FF). On the other hand, if the redistribution
is done through pensions, then the system would be a hybrid with the pen-
sions of the rich operating under a FF scheme whilst that of the poor would
be under a PAYG scheme. Our paper thus brings together two approaches
that have usually been considered on an individual basis.
We are able to derive some key analytical results. These can be sum-
marised as:
1. Redistribution imposes costs on the economy in terms of capital for-
mation. Consistent with Feldstein (1974), a PAYG system leads to a
lower capital stock. This is because the beneciaries (the poor) reduce
their savings in anticipation of pensions whilst the rich have a lower
level of savings because of a lower disposable income;
2. Capital is always higher under a FF system than the PAYG. Moreover,
6Though we only consider the transfer in either one form or another, it is also possible
for the planner to provide the income to the poor during the two periods of their lives. A
poor agent would thus receive income support when young and pensions when old. This
is considered in Chapter 4.
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if all the agents have the same discount factor, then intragenerational
redistribution does not a¤ect capital formation. On the other hand,
intragenerational redistribution can adversely a¤ect capital formation
when the poor discount the future more than the rich;
3. An increase in the proportion of the rich and/or productivity reduces
the tax rate for intragenerational transfers;
4. The utility of the rich falls as the tax rate rises whilst that of the poor
increases;
5. An increase in the proportion of the rich and/or productivity increases
welfare unambiguously;
6. An increase in the population growth rate reduces welfare through a
decrease in capital.
Given the nature of the OLG model, we lose analytical tractability be-
yond a certain point and have recourse to simulations to show some of the
general equilibrium e¤ects. The parameter values are in line with the macro-
economic literature and are chosen to yield a dynamically e¢ cient economy
in the baseline case. There are parameter ranges for which it is optimal to
have no redistribution through pensions. The results also show that for some
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parameters the economy can become dynamically ine¢ cient (r < n). When
this is the case, there has been an overaccumulation of capital and the pre-
vailing interest rate is less than the population growth rate. According to
Samuelson (1975), welfare can be increased by reducing capital in such in-
stances. As such, a PAYG scheme can be used to reduce capital and restore
dynamic e¢ ciency.
Some of the simulation results can be summarised as follows:
1. Although redistribution introduces some elements of distortion in the
economy, we nd that intragenerational transfers always leads to an
increase in welfare compared to the initial situation without redistrib-
ution. This can be rationalised on account of the fact that the welfare
gains of the poor at least exceeds the welfare loss of the rich;
2. Though transfers through pensions are also welfare enhancing, there
exists a set of parameters for which it is optimal to have no redistrib-
ution through pensions;
3. The Aaron (1966) condition holds in the case of dynamic ine¢ ciency
(r < n) : If the economy is dynamically e¢ cient, redistributing through
pensions yields higher welfare;
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4. When the economy is dynamically e¢ cient (r > n) ; income support
prevails. However, as the economy approaches dynamic ine¢ ciency,
there is a small range when with r ' n for which it is optimal to
redistribute through pensions. We suggest the PAYG pensions ensures
the economy remains dynamically e¢ cient;
5. Intragenerational transfers are optimal when an economy is charac-
terised by a small proportion of rich and the poor have a low produc-
tivity since such an economy will be dynamically e¢ cient. Otherwise,
in an economy where there is no wide di¤erences in the proportion of
rich and the productivity of the poor, a PAYG might deliver a higher
level of aggregate welfare since such an economy can potentially be
dynamically ine¢ cient.
This paper can be related to two strands of the literature, namely: pen-
sions and ageing, and inequality. With the ageing of the population of most
countries across the world and the associated implications for the sustainabil-
ity of PAYG pensions schemes, there have been calls (World Bank, 1994; Gill
et al., 2004) to review the way pensions are provided. The current work can
be considered as an extension to analyse the implications of putting in place
a targeted approach to the provision of pensions. Thus, only the poor receive
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pensions. Our work could also be seen as a departure from the consumption
smoothing role of pensions, as in Feldstein (1985), or cases where pensions is
motivated by altruism (Hansson and Stuart, 1989) or that of risk-sharing as
prescribed by Shiller (1999), Conesa and Krueger (1999) and Bohn (1999).
We consider pensions as social insurance.
There is a wide array of literature that has focused, directly or indirectly,
on inequality and the various channels through which it a¤ects growth and
welfare since Kuznets (1955). Since economies are seldom homogeneous, with
agents di¤ering across skills and asset endowments to highlight but two, there
is a growing belief that redistribution can have major politico-economic ram-
ications and implications for policy. Redistribution is often considered as
one of the routes through which social justice and e¢ ciency can be promoted
by reducing inequality and supporting those at the lower end of the economy.
Besides the philanthropic arguments, there have been growing concerns that
inequality can be harmful for growth and too skewed a distribution of assets
and income can have damaging consequences (Persson and Tabellini (1994);
Alesina and Rodrik (1994); Alesina and Perrotti (1996)). Intragenerational
transfer is the instrument par excellence to bridge the gap between the rich
and the poor but there is a limited number of papers that deal explicitly
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with how intergenerational transfers can be used to reduce inequality. Have-
man (1988) argues that intragenerational inequality reducing transfer works
best since it increases the opportunities of the young poor. Krueger and
Kubler (2006) look at intergenerational transfers but more from the perspec-
tive where markets are missing.
The current work can be seen as an extension to a recent paper by Conde-
Ruiz and Galasso (2005) who consider the various aspects of intra and in-
tergenerational redistribution. They nd that with su¢ cient inequality in
earnings and elderly in the economy, there is an equilibrium that supports
the existence of both intra and intergenerational redistribution. We consider
the macroeconomic implications of redistribution where pensions aims to
achieve some form of social insurance. Most of the papers that have consid-
ered inter and intra generational redistribution simultaneously have done so
from a political economy perspective whereby agents with di¤ering abilities
get to vote on the level of taxes and benets (Galasso and Profetta, 2002).
As is often the case with those models, the relative positioning of the me-
dian voter, or the skewness of the distribution of income, is one of the key
drivers of the results (example, Galasso and Profetta, 2004, 2007). Razin et
al. (2002) consider how the optimal level of tax and social transfers vary with
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changes in the dependency ratio when people have the option of acquiring
education - at a cost. Their theoretical nding is ambiguous because of the
conict arising out of ageing between the young voter, who wants to have
lower taxes, and the median voter who is more likely to be poor (based on
the mechanics of the model), who will want a higher level of redistribution.
Hence, the ambiguity. However, their empirical work suggests the rst e¤ect
dominates the second and ageing leads to a reduction in the welfare state.
Bossi (2007) investigates the political economy considerations of which form
of social security is adopted in an economy where one generation is faced
with the risk associated with a nancial asset such as a downturn in the
stock market. His ndings suggest the existence of such risks is one of the
major explanations for the political prevalence of PAYG systems.
The rest of this paper is as follows: in Section 2 we describe the set up
of the economy. Section 3 derives the competitive equilibrium whilst Section
4 considers the planners problem in terms of nding the optimal level and
timing of transfer. Section 5 tests the model to a sample of countries. Section
6 concludes and provides some potential extensions.
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3.2 The Economy
Economic activity takes place over innite discrete time t 2 f0; 1:::;1g with-
out uncertainty. The economy consists of two types of utility maximising
agents h(r; p), prot maximising rms and a welfare maximising social plan-
ner. At each time t, two factors, an amount of capital; k; and labour; l; are
available as inputs to production and a homogeneous good is produced.
3.2.1 Agents
At t, two generations live simultaneously - one generation is young and the
other is old. Population grows at a constant rate n and therefore, at any
time t, there are (1 + n) more (young) workers than (old) retirees. The pop-
ulation at t can thus be expressed as: Lt + Lt 1 = (2 + n)Lt: Lt refers to
the agents born at t. Following Samuelson (1958), the composition of the
population is considered to be stationary. Therefore, the proportions and
types of individuals remain the same across generations.
Each young agent is endowed with one unit of labour which he provides
inelastically. The labour endowment in the second period of life is zero.
Agents di¤er according to their productivity  2 (0; 1], which in turn deter-
mines the wage they receive. There are high productivity agents (the rich,
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r) and low productivity agents (the poor, p). To simplify the argument, the
productivity of the rich (r) is normalised to 1 and hence any agent with  < 1
is considered as poor (p). We assume that the rich make up a proportion 
of the economy and hence the poor make up for the remaining (1  ) :
Agents derive utility solely out of consumption and they are non-altruistic.
They are thus born without assets and do not leave bequests. At time t the
young agent chooses his level of consumption and savings to maximise utility
whilst the old agent lives o¤ his savings (and any transfer).
The inter-temporal optimisation problem can be expressed as maximising
uh(cht ; c
h
t+1) subject to the budget constraints which vary according to the in-
dividuals type and mode of transfer in operation. For ease of manipulation,
the intertemporal utility function is taken to be additive and log-linear. The
utility function is thus strictly concave, since more consumption is preferred
to less, and twice di¤erentiable: u0(c) > 0 and u00(c) < 0. The function also
satises lim
c!0
u0(c) =1 such that subject to its disposable income, the house-
hold will always choose a positive level of consumption when maximising
life-cycle utility. The rich agents problem can be expressed as:
Max
fcyt ;cot+1;stg
: U r = ln cy;rt +  ln c
o;r
t+1 (1)
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subject to:
cy;rt = wt(1  )  sy;rt (2)
co;rt+1 = Rt+1s
y;r
t (3)
Let us consider in the rst case, the transfer from the young rich to the
young poor. The poor agents problem will thus be of the following form:
Max
fcyt ;cot+1;stg
: Up = ln cy;pt +  ln c
o;p
t+1 (4)
The maximisation problem of the two agents are broadly similar, in that
they maximise consumption over both periods of their lifetime; except for
the subjective discount factor,    2 (0; 1): The disparity in the discount
factor can be rationalised along the lines of Becker (1990) who suggests that
the poor tend to discount the future at a higher rate. Over and above
the disparity in productivity, with both agents providing one unit of labour
inelastically, the budget constraints also di¤er in that the rich are taxed a
constant proportion  2 (0; 1) out of their income and this is redistributed to
the poor. Disposable income is then allocated à la Diamond (1965) between
present consumption and savings. R  (1 + r) is the gross rate of return on
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savings: Irrespective of the transfer mode, the rich consume only their savings
in retirement. In turn, the budget constraints of the poor will depend on the
mode of transfer in operation. With redistribution in the rst period, their
consumption is as follows:
cy;pt =  wt + bt   sy;pt (5)
co;pt+1 = Rt+1s
y;p
t (6)
bt represents the intragenerational redistribution from the rich to the poor.
We will refer to bt as income support. We nd that under this scheme, the
poor also have only their savings to rely on when old. The pensions system
in this set up thus approximates to a fully-funded scheme where everyone is
responsible for the provision of their own consumption in retirement through
their savings. On the other hand, if the redistribution takes place in the
second period of the lifetime, the consumption of the poor will be:
cy;pt =  wt   sy;pt (7)
co;pt+1 = Rt+1s
y;p
t + pt+1 (8)
pt+1 represents the intergenerational redistribution from the young rich
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to the old poor. We will refer to pt+1 as pensions. With intergenerational
redistribution, a hybrid pensions system arises in that the rich fund for their
own retirement but the poor have an additional source of income in the form
of pensions.
3.2.2 Firms
A large number of identical rms produce a homogeneous good using an
identical economy-wide Cobb Douglas production function. The production
function can be represented as Y = KL1 ; where  is the share of capital
in production.
In intensive form, the production function reduces to: y = k. Firms max-
imise prot by taking factor prices, which are paid their marginal products in
a competitive setting, as given. It is assumed that the labour market clears
such that labour demand equals labour supply and the wages received by a
worker depends on his level of productivity. The economy is endowed with
an initial capital stock K0 > 0 and capital depreciates fully from one period
to the next. We assume no technological change. The production function
satises the usual conditions such that f(0) = 0, f 0(k) > 0, f 00(k) < 0 and
the Inada conditions: lim
k!0
f 0(k) =1 and lim
k!1
f 0(k) = 0.
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3.2.3 Social Planner
The social planner is assumed to be a benevolent welfare maximiser. Its
role is limited to that of raising taxes from the currently active rich and
transferring it to the poor, young or old, depending on which mode yields
the highest welfare level. The total taxes (T ) raised can be represented
as a proportion of wages as follows: Tt = Ltwt: If this is redistributed
to the young (poor), the total benets (B) they receive is: Bt = Ltwt:
If the transfer is done as a PAYG pensions scheme, the poor thus receive:
Pt = Lt 1wt: With a stationary population and commitment device, a
poor agent is thus faced with receiving either of the following benet levels:
FF : bt =
 1wt
(1  ) (9)
PAYG : pt+1 =
(1 + n) 2wt+1
(1  ) (10)
Since the redistribution a¤ects the capital accumulation process, we can
safely assume that the wages will di¤er in both settings and the optimal
level of tax rate will also be di¤erent. Hence we can also infer that the
level of benets, either b or p, would be di¤erent under both settings. Some
comparative statics reveal that @b=@ =  1wt=(1   )2 > 0 suggesting that
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as , the proportion of rich increases, the level of benets b increase as well.
For the PAYG system, @p=@ = (1 + n)  2wt+1=(1   )2 > 0; @b=@n =
 2wt+1=(1 ) > 0, implying that ceteris paribus as the population growth
rate increases, the generosity of the pensions scheme increases as well.
3.3 Competitive Equilibrium
Given the householdsand the rmsobjectives, a competitive equilibrium
for the economy can be dened as a sequence of consumption fcyt ; cotg1t=0
such that:
1. A given a sequence of taxes and transfers, fwt; bt=pt+1g1t=0 , and the
prevailing competitive wages, wt, and interest rate, Rt, solves the indi-
viduals optimisation problem subject to satisfying the Euler equation;
2. Factors of production are paid their marginal products. Hence, wt =
(1   )kt and Rt = k 1t . Labour and capital markets clear, hence
LDt = Lt and St = Kt+1;
3. Irrespective of the mode of transfer, the planners budget is always
balanced. Hence taxes raised are redistributed as benets in the same
period Tt = Bt;
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4. The economys resource constraint is always satised. In intensive form,
the constraint suggests that output at any time is allocated between
consumption and capital formation. Consumption consists of that of
the young and the old; rich and poor.
yt = c
y
t +
cot
(1 + n)
+ (1 + n)kt+1 (11)
Given the above denition of competitive equilibrium, the agent has to
choose his level of consumption and savings subject to the budget constraint
to maximise utility. The intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) suggests the
present value of lifetime consumption equals lifetime disposable income. The
IBC of the rich can be expressed as:
cy;rt +
co;rt+1
Rt+1
= wt(1  ) (12)
The IBC of the poor will vary with the mode of transfer - with income
support, there is no discounting, whilst any pensions received as an elderly
will be discounted. The IBCs under the two settings can thus be written as:
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FF: cy;pt +
co;pt+1
Rt+1
=  wt + bt (13)
PAYG: cyt +
cot+1
Rt+1
=  wt +
pt+1
Rt+1
(14)
Given the intertemporal budget constraint, we can solve for the competi-
tive equilibrium for the poor when the transfer takes place in the rst period.
The Lagrangian and the rst order conditions are:
Max
fcyt ;cot+1g
: ` = ln cy;pt +  ln c
o;p
t+1   [co;pt+1  Rt+1fwy;pt + bt   cy;pt g] (15)
@`
@cyt
: Rt+1c
y
t = 1 (16)
@`
@cot+1
: cot+1 =  (17)
where  represents the Lagrangian multiplier. Combining the two rst
order conditions yields the Euler equation, which is the optimal allocation of
consumption during the two periods of the agents lifetime:
cot+1 = Rt+1c
y
t (18)
Using the Euler equation, the optimal consumption and savings of a poor
utility maximising agent who receives income support can be described as:
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cy;pt =

1
1 + 
[ wt + bt]

(19)
co;pt+1 =

Rt+1
1 + 
[ wt + bt]

(20)
sy;pt =


1 + 
[ wt + bt]

(21)
Using the same approach, the optimal level of consumption and savings
of the poor who receive a transfer in the second period of their life in the
form of pensions can be expressed as:
cy;pt =

1
1 + 

 wt +
pt+1
Rt+1

(22)
co;pt+1 =

Rt+1
1 + 

 wt +
pt+1
Rt+1

(23)
sy;pt =

1
1 + 

 wt   pt+1
Rt+1

(24)
The main di¤erence between the two modes of transfer for the poor is
the fact that pensions cause savings to be lower - potentially crowding out
capital. We rst consider the optimal level of consumption and savings of the
rich - which can be expressed in a similar manner under both settings since
the rich only pay out taxes and receive no benets. However, the fundamental
di¤erence will arise when the tax rates  1 and  2 are di¤erent under the two
settings.
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cy;rt =

1
1 + 
[wt(1  )]

(25)
co;rt+1 =

Rt+1
1 + 
[wt(1  )]

(26)
sy;rt =


1 + 
[wt(1  )]

(27)
It can be seen that if the agents do not discount the future, that is,
 =  = 1, then the agents consume exactly half of their income and save
the remaining half. Conversely, if  =   0, then most of the consumption
takes place during the rst period of lifetime.
Having derived the optimal levels of consumption and savings, it is now
possible to consider capital formation. For comparative purposes, the steady-
state capital under three settings are derived: without redistribution (k0);
with redistribution in rst period (k1) and second period (k2) respectively.
In all three cases, with complete depreciation of capital from one period to
the next, the capital formation process follows:
(1 + n)kt+1 = s
y;r
t + (1  )sy;pt (28)
implying that the capital available per worker in the current period is
the savings of the rich and the poor carried over from the previous period.
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We thus nd that the proportions of rich and poor play an important role in
capital formation. The steady state capital in the three cases are:
k0 =

(1  )
(1 + n)


1 + 

+

(1  ) 
1 + 
 1
(1 )
(29)
k1 =

(1  )
(1 + n)

(1   1)
1 + 

+

 [(1  ) +  1]
1 + 
 1
(1 )
(30)
k2 =

(1  )
(1 + n)

(1 + )
(1 + )+  2(1  )
 
(1   2)
1 + 

+

(1  ) 
1 + 
 1
(1 )
(31)
k0 represents steady state capital without any redistribution. We can see
from eqns. (30) and (31) that k1 and k2 depend on the additional parameters
 1 and  2 respectively. To carry out some comparative statics we consider
the special case where all the agents have the same discount factor such that
 =  = : Then, the steady state capital can be simplied to:
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k0 =

(1  ) [ + (1  ) ]
(1 + n) (1 + )
 1
(1 )
(32)
k1 =

(1  ) [ + (1  ) ]
(1 + n) (1 + )
 1
(1 )
(33)
k2 =

(1  ) [(1   2) + (1  ) ]
(1 + n) [(1 + )+  2(1  )]
 1
(1 )
(34)
Proposition 3 (a) An increase in  increases k
(b) An increase in  increases k
(c) An increase in  increases k
(d) An increase in n reduces k
(e) When the agents have the same discount factor, intragenerational
redistribution does not a¤ect capital.
(f) Intergenerational redistribution always lowers capital formation.
Proof. The Proof is in Appendix 3.1.
Some of the basic results can be summarised as: @k0
@n
< 0 implying
that as the population growth rate increases, capital available per worker
falls; @k0
@
= @k1
@
> 0 suggest increases in the discount factors will lead to
increased savings and therefore increased capital formation ; @k0
@
> 0 imply
that as the proportion of rich increases, capital formation is higher; @k0
@ 
> 0
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suggests that an increase in the productivity of the poor leads to higher cap-
ital formation; @k1
@1
< 0 for  > ; @k2
@2
< 0 reect the distortionary costs of
redistribution.
Proposition 4 (a) Capital is higher under FF than PAYG
(b) For the same discount factor, k0 = k1 = k2 i¤  2 = 0:
Proof. The Proof is in Appendix 3.1.
These results are consistent with the critiques of a PAYG system who
suggest its existence reduces the capital stock (Feldstein, 1974, 1985).
3.4 The Planners Problem
Given the competitive equilibrium, the planners problem is to choose the
tax rate  so as to maximise fcyt ; cot ; kt+1g1t=0 subject to the allocation fytg1t=0.
The planner weighs the utility of all agents living in the economy and each
generation, born or unborn, is given a weight,  2 (0; 1); which is decreasing
in time. In the Benthamite tradition, we assume that the planner attaches
the same weight to all agents living at a given point in time. Assuming
the utility function remains the same across generations, the planners social
welfare function is thus:
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W =
1X
t=0
t
 
U
 
ch

(35)
To enable a clearer comparison between the two modes of transfers, the
analysis is carried out in steady state. This assumption enables us to avoid the
issue of having to include the rst generation of retirees (beneciaries) and
workers (taxpayers) when the intergenerational scheme is set up: Following
Feldstein (1985), unless the future is discounted at a very high rate, the
e¤ect of the initial period over the long term will be relatively unimportant.
Moreover, the steady state can reasonably be considered as the framework
within which most of the agents will operate in an innitely lived economy
(Galor, 1992).
Normalising the rst periods population to 1, the aim of the planner at
t can be considered as choosing a sequence of f ; b=pg1t=0 so as to maximise
welfare for all t > 0. The welfare function at t can thus be expressed as that
of maximising the welfare of all living generations, young and old, rich and
poor, simultaneously. Hence, Vt = C = Cy;h+Co;h: This can be summarised
in intensive form as:
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V =  [ln(cy;r) +  ln(co;r)] (36)
+(1  ) [ln(cy;p) +  ln(co;p)]
The rst part of the welfare function refers to the rich and their consump-
tion over their lifetime whilst the second part refers to the consumption of
the poor. Based on the optimal levels of consumption from the competitive
equilibrium and the equilibrium conditions for the transfers from the planner,
the welfare functions for the two modes of transfers can now be elaborated.
For comparative purposes, we also include the welfare function without re-
distribution. We refer to the welfare functions as V0; V1 and V2 and these are
shown in Appendix 3.1.
V0 represents welfare without redistribution whilst V1 and V2 represent
welfare with redistribution in periods 1 (intragenerational) and 2 (intergener-
ational) respectively. If redistribution increases welfare such that the V1  V0
and V2  V0, the decision criteria for the planner can be summarised as fol-
lows:
(i) V1   V2 > 0
If V1   V2 > 0, the transfer in the rst period yields the highest welfare
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for the economy and  1 is optimal. The system then approximates to a FF
system, where each individual is responsible for providing for his own income
in retirement.
(ii) V1 = V2
If V1   V2, then both modes of transfer generate the same welfare and
whether the redistribution takes place through  1 or  2 does not matter.
(iii) V2   V1 > 0
If V2   V1 > 0 then  2 is the optimal instrument to redistribute with.
The transfer promotes a kind of a hybrid system where the rich fund their
pensions under the FF scheme whilst the redistribution provides the poor
with an additional source of income in retirement.
Before proceeding to calculate the optimal level of tax and the implica-
tions for the mode of redistribution, the impact of three of the key exogenous
variables (;  ; n) for welfare are considered. For ease of manipulation, we
consider V0 and further assume that the agents have the same discount factor
: The welfare function can then be summed up as:
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V0 =

(1 + 2  )
(1  )

ln [ + (1  ) ] ln(1+n)+(1 ) (1 + ) ln +z (; ) 7
(37)
Proposition 5 (a) An increase in  increases welfare unambiguously.
(b) An increase in  increases welfare unambiguously.
(c) An increase in n reduces welfare unambiguously
Proof. The Proof is in Appendix 3.1.
The results suggest that welfare is higher in richer economies or economies
with relatively small di¤erences in the productivity of the rich and poor. An
increase in the population growth rate reduces capital per worker and as a
result leads to a reduction in welfare.
3.4.1 The Optimal Level of Redistribution
The optimal level of redistribution or transfer  from the rich to the poor can
be found by setting dV
d
= 0: Based on the resulting tax rates, we can then
infer which type of redistribution is optimal and what type of mechanism
will be put in place.
7z (; ) =  ln+
h
(1+)
(1 )
i
ln    (2 + ) ln (1 + ) +
h
1+
(1 )
i
ln(1  )
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The Golden Rule: Intragenerational Transfer The Golden Rule, where
the returns to capital, R = (1 + n), Samuelsons biological rate of inter-
est, is considered. Steady state capital is given by eqn.( 30). We replace
R1 = (1 + n) in the welfare function V1 and proceed to di¤erentiate it with
respect to  1. This results in:
@V1
@ 1
=
2664  (1+)(1 1) + (1 )(1+)[(1 ) +1]
+

[(1+)+(1 )(1+)]( )
(1 )[(1+)(1 1)+(1+)[(1 ) +1]]

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We can see from the second part that there is a component of @V1
@1
consist-
ing of (   ). Hence we can consider @V1
@1
= 0 when all agents have the same
discount factor. For  =  = , @V1
@1
=
h
 1
(1 1) +
(1 )
([(1 ) +1])
i
= 0. Hence
the optimal tax is:
 1 = (1  )(1   ) (38)
For  = ; the optimal level of transfer is simply a function of the relative
gap in productivity between the rich and the poor and the proportion of poor
in the economy.
Proposition 6 An increase in  or  leads to a lower tax rate
Proof. Follows from Eqn. (38)
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This implies that as the proportion of rich in the economy increases,
the optimal level of transfer from the rich to the poor falls - and this can be
rationalised to the extent that, if there are fewer poor people in the economy,
the contribution to be made by the rich for redistribution towards the poor
falls relatively. Similarly, if the productivity gap between the rich and the
poor falls, the optimal level of contribution by the rich declines. This can
again be explained by the fact that as the wedge between the rich and the
poor declines, the amount of funds needed to bridge the gap between the rich
and the poor narrows.
 1 2 (0; 1) is always satised8. One of the clear implications is that
the minimum rate of tax is achieved under conditions of near homogeneity.
If all the agents are classed as rich ( =  = 1), then the optimal level of
redistribution from young to rich is zero. Conversely, the lower the level of
 and  , the higher the tax rate. This suggests that in a highly unequal
economy with a small proportion of rich and where the poor have a lower
productivity, the rich will have to bear a high burden for redistribution.
8For 1 > 0;  < 1 and  < 1:For 1 < 1;  > 0 and  > 0: Since the above conditions
on  and  are always satised, it follows that 1 2 (0; 1):
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General Case: Intragenerational Transfer We now consider the gen-
eral case and proceed to nd the optimal level of redistribution between the
young rich and the poor. The steady state capital stock is dened as before
by eqn.( 30). The welfare function is shown in Appendix 3.1. The optimal
tax is derived as previously and this yields:
@V1
@ 1
=
2664  (1+)(1 1) + (1+)(1 )[(1 ) +1]
+
h
[(1+2 )+(1+2 )(1 )]( )
(1 )[(1+)+(1+)(1 ) +[ ]1]
i
3775 (39)
As for the Golden rule case, we can nd that there is a (   ) component
present in eqn. (39) : We therefore consider the case for  =  =  and this
yields the same result as for the Golden rule:
 1 = (1  )(1   ) (40)
Proposition 7 For intragenerational redistribution, the optimal tax rate is
the same for the Golden rule and the general case.
Proof. This can be seen by comparing eqns. (38) and (40) :
The Golden Rule: Intergenerational Transfer The case where the
transfer is from young to old is now considered for the golden rule. The
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general welfare function and the rst order condition are shown in Appendix
3.1. For the special case of  =  = ; @V2
@2
yields:
@V2
@ 2
=
0BB@  1(1 2) + (1 )[(1 ) +2] h

(1 )[(1 2)+(1 ) ] +

[(1+)+2(1 )]
i
1CCA (41)
Eqn. (41) does not allow for a signicant degree of analytical tractability
and we consider it again in the simulations section.
General Case: Intergenerational Transfer When redistribution takes
place via the pensions scheme for the general case, capital is dened by
eqn. (31). The welfare function is rather cumbersome and for  =  = ;
di¤erentiating V2 with respect to  2 yields:
@V2
@ 2
=
2664

 (1+)
(1 2)

 

[1+2 ]
(1 )[(1 ) +(1 2))]

 

[(1+)+((1+) 1)( 1)]
((1+)+(1 )2)

+

(1+)(1 )[(1 )((1+)(1 ) +(1 22))]
[((1 ) (1+))+(1 )[(1+)(1 ) 2+2(1 2))]]

3775
(42)
Given the nature of eqn. (42), there is no straightforward closed form
solution that is possible. Hence, we consider how  2 behaves as the parameter
values change in the simulations section.
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3.4.2 Impact of  on utility of rich and poor
Given the nature of the utility functions, it is quite intuitive that the utility
of rich (UR) is negative in taxes whilst that of the poor (UP ) is positive. For
ease of exposition, we will assume that the agents have the same discount
factor. With redistribution in the rst period, we can express the utility of
the two types of agents as:
UR1 = (1 + ) ln(1   1) + (1 + ) lnw1 +  lnR1 (43)
UP1 = ln

 +
 1
(1  )

w1

+  ln

 +
 1
(1  )

w1R1

(44)
Proposition 8 The utility of the rich falls as  rises whilst that of the poor
increases.
Proof. Since for  =  = , k1 is independent of  1; it follows that @UR1@1 < 0
and @UP1
@1
> 0:
3.4.3 Simulations Results and Sensitivity Analysis
Having considered the behaviour of the tax rate under some specic settings,
the optimal level and timing of redistribution is now considered in a general
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equilibrium framework encompassing capital, output, wages, interest rates,
consumption, the tax rate and welfare. The optimal timing of redistribution
will be based the decision criteria of the planner (as highlighted previously).
For a given set of parameters and tax rates, the welfare function with the
highest value determines in which of the two periods it is optimal to e¤ect
the transfer. Alternatively, there might be a set of parameters and tax rates
for which it is not possible to improve on the initial distribution, in which
case redistribution, in one form or another, is not optimal.
Choice of parameters The parameters are chosen to ensure the economy
is dynamically e¢ cient with an initial interest rate of 4 percent. The values
for the population growth rates and the discount factors are in line with
the range of values used for macro simulations (see de la Croix and Michel,
2002; Krueger and Kubler, 2006). In line with the demographic transitions
a¤ecting di¤erent regions of the world, there is a wide range of parameters
that could have been used ranging from 0 for Europe to 2.4 percent for Africa
with 1.3 percent for the world9 (United Nations, 1999). For the purpose of
the simulations we assume that population grows at a rate of 1 percent. The
share of capital in production is set at 0.3. The discount factor of the rich
9Data pertain to 1995-2000.
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() is 0.96, whilst that of the poor () is initially 0.96 and it is then lowered
to 0.9 for  > . In the baseline, we assume that the poor earn 75 percent
of that of the rich. The rich, ; make up 40 percent of the economy, with
the poor accounting for the remaining 60 percent. (n = 0:01; = 0:3;  =
0:96;  = 0:96=0:9;  = 0:75;  = 0:4)
Simulation Results For the baseline, two cases for the discount factors
are considered: Firstly, the discount factor of the poor () and rich () is set
to be the same at 0.96. In the second case,  (0:96) >  (0:9) is considered.
The baseline results are shown in Table 1.
The rst case of  =  is analysed for a general overview of the results. V0,
V1 and V2 are dened as previously. When redistribution takes place in the
rst period, for  = , it can be seen that the capital stock is not (adversely)
a¤ected relative to the initial distribution and as a result, the output, wage
and interest rate are the same. With intragenerational redistribution, the tax
rate is 15% - and this conrms the earlier result that for  = ; the optimal
level of transfer is dened by  1 = (1  ) (1   ). There is an increase in
aggregate welfare relative to the initial distribution. In this setting this takes
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    n
 =  0:3 0:96 0:96 0:4 0:75 0:01
k y w R UR UP  Welfare
V0 0.1694 0.5870 0.4109 1.0397 -3.0639 -3.6278 0 -3.4022
V1 0.1694 0.5870 0.4109 1.0397 -3.3824 -3.3824 0.1500 -3.3824
V2 0.1468 0.5623 0.3936 1.1495 -3.2713 -3.4599 0.1059 -3.3845
     n
 >  0:3 0:96 0:9 0:4 0:75 0:01
k y w R UR UP  Welfare
V0 0.1652 0.5826 0.4078 1.0581 -3.0618 -3.5142 0 -3.3332
V1 0.1647 0.5821 0.4075 1.0602 -3.3256 -3.3123 0.1260 -3.3176
V2 0.1464 0.5619 0.3934 1.1513 -3.2301 -3.3822 0.0870 -3.3214
Table 1: Baseline Simulations
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place through the following mechanism: (i) the utility of the rich falls; (ii)
the utility of the poor rises and; (iii) all the agents consume the same amount
after redistribution such that their utility is equalised.
When intergenerational redistribution takes place, the adverse impact of
the redistribution on the capital stock results in a lower output and wage
and higher interest rate. However, despite the distortion introduced in terms
of capital formation, intergenerational redistribution still represents an im-
provement over the initial distribution. The same mechanism operates as
regard consumption in that the rich consume less than the initial level whilst
the poor consume more. However, since the tax rate is now smaller, the
utility of the rich falls by a smaller amount whilst that of the poor rises by
a smaller amount as well.
Whilst both V1 and V2 represent an improvement over V0, it can be seen
the welfare is higher for V1 compared to V2; suggesting that for the given
set of parameters, intergenerational transfer is optimal. Each young agent
would then fund for his own retirement and there is no need for pensions as
a redistributive instrument in this set-up.
For  > ; the capital stock is now lower, compared to  = ; resulting in
lower output and wages whilst the interest rate goes up. Aggregate welfare
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is higher than that of the initial distribution. There is a decrease in the tax
rates compared to the case of  = . As for  =  welfare is unambiguously
higher with redistribution, with welfare higher for intragenerational redistri-
bution compared to intergenerational redistribution. For  >  the optimal
redistribution is thus still from young to young. One of the interesting as-
pects of the results is the fact that although  1is almost 112 times  2; the
welfare is still higher under intragenerational transfer implying that the wel-
fare costs in terms of capital formation are fairly high with intergenerational
transfer. The main results for the two cases for the given set of parameters
are summarised in Table 2.
The results in Table 2 are in line with the previous ndings that redistri-
bution leads to a lower capital stock when the discount factor of the rich, 
is greater than , the discount factor of the poor. As a result, k > k which
in turn yields y > y;w > w and R < R: Though not shown in Table 2,
with redistribution the consumption of the rich is always lower than without
redistribution, whilst that of the poor is always higher.
Having considered the results we now proceed to show the impact of a 1%
change in the exogenous parameters on the endogenous variables compared
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(i) (ii) (i) vs (ii)
 =   > 
k0 = k

1 > k

2 k0 > k1 > k2 k
 > k
y0 = y

1 > y

2 y0 > y1 > y2 y
 > y
w0 = w

1 > w

2 w0 > w1 > w2 w
 > w
R0 = R

1 < R

2 R0 < R1 < R2 R
 < R
 1 > 

2  1 >  2 
 < 
V 0 < V

2 < V

1 V0 < V2 < V1 V

0 < V0 < V

2< V2 < V

1 < V1
Table 2: Summary of Results for Selected Parameters
to the baseline. The results for  >  are summarised in Table 3.
Changes in the exogenous parameters for  =  and  >  are unambigu-
ous in so far as the impact on capital and consequently output, wages and
interest rate are concerned. However, the main di¤erence lies at the level of
taxes and welfare. For  = , the tax rate changes for young to young only
when the proportions of rich and the level of productivity of the poor change
since  = (1  ) (1   ). Changes in the other parameters do not a¤ect the
optimal level of tax from young to young.
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k y w R UR UP Tax
       +      
 + + +        
 + + +        
 + + +   + +  
 + + +   + +  
Table 3: Impact of a 1 percent change
Changes in  and n have a negative impact on capital. Changes in 
has an unambiguous negative impact on welfare for both types of transfer.
However, it has to be noted that the impact of n is innitesimal compared
to a change in .
For the baseline case for  > , capital is unambiguously and positively
related to any change in ; ;  and  . A 1% increase in  or  unambiguously
reduces welfare. This could possibly be due to the fact that at high levels of 
and , any increase in the parameters causes a higher decrease in the utility
from the reduced consumption than the gain from the increase in capital.
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The relationships between capital (hence, output and wages) and both 
and  are positive. An increase in  has a positive impact on welfare and
is consistent with the view that a homogeneous economy, in terms of having
more rich people, requires a lower level of transfer from the rich to the poor.
In the same vein, an increase in the proportion of rich people in the economy
leads to an increase in welfare. The same reasoning applies to  - an increase
in productivity leads to a reduction in the gap between the rich and the poor
and as a result a lower level of transfer is required whilst overall welfare is
higher.
Sensitivity Analysis
Changes in the discount factor: So far, consistent with Pigous "faulty
telescopic faculty", it has been assumed that agents su¤er from partial my-
opia in that they discount the future. Starting with the case where agents do
not discount the future, that is they have perfect foresight, a combination of
cases where agents discount the future at high rates are considered. Except
for  and , all the other parameters are taken to be the same as in the
previous experiments.
 =  = 1 : When none of the agents discount the future, this can be
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Figure 5: Tau for given pi and psi
summarised as  =  = 1. When the transfer is from young to young, the
general result  1 = (1  ) (1   ) still applies whilst if there is an intergen-
erational transfer, the optimal level of tax is lower. This also results in a
higher level of capital. Compared to the initial baseline, aggregate welfare is
lower in all three cases. Figure 5 shows all the possible intragenerational tax
rates for  1 = (1  ) (1   ) :
 = 1; ! 0 : Assuming that the rich do not discount the future, we
initially begin with a similar discount factor for the poor. We then proceed
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by allowing the poor to discount the future at a higher rate. We nd that
as the wedge increases marginally, this leads to an increase in the level of
welfare under all settings. The fact that welfare increases initially as the
poor discount the future at a higher level can be attributed to the fact that
the initial increase in consumption boosts welfare by a higher level than the
fall in capital. However, as the wedge widens, the associated costs in terms
of lower capital and higher taxes dominate. The impact of the wedge on
welfare is summarised in Figure 6.
It can be noticed that when both  and  are close to 1, the optimal
redistribution scheme is intergenerational, albeit V2 is marginally greater
than V1. This result is not consistent with the Aaron condition in that when
 =  = 1, the interest rate for R1 = 1:0185 and R2 = 1:1369; implying that
both economies are dynamically e¢ cient (n = 0:01).
However, once  < 0:9, intragenerational transfer is optimal throughout.
As  falls further we note that the tax rates under both schemes fall. For
 < 0:6, it is not optimal to have any redistribution scheme for this set of
parameters. This is due to the fact that a fall in the discount rate causes a
fall in capital. The decrease in the tax rate mitigates the impact of the fall
but does not fully compensate for it. For  < 0:6; the cost in terms of capital
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is so high that the optimal tax rate is zero.
Changes in proportions of rich and productivity of poor: We have
seen that the proportions of rich and the productivity of the poor will play
an important role in determining welfare in this set-up. An economy with
a low proportion of rich has a lower level of utility (relative to baseline)
and similiarly, as the gap between the rich and the poor widens, this has
detrimental e¤ects on welfare. Any changes in  or  will a¤ect capital
and hence welfare. Keeping all the other parameters unchanged relative to
the baseline,  and  are allowed to vary and the resulting impact on the
policy variables considered. The general equilibrium results for  >  are
summarised in Figure 7.
The rst set of diagrams represent the evolution of ; the proportion
of rich in the economy. We nd that when  is set to 1% it leads to lower
capital and hence the interest rate is higher, nearing 20% compared to 4% for
the baseline (output and wages are also lower). The wedge between capital
under various modes of redistribution persists such that k0 > k1 > k2. We
also nd that for low levels of ; the tax rate is higher, suggesting that the
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Figure 7: Impact of Pi (R) and Psi (L)
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higher the inequality, the higher the level of redistribution undertaken. As
 increases, we nd that capital increases and the interest rates falls such
that dynamic ine¢ ciency (r < n) creeps in beyond a certain level. Dynamic
ine¢ ciency creeps in faster in the case of intragenerational transfers (since
k1 > k2). Consistent with our nding that more equal societies require less
redistribution, the tax rate falls gradually. Welfare increases unambiguously.
The same mechanism applies to the relative productivity of the poor,
 : When the productivity of the poor is low it severely reduces capital.
Welfare is the lowest among all the experiments considered and the tax rate
is highest as well. We however nd that as  starts to increase, capital
increases consistently, with the wedge between k2 still apparent, and the
interest rates start to converge and fall (with dynamic ine¢ ciency beyond a
certain level). There is a convergence and increase in welfare as  increases
with the convergence faster at lower levels of  :
Once again we nd that the Aaron condition is violated in that there
is a range of parameters for which it is optimal to have intergenerational
redistribution in a dynamically e¢ cient economy. It is noted that when 
and  exceed a certain level, which is relatively high, it is no longer optimal
to have redistribution from the rich to the poor.
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Changes in population growth rates: As far as n is concerned, its
impact in the current set up is relatively subdued in the sense that there have
to be signicant changes in the population growth rate for there to be any
signicant impact on the variables under consideration. We consider changes
ranging from a 1% fall to a 1.5% increase in population from one period to
the next. A fall in n is associated with an ageing population. The ndings
are in line with expectations in that as the population growth rate increases,
capital available per worker falls and the interest rate rises. The wedge in
capital is still apparent. The impact on the tax rate is innitesimal though it
does tend to fall as the population growth rate increases. In the case of the
population growth rate increasing from -1.5% to 1%, for intragenerational
transfer, the fall is only 1 basis point whilst in the case of intergenerational
transfer, it is 13 basis points. Welfare falls as the population growth rate
increases due to the decline in capital per worker.
3.4.4 When is pensions an optimal tool for redistribution?
A transfer from the rich to the poor through intragenerational taxes (young-
to-young) is almost always welfare improving. The same applies to transfers
through pensions with some restrictions in the sense that there are certain
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instances where it is optimal not to have pensions.
We now consider under what conditions pensions can be an optimal in-
strument for redistribution. For ease of exposition, the parameter values are
set as before and we only consider how the decision is a¤ected by changes
in the proportions of rich and the level of productivity of the poor; the two
parameters that seem to have the highest incidence on the optimal timing of
redistribution. For pensions to be the optimal redistribution instrument, we
require, V2   V1 > 0.
Figure 8 depicts how the optimal instrument varies as the proportions
of rich and productivity of the poor change. In the baseline  had been set
at 0:4 and for the given set of parameters, intragenerational transfer was
optimal. Allowing  to increase results in a bridging of the gap between V1
and V2. Intragenerational transfer is optimal for all  < 0:54. For  = 0:54;
V1 = V2 and two modes of transfers yield the same welfare. If  > 0:54, then
an intergenerational transfer is optimal. It can also be seen that for higher
levels of  intergenerational redistribution is preferred.
The same mechanism applies to  which had been set at 0:75 in the base-
line and for the given set of parameters, intragenerational transfer was opti-
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Figure 8: Optimal Timing of Redistribution
mal. By allowing  to increase, intragenerational transfer remains optimal
for  < 0:79: increases to around 79% when welfare is the same irrespective
of the mode of redistribution in place. For  = 0:79; V1 = V2 and two modes
of transfers yield the same welfare. For  > 0:79, intergenerational transfer is
optimal. Higher levels of  lead to intergenerational transfer being preferred.
In so far, we have assumed that either  or  vary, but that they do
not vary simultaneously. For instance, if  falls to 0:01,  needs to increase
to around 0:815 to ensure that V1 = V2. If  is higher (lower), then it is
optimal to transfer from young-to-old (young-to-young). On the other hand
if  increases to 90%,  can be as low as 14:7% and yet V1 = V2. Conversely,
if  is 1%,  needs to be as high as 91:55% to ensure V1 = V2. If we allow  
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to be 90%, then intergenerational redistribution is optimal for any .
The mode of transfer will also determine the type of pensions scheme in
place. With intergenerational transfer, there is a hybrid system with the rich
saving through a FF scheme through the provision of their own pension whilst
the poor, although they might save also receive an additional transfer when
old in the form of a PAYG scheme. On the other hand, with intragenerational
transfer, all redistribution takes place in the rst period and every individual
is responsible for the provision of his or her own pension in retirement. The
system is FF in that case.
The above results suggest that it is optimal to redistribute in the rst
period if an economy is characterised by pervasive inequality and the pro-
ductivity of the poor relative to the rich is low. Under those circumstances,
redistributing in the rst period yields higher welfare than redistributing
through pensions. However, in an economy where inequality is relatively
low, transferring through the pensions scheme is optimal. We have seen
that for most part the results are in line with the Aaron condition, in that
when r < n; intergenerational redistribution is preferred. However, there
is a range in a dynamically e¢ cient economy when it is optimal to redis-
tribute through pensions. This ensures the economy remains dynamically
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e¢ cient. Without the intergenerational redistribution, the economy would
tend towards dynamic ine¢ ciency.
3.5 An Application
We now estimate some of the parameters for 39 countries which is made
up as follows: Europe (14) ; America (8), Africa (10), Asia (5) and Pacic
(2). The aim is to nd out some estimates for the parameters ; ; ;  ; and
n and then consider which type of redistributive scheme would be in place:
For simplicity, we assume that the discount factors of the poor and the rich
are the same such that  = : The data denitions and sources are provided
in Appendix 3.2.
The initial results can be summarised as follows: Redistribution unam-
biguously increases welfare in all the countries sampled. Out of the 39 coun-
tries, intragenerational tax is optimal in 11 whilst intergenerational is optimal
in 28. There are two important ndings: There is always a positive level of
intragenerational tax that exists, however for some values of , the optimal
intergenerational tax is zero. In all cases where intragenerational taxes were
chosen, the economies were dynamically e¢ cient. Of the 28 economies where
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Figure 9: Overview of Estimated Exogenous Parameters
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Figure 10: Overview of Optimal Tax Rates
intergenerational taxes was chosen, 11 became dynamically e¢ cient after re-
distribution. However, for 17 countries the dynamic ine¢ ciency persisted.
After adjusting the  parameter upward above a certain level to ensure dy-
namic e¢ ciency, it was found that in 37 of the economies intragenerational
redistribution is optimal. The optimal tax rates in a dynamically e¢ cient
context are shown in Figure 10.
When we consider the adjusted parameters of  for which all the economies
are dynamically e¢ cient, we note that intragenerational redistribution takes
105
place in 37 cases with an average tax of 14.6% whilst intergenerational tax is
restricted to China and Uganda with tax rates of 32.7% and 45.5% respec-
tively. We also note that the tax rate is highest in developing countries which
is in line with the hypothesis that these countries have a low proportion of
workers in services and the disparity between the rich and the poor in terms
of wages (productivity) is highest. We note that for most of the developing
countries, the tax rate is in the range of 20-50% whilst for the developed
nations, it is under 20%.
3.6 Conclusions and Extensions
We have considered the impact of redistribution in an overlapping genera-
tions economy and considered some of the implications in a general equilib-
rium framework. We adopt a relatively underutilised approach to consider
the pensions scheme as a redistribution instrument as opposed to the more
conventional income support. Our results conrm some of the earlier nd-
ings on redistribution that it can be costly and there are distortions that arise
in the economic decision making of the recipients. In our framework, this
takes the form of a crowding out of capital resulting in an adverse impact on
output and wages whilst causing interest rate to rise. We also nd that the
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level and timing of redistribution matters as well. Whilst the poor benet
unambiguously from redistribution, the rich are worse o¤. Our other ndings
suggest that in cases of high inequality, that is, when there is a very small
proportion of rich and the poor have a low productivity, such an economy is
most likely to be dynamically e¢ cient and intragenerational transfer is the
optimal instrument. On the other hand, when inequality is fairly low, then
the economy can tend towards dynamic ine¢ ciency and it is then optimal
to redistribute though intergenerational transfers. Though redistribution in-
creases welfare in most cases, in some situations, it is optimal to have no
redistribution. We have seen that for most part the results are in line with
the Aaron condition, in that when r < n; intergenerational redistribution is
preferred. However, there is a range in a dynamically e¢ cient economy when
it is optimal to redistribute through pensions.
Using a relatively simple framework, we have shown how the optimal
method of redistribution might vary as the productivity and the relative
proportions of the agents vary. However, we might enrich the environment
by including two additional factors. We have so far assumed that there is
only two types of agents, rich or poor. However, it might be appropriate
to include a continuum of agents that di¤er according to their productivity
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and see how this a¤ects the timing and level of redistribution. Moreover,
in so far, we have considered the case that redistribution is carried out only
through income support or pensions, that is, it is restricted to one period.
This could be extended to include a situation whereby a proportion of the
redistribution takes place in the rst period whilst the remainder takes place
in the second period. This is considered in the next chapter.
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Appendix 3.1
Welfare functions for V0; V1 and V2.
V0 = 

(1 + ) ln

w0
1 + 

+ ln (R0)

+(1  )

(1 + ) ln

 w0
1 + 

+ ln (R0)

V1 = 

(1 + ) ln

(1   1)w1
1 + 

+ ln (R1)

+(1  )

(1 + ) ln

w1
1 + 

 +
 1
(1  )

+ ln (R1)

V2 = 

(1 + ) ln

(1   2)w2
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
+ ln (R2)

+(1  )

(1 + ) ln

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1+
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 +
(1 + n) 2
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
+ ln (R2)

Golden Rule: Intragenerational transfers Replacing R1 = (1 + n) in
the welfare function V1 now results in:
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V1 =
2664  (1 + ) ln(1   1) + (1  ) (1 + ) ln [(1  ) +  1] + z1 (; ; ; ; n)+
[(1+)+(1 )(1+)]
(1 ) ln [ (1 + )(1   1) +  (1 + ) [(1  ) +  1]]
3775
where z1 is a set of parameters independent of the policy term.
Golden Rule: Intergenerational transfers
V2 =
2664  (1 + ) ln(1   2) + (1  ) (1 + ) ln [(1  ) +  2]
+ [(1+)+(1 )(1+)]
(1 ) ln

[(1+)(1 2)+(1+)(1 ) ]
[(1+)+2(1 )]

+ z2 (; ; ; )
3775
where z2 represents a set of parameters independent of the policy term.
The optimal tax is now represented by:
@V2
@ 2
=
2664  (1+)(1 2) + (1 )(1+)[(1 ) +2] h
(1+)[(1+)+(1 )(1+)]
(1 )[(1+)(1 2)+(1+)(1 ) ] +
[(1+)+(1 )(1+)]
[(1+)+2(1 )]
i
3775
General Case: Intragenerational Transfer The welfare function V1
can be summed up as:
V1 =
2664 (1 + ) ln(1   1) + (1 + ) (1  ) ln [(1  ) +  1] +h
(1+2 )+(1+2 )(1 )
(1 )
i
ln ( (1 + ) +  (1 + ) (1  ) + [   ]  1) + z2
3775
where z2 is a set of parameters independent of the policy term.
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General Case: Intergenerational Transfer The welfare function now
takes the following form:
V2 =
2664 (1 + ) ln(1   2) + fAg ln [D    (1 + ) 2)]  fBg ln [(1 + )+ (1  ) 2] +
(1 + ) (1  ) ln [E + (1  ) [(1 + ) (1  ) + ]  2   (1  ) 22)]
3775
whereA = 1
(1 )
8>><>>:
2664 [(1 + ) + (1 + ) (1  )]+ [   (1  )] (  1)
  (1 + ) (1  ) (1  )
3775
9>>=>>; ;
B = 1
(1 ) f[(1 + ) + (1 + ) (1  )]+ [   (1  )] (  1)g ;
D = [ (1 + ) (1  ) +  (1 + )] ;
E = (1  ) (1 + ),
are sets of parameters independent of the policy term.
The optimal level of tax now results in:
@V2
@ 2
=
2664
 (1+)
(1 2)   fAg
(1+)
[D (1+)2)]  
[(1+)+(1+)(1 )]+[ (1 )]( 1)
[(1+)+(1 )2]
+ (1+)(1 )(1 )[(1+)(1 ) +(1 22)]
[(1 ) (1+)+(1 )[(1+)(1 ) +]2 (1 )22)]
3775
Impact of  2 on Utility of Rich and Poor. We carry out the same
procedure for  2:With one major di¤erence, in that  2 now inuences capital
even if the agents have the same discount factor. The utility of the rich and
the poor is given by:
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UR2 = [(1 + ) ln(1   2) + (1 + ) lnw2 +  lnR2]
UP2 = (1 + ) ln ([(1  )R2 + (1 + n) 2] + lnw2   ln(1  )R2) +  lnR2
It then follows that:
@UR2
@ 2
=
0BB@  (1+)(1 2)
+
h
((1+2) )
(1 )
i h
(1 )
[(1+)+2(1 )]   1[(1 2)+(1 ) ]
i
1CCA
@UP2
@ 2
=
0BB@
h
(1+)(1 )[(1 ) (1+)+(1 22)]
[(1 ) [(1+)+2(1 )]+(1 )[(1 ) +(1 2)]2]
i
 
h
((1+2) )
(1 )[(1 2)+(1 ) ] +
(1+)
[(1+)+(1 )2]
i
1CCA
The utility of the rich falls and that of the poor increases if @UR2
@2
< 0 and
@UP2
@2
> 0:
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Proof of Proposition 3:
(1a) @k0
@
= @k1
@
= 1
1 
h
(1 )f+(1 ) g
(1+n)(1+)2
i 
1 
> 0 Eqns. (32)  (33)
(1b) @k0
@
= @k1
@
= 1
1 
h
(1 )(1  )
(1+n)(1+)
i 
1 
> 0 Eqns. (32)  (33)
(1c) @k0
@ 
= @k1
@ 
= 1
1 
h
(1 )(1 )
(1+n)(1+)
i 
1 
> 0 Eqns. (32)  (33)
(1d) @k0
@n
= @k1
@n
= 1
1 
h
 (1 )[+(1 ) ]
(1+)(1+n)2
i 
1 
< 0 Eqns. (32)  (33)
(1e) Comparing eqns. (30) and (33) ; we can see that eqn. (33) does not
depend on  1: Moreover, eqn. (32) = eqn. (33) :
Else,@k1
@1
= 1
1 
h
(1+n)(1+)(1+)(1 )[ ]
[(1+n)(1+)(1+)]2
i 
1 
< 0 for  >  eqn. (30)
(1f) @k2
@2
= 1
1 
h
  (1+n)(1 )f(1+)+(1 )[+(1 ) ]g
[(1+n)[(1+)+2(1 )]]2
i 
1 
< 0 eqn. (34)
Proof of Proposition 4:
(2a) For ; k1  k2 [Eqn: (33)  Eqn: (34)] simplies to the following con-
dition:
 2 [(1  ) + (1  )(1  ) +  (1 + )] > 0
It follows that for all  2 > 0; the above condition is always satised and
hence k1 > k2:
(2b) If  2 = 0; in eqn. ( 34) ; then eqn. (32)  ( 34) are the same.
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Proof of Proposition 5:
(3a) :
@V0
@
=

(1 + 2  ) (1   )
(1  ) [ + (1  ) ]

  (1 + ) ln > 0
(3b) :
@V0
@ 
=

(1 + 2  ) (1  )
(1  ) [ + (1  ) ]

+ (1  ) (1 + ) 1
 
> 0
(3c) :
@V0
@n
=
 1
(1 + n)
< 0
Proof of Proposition 8:
@UR1
@ 1
=
  (1 + )
(1   1) < 0
@UP1
@ 1
=
(1 + )
[(1  ) +  1] > 0
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Appendix 3.2
Europe America Africa Asia
(14) (8) (10) (5)
Austria Canada (Can) Algeria (Alg) China (Chn)
Belgium (Blg) United States (US) Botswana (Bots) Hong Kong (HK)
Denmark (Den) Argentina (Arg) Egypt (Egy) Japan (Jap)
Finland (Fin) Brazil (Brz) Ethiopia (Eth) Singapore (Sng)
France (Fra) Chile (Chl) Kenya (Ken) Israel (Isr)
Germany (Ger) Mexico (Mex) Mauritius (Mus)
Ireland (Ire) Peru (Per) Nigeria (Nig)
Italy (Ita) Uruguay (Uru) Rwanda (Rwn) Pacic
Netherlands (Neth) South Africa (SA) (2)
Spain (Spn) Uganda (Ugn) Australia (Auz)
Sweden (Swd) New Zealand (NZ)
Switzerland (Swi)
Turkey (Tur)
United Kingdom (UK)

 is the share of capital in output. We use the database of Nehru and
Dhareshwar (1995) from the World Bank. The period covers 1960-1990. We
dene  = Physical Capital Stock
GDP
and the initial estimates vary from 0.09 for
Ethiopia to 0.5 for Kenya with an average of 0.27 for the sample.

 = 1
1+r
where r is the annual real rate of interest for the period 1990
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to 2005. However, where estimates were not available, they were assigned
a value of 0.96, in line with the literature. The estimates ranged from 0.65
for Brazil to 0.98 for China with an average of 0.94 for the sample. (Source:
IFS)

 was derived from ILO data and considered to be the proportion of
workers working in the services sector. The values here ranged from 0.14 for
China to 0.83 for Hong Kong with a mean of 0.62.
 
 was derived from ILO data as follows:
1. The average wage in the economy throughout the sectors was derived.
2. The workers were then classed into 2 categories - low and high (below
and above average wage);
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3. The ratio of the wage of the low worker relative to the high worker was
then taken to be  
In this case, the mean was 0.61 within a range of 0.35 for Uganda and
0.95 for Italy.
n
n is the annual average of the population growth rate from 1981-2005.
(Source: WDI)
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4 REDISTRIBUTION-TILTINGWITHPLAN-
NER INEQUALITY AVERSION
4.1 Introduction
Governments intervene in economies to achieve a multiplicity of objectives.
Among others, carrying out redistribution from the rich to the poor has
been one of the main reasons for intervention. However, redistribution often
entails costs, be they budgetary or in terms of the disincentives it gives
rise to. Nonetheless, governments are called to carry out redistribution in
various forms. As such, an optimal redistribution scheme can help in dening
what is the optimal level of redistribution and when it should take place.
This chapter is an extension of chapter 3 whereby we considered whether
redistribution should be intergenerational or intragenerational. The planner
thus had only one policy tool to choose from, i.e., either income support
where all the resources are transferred to the young or pensions whereby the
poor benet from all the redistribution.
The basic gist of the current paper remains the same: redistribution takes
place from the young rich to the poor. However, unlike the previous chapter
where redistribution could be either to the young or the old, this time round
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we allow for redistribution to be to both the young and the old. The basic
question focuses on what determines the proportion which is allocated to the
young and the old. If all the tax raised from the young rich is transferred
to the young poor, then all agents fund for their own retirement and we
have a fully-funded pensions system. On the other hand, if all the money is
allocated to the old poor, we have a kind of a hybrid system whereby the rich
fund for their own pensions whilst for the poor, the pay-as-you-go (PAYG)
pensions is targeted and is purely redistributive.
We develop a two-period overlapping generations economy in a general
equilibrium framework with endogenous capital formation. The economy is
innitely lived and the analysis is performed in steady state. Agents work in
the rst period and live in retirement in the second period. There are two
types of agents who di¤er in terms of their productivity. The high produc-
tivity agents are considered as rich, whilst the low productivity agents are
referred as poor. Redistribution in this context aims to bridge the inequality
between the rich and the poor. There is a welfare maximising planner, with
some degree of inequality aversion. The planner raises revenue by taxing the
young rich and then redistributes the money to the poor - both young and
old. The planner thus chooses two instruments, the tax rate to levy on the
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rich, and the proportion to allocate to the young poor - with the remain-
der going to the old poor. This chapter extends Chapter 3 by considering
the redistributive instruments simultaneously and introducing an element of
inequality aversion on behalf of the planner.
Abstracting from the new elements of the model, the results remain
broadly in line with Chapter 3. The key analytical results can be summarised
as:
1. Redistribution adversely a¤ects capital formation. The higher the in-
tergenerational redistribution component, the greater the crowding out;
2. An increase in the proportion of rich leads to a lower tax rate;
3. An improvement in productivity leads to lower tax rates;
4. Increased inequality aversion on the part of the planner results in higher
tax rates.
The simulations results suggest that there are some parameter values
where it is optimal to have no redistribution at all. The overall results can
be summarised as:
1. An increase in the proportion of the rich or productivity leads to a lower
tax rate and a tilting towards intergenerational redistribution. We
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suggest that whilst the increase in proportion of the rich or productivity
and the resulting fall in the tax rate could potentially result in dynamic
ine¢ ciency, the tilting towards intergenerational redistribution ensures
the economy remains dynamically e¢ cient.
2. Higher inequality aversion leads to higher taxes but also result in a
shift towards intragenerational redistribution. The result is analogous
to (1) above, in that the tilting towards intragenerational reverses some
of the fall in capital induced by the increase in the tax rate.
3. As the discount factor falls and the agents become increasingly impa-
tient, the tax rate remains broadly unchanged but there is a shift in
emphasis towards intragenerational redistribution. This ensures that
the fall resulting from the higher discounting is compensated for by the
tilting towards intragenerational redistribution.
4. As the population gets younger, the tax rate falls innitesimally and
there is a shift towards intragenerational redistribution. The tilting
counters the increase in capital resulting from the fall in the tax rate.
Our results thus suggest that the tax rate and the timing of the redis-
tribution work so as to ensure capital does not increase or fall signicantly.
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This ensures the economy remains dynamically e¢ cient at all times. When
we put the model to test for a sample of 27 countries, we nd that in all
developing countries the planner will undertake redistribution even without
inequality aversion. However, in the OECD countries, it is only when the
planner gives a higher weight to the utility of the poor that redistribution
will take place.
The chapter can be linked to the growing literature on the optimal form
of pensions system to deal with an ageing population (World Bank, 1994;
Gill et al., 2004). The current approach focuses on redistribution where
pensions is used as a redistributive instrument as is income support. We
consider which of the two approaches is given a higher weight depending on
the prevailing economic conditions. Pensions in this set up are targeted in
that only the poor benet from such payments whilst the rich fund for their
own retirement. The model can also be seen as incorporating two of the
three pillars of the World Bank, rstly an element whereby everyone saves
a proportion from their income; secondly, where pensions aim to ensure no
one lives in poverty during retirement and redistributes from the rich to the
poor.
In this chapter, we add to literature pertaining to inequality and redis-
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tribution. There is a large literature that emphasises the harmful impact of
inequality on growth and how it can have serious politico-economic ramica-
tions (Persson and Tabellini (1994); Alesina and Rodrik (1994); Alesina and
Perrotti (1996)). Previously, redistribution had been considered as either in-
tragenerational (Haveman, 1988) or intergenerational (Krueger and Kubler,
2006). In Chapter 3, we bridged this gap by comparing both types and con-
sidered which of the two tools would prevail under given economic conditions.
In this paper, we include both intergenerational and intragenerational ele-
ments simultaneously. Our results can thus be considered as analogous to
that of Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2005) who suggest that with su¢ cient in-
equality in earnings and elderly in the economy, there is an equilibrium that
supports the existence of both intra and intergenerational redistribution. In
the current framework, we also nd that both inter and intragenerational re-
distribution operate depending; with the weight attached to each depending
on the economic environment.
The rest of this chapter is as follows: in Section 2 we describe the set up
of the economy. Section 3 derives the competitive equilibrium whilst Section
4 considers the planners problem in terms of nding the optimal level and
timing of transfer. Section 5 tests the model to a sample of 27 countries.
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Section 6 concludes and provides some potential extensions.
4.2 The Economy
We consider an innitely lived overlapping generations economy in the
Samuelson-Diamond spirit. Economic activity takes place over discrete time
t 2 f0; 1:::;1g without uncertainty. The economy consists of two types of
utility maximising agents; h (r; p) ; heterogeneous in their productivity  ;
prot maximising perfectly competitive rms; and a welfare-maximising so-
cial planner. We consider a planner who can potentially have an aversion
to inequality such that the utility of the poor can be given a higher weight
in the welfare function. At each time t, two factors, an amount of capital;
k; and labour; l; are available as inputs to production and a homogeneous
good; y; is produced.
4.2.1 Agents
At time t, one young generation and an old generation live simultaneously.
Population grows at a constant rate n: Hence, at any time t, there are (1+n)
more (young) workers than (old) retirees. The population at t can thus be
expressed as: Lt+Lt 1 = (2+n)Lt: Lt refers to the agents born at t. Following
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Samuelson (1958), the population structure is considered to be stationary.
Therefore, the proportions and types of individuals remain the same across
generations.
When young, each agent provides one unit of labour inelastically. When
old the labour endowment is zero. There are two types of labour who di¤er
in terms of their productivity  2 (0; 1]. In competitive markets, the pro-
ductivity determines the wages the agents receive. We will term the high
productivity agents as rich (r) and normalise their productivity to 1. Any
agents with  < 1 will be considered as poor (p) and can potentially receive
benets. The rich and the poor make up proportions  and (1  ) of the
economy respectively.
Agents maximise utility by maximising consumption uh(cht ; c
h
t+1) subject
to the budget constraints over their lifetime. They are non-altruistic, they
are born without any assets and leave no bequests. When young, the agents
choose the level of consumption and savings which maximises their utility,
whilst when old the agents live o¤ their savings (and the poor potentially
receive some transfers). For ease of manipulation, the intertemporal utility
function is taken to be additive and log-linear. The utility function is thus
strictly concave, since more consumption is preferred to less, and twice dif-
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ferentiable: u0(c) > 0 and u00(c) < 0. The function also satises lim
c!0
u0(c) =1
such that subject to its disposable income, the household will always choose
a positive level of consumption when maximising life-cycle utility. We can
express the utility-maximising problem of a rich agent as follows:
Max
fcyt ;cot+1;stg
: u = ln cy;rt +  ln c
o;r
t+1 (1)
subject to: (2)
cy;rt = wt (1  )  srt (3)
co;rt+1 = Rt+1s
r
t (4)
Eqn. (1) suggests that the agent maximises utility over both periods of
his lifetime and future consumption is discounted by a factor  2 (0; 1): The
budget constraints suggest when young, the agent earns a wage wt out of
which a (constant) proportion  is taxed. In line with Diamond (1965), the
disposable income is then either consumed or saved. When old, the agent
consumes his savings and the interest rates earned thereon. We note the rich
fund their own retirement.
Similarly the utility function of the poor can be written in similar fashion
with the di¤erence that since the productivity of the poor is lower, their wage
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is lower as well. The poor receive a wage  2 (0; 1] times that of the rich
such that their wage is  wt: We can express their problem as follows:
Max
fcyt ;cot+1;stg
: up = ln cy;pt +  ln c
o;p
t+1 (5)
subject to :
cy;pt =  wt + bt   st (6)
co;pt+1 = Rt+1st + pt+1 (7)
The utility maximising problem of the poor is similar to that of the rich in
that it depends on consumption over their lifetime. The budget constraints of
the poor suggest they receive a wage  wt and they can also receive benets.
Benets in the rst period is termed bt whilst if it is in the second period
it is considered as pt+1: The poor agent allocates his rst period disposable
income between consumption and savings. The savings carried over plus the
interest earned thereon funds the second period consumption along with any
benets the poor may receive in the form of pensions.
4.2.2 Firms
A large number of identical rms produce a homogeneous good using an
identical economy-wide Cobb Douglas production function. The production
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function can be represented as Y = KL1 ; where  is the share of capital
in production.
In intensive form, the production function reduces to: y = k. Firms
maximise prot by taking factor prices, which are paid their marginal prod-
ucts in a competitive setting, as given. It is assumed that the labour market
clears such that labour demand equals labour supply and the wages received
by a worker depends on his level of productivity. The economy is endowed
with an initial capital stock K0 > 0 and capital depreciates fully from one
period to the next10. We assume no technological change. The produc-
tion function satises the usual conditions such that f(0) = 0, f 0(k) > 0,
f 00(k) < 0 and the Inada conditions: lim
k!0
f 0(k) =1 and lim
k!1
f 0(k) = 0.
4.2.3 Social Planner
The social planner is considered as a social welfare maximiser and we allow
for it to have an aversion to inequality . Its policy role is limited to that of
raising taxes from the rich at a rate  and deciding on the optimal proportion
! to transfer to the young poor and the remainder (1  !) to the old poor.
The total tax raised (T ) is allocated between benets to the young (B)
10Depreciation is used in the non-conventional sense: the old consume the capital and
the young replenish it.
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and benets to the old (P ). Hence, Tt = Ltwt = Bt + Pt. Bt refers to
the component of taxes redistributed in the form of income support and it is
allocated to the proportion of poor born at time t. Pt refers to the component
of redistribution that takes place in the form of pensions and it is allocated
to the proportion of poor born at time t   1. We can then represent the
equilibrium conditions as follows:
Bt = !Tt = (1  )Ltbt
Pt = (1  !)Tt = (1  )Lt 1pt
With a stationary population structure and commitment device, the poor
are thus faced with the following benets levels in intensive form:
bt =
!Ltwt
(1  )Lt =
!wt
(1  ) (8)
pt =
(1  !)Ltwt
(1  )Lt 1 =
(1  !) (1 + n) wt
(1  ) (9)
If ! = 1; all the tax raised is redistributed to the young, in which case we
have a fully funded pensions scheme, since all agents provide for their own
pensions. On the other hand, if ! = 0; all the taxes raised are allocated to
the old in the form of pensions.
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4.3 Competitive Equilibrium
Given the householdsand the rmsobjectives, a competitive equilibrium
for the economy can be dened as a sequence of consumption fcyt ; cotg1t=0
such that:
1. Given a sequence of taxes and transfers, fwt; bt=pt+1g1t=0 , and the
prevailing competitive wages, wt, and interest rate, rt, solves the indi-
viduals optimisation problem subject to satisfying the Euler equation;
2. Factors of production are paid their marginal products (wt = (1  
)kt ;Rt = k
 1
t ) and labour and capital markets clear such that
LDt = Lt and St = Kt+1;
3. The planners budget is always balanced. Hence taxes raised is redis-
tributed between the young and old poor in the same period: Tt =
Bt + Pt;
4. The economys resource constraint is always satised. In intensive form,
the constraint is dened as the allocation of current output, yt, between
consumption of the young and old and capital formation in the next
period.
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yt = c
y
t +
cot
(1 + n)
+ (1 + n)kt+1 (10)
Given the above denition of competitive equilibrium, we can express the
intertemporal budget constraints for the rich and the poor as:
cy;rt +
co;rt+1
Rt+1
= wt(1  ) (11)
cy;pt +
co;pt+1
Rt+1
=  wt + bt +
pt+1
Rt+1
(12)
We can then write the Lagrangian and derive the standard Euler equation
which dictates the optimal allocation of consumption over the two periods of
an agents lifetime. For the poor, this can be expressed as:
cot+1 = Rt+1c
y
t (13)
We can now proceed to derive the optimal levels of consumption and
savings of both agents as:
cy;rt =

[wt (1  )]
1 + 

(14)
co;rt+1 =

Rt+1 [wt (1  )]
1 + 

(15)
sy;rt =

 [wt (1  )]
1 + 

(16)
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cy;p =

1
1 + 

 +
!
(1  )

wt +
(1  !) (1 + n) wt+1
(1  )Rt+1

(17)
co;p =

Rt+1
1 + 

 +
!
(1  )

wt +
(1  !) (1 + n) wt+1
(1  )Rt+1

(18)
sy;pt =

1
1 + 



 +
!
(1  )

wt   (1  !) (1 + n) wt+1
(1  )Rt+1

(19)
Eqns. (14)-(16) show that the equilibrium levels of consumption and
savings of the rich depends on their disposable income. On the other hand,
eqns (17)-(19) suggest that for the poor, their consumption levels depend on
their income plus any income support they receive and the discounted value
of pensions. We also note from eqn. (19) that there is potential crowding
out that arises when pensions are provided. If ! < 1; then this reduces the
amount of savings undertaken by the agents. Maximum crowding out occurs
when ! = 0, i.e., when redistribution is only through pensions.
We can now consider how capital formation takes place in this economy.
With full depreciation of capital from one period to the next, the capital in
the next period is simply the savings of the current working (young) gener-
ation. This can be characterised as:
Kt+1 = St = S
r
t + S
p
t (20)
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suggesting that capital in the next period consists of the savings of the
working rich and poor. In intensive form, this reduces to:
(1 + n) kt+1 = s
r
t + (1  ) spt
Since the savings of the rich and poor di¤ers, the proportions of rich and
poor play an important role in the capital accumulation process. In steady
state where kt+1 = kt = k; steady-state capital is characterised as:
k =

(1  ) f (1  ) + (1  ) + !g
(1 + n) [(1 + )+ (1  !)(1  ) ]
 1
1 
(21)
Proposition 9 (a) An increase in ! (intragenerational transfers) increases
k
(b) An increase in  decreases k
Proof. The Proof is in Appendix 4.1
From eqn.(21), it follows that if ! = 1; then the tax rate does not a¤ect
capital accumulation if all redistribution is done in the rst period. Steady
state capital is given by:
k =

(1  ) f + (1  ) g
(1 + n) (1 + )
 1
1 
(22)
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Proposition 10 (a) An increase in  increases k
(b) An increase in  increases k
(c) An increase in  increases k
Proof. The Proof is in Appendix 4.1
If ! = 0; i.e., implying all the redistribution is intertemporal, then the
tax rate matters:
k =

(1  ) f (1  ) + (1  ) g
(1 + n) [(1 + )+ (1  ) ]
 1
1 
(23)
It thus follows from proposition 1(a) that capital is greater for (22) than
(23).
4.4 The Planners Problem
The planners objective is to maximise aggregate social welfare. Given this
objective and the competitive equilibrium, the planners problem is to choose
 and ! so as to maximise fcyt ; cot ; kt+1g1t=0 subject to the allocation fytg1t=0.
We also account for the fact that the planner can have an aversion to in-
equality such that the utility of the poor is given a higher weight  > 1. If
 = 1; the welfare function is Benthamite where all agents are given the same
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weight. Assuming steady state, the planners problem can be expressed as
follows:
Max :
f;!g
V =
1X
t=0
t (U (cr) + U (cp)) (24)
The welfare function consists of the utility of the rich and poor and the
inequality aversion parameter of the planner,  > 1:  refers to the weight the
planner attaches to the generations, living and unborn, and this is decreasing
in time.
Given the additive nature of the utility functions of the agents, we can
proceed to write the planners problem as that of maximising the utility of
all agents living simultaneously, that is, the young and old, rich and poor.
We can then write this in intensive form as:
V =  [(1 + n) ln(cy;r) + ln(co;r)] +  (1  ) [(1 + n) ln(cy;p) + ln(co;p)] (25)
The rst part of the welfare function refers to the proportion of rich in
the economy. Since population grows at a rate n, there are (1 + n) more
youngsters than elderly. The second part of the welfare function considers
the poor and  is the inequality aversion parameter of the planner. The
higher the value of , the greater the inequality aversion.
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4.4.1 The Optimal Level of  & !
We proceed to di¤erentiate V with respect to  and ! to nd their respective
optimal levels. For the general case, this results in:
@V
@
=  
(1 )+
h
[(3+n) 1]+[(1+n)+](1 )
(2+n)(1 )
i h
(! 1)
f(1 )+!+(1 ) g   (1 !)(1 )[(1+)+(1 !)(1 ) ]
i
+ (1  )
2664 (1 ) (1 !)(1 )+(1+)!+2!(1 !)(1 )+(1 )(1 !)[(1 2)+2!+(1 ) ][[(1 ) +! ][(1+)+(1 !)(1 ) ]+(1 )f(1 )+!+(1 ) g(1 !) ]
  (! 1)f(1 )+!+(1 ) g
3775
@V
@!
=
h
[(3+n) 1]+[(1+n)+](1 )
(2+n)(1 )
i h

f(1 )+!+(1 ) g +
(1 )
[(1+)+(1 !)(1 ) ]
i
+ (1  )
2664  (1 ) (1 )+(1+)+(1 2!)(1 ) (1 )f(1 )+(1 ) g+(1 )(1 2!)[[(1 ) +! ][(1+)+(1 !)(1 ) ]+(1 )(1 !)f(1 )+!+(1 ) g]
  f(1 )+!+(1 ) g
3775
Given the nature of the two simultaneous equations, we have recourse
to simulations to solve for  and ! in the next section. For now, let us
assume that ! = 1; such that all redistribution is intragenerational. Then,
@V
@
=  1
(1 ) +
h
(1 )
[(1 ) + ]
i
and it follows that:
 =
(1  ) (   )
 +  (1  ) (26)
Proposition 11 (a) An increase in  reduces 
(b) An increase in  reduces 
(c) An increase in  increases 
Proof. The Proof is in Appendix 4.1
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The results are consistent with expectations in that the richer an economy
or the lower the inequality, the less the need for redistribution. Similarly, the
higher the inequality aversion of the planner, the higher the tax rate. When
we set  = 1; the optimal tax rate is the same as the one for intragenerational
transfer in Chapter 3 and yields  = (1  ) (1   ) : This is consistent with
the view that complete equalisation of consumption of the rich and poor is
optimal.
4.4.2 Simulation Results and Sensitivity Analysis
We now consider the behaviour of the model for a given set of parameters.
These parameters have been chosen to initially yield a dynamically e¢ cient
solution and provide plausible values of  and ! 2 (0; 1). There exists a
set of parameters for which redistribution is not optimal. We ignore these
situations. We assume the agents have the same discount factor which is
taken to be line in line with values used for macro simulations (see de la Croix
and Michel, 2002; Krueger and Kubler, 2006). We set the discount factor
at 0:96. The population growth rate is set at 1 percent. In the baseline,
we assume that the poor earn 75 percent of what the rich earn and we
assume that the rich, ; make up 40 percent of the economy, with the poor
137
     n
0:3 0:96 1 0:4 0:75 0:01
Capital Output Wage Interest  ! UR UP V
V0 0.169 0.587 0.411 1.04 0 0 -3.063 -3.628 -3.489
V1 0.156 0.572 0.401 1.10 0.1521 0.5898 -3.380 -3.380 -3.466
Table 4: Baseline Simulations
accounting for the remaining 60 percent. We initially set  = 1 whereby the
planner treats all agents equally. We allow for all these values to change
when carrying out sensitivity analysis.
Baseline Results The baseline results are presented in Table 4:
Two welfare functions are presented in Table 4. For comparative pur-
poses, V0; which represents the case where there is no redistribution, has
been included. V1 represents the welfare function with redistribution. We
allow for redistribution to take place over the two periods of the lifetime of
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the agent. In V0; the utility of the agents is only a function of their earnings
and we can nd that as expected, the utility of the rich is higher than that
of the poor.
After allowing for redistribution to take place, we note that the optimal
tax rate on the rich is around 15.21 percent and the young poor receive
around 59 percent of the tax raised in the form of income support whilst
the old poor receive the remaining 41 percent in the form of pensions. As
a result of the redistribution, we note that capital is lower and as a result
output and wages are lower too. This results in a higher interest rate. Though
before redistribution the utility of the rich was higher than that of the poor,
following redistribution, the utility of the rich falls unambiguously whilst
that of the poor increases and they are both equalised. Aggregate welfare is
unambiguously higher.
The results di¤er from the situation with one instrument (Chapter 3)
whereby, when the agents had the same discount factor, capital formation
was not a¤ected. However, it relied on the fact that all the redistribution was
intergenerational. In this case, since we have both inter and intragenerational
redistribution simultaneously, capital is lower and as a result we have a higher
interest rate.
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k y w R Tax ! UR UP Welfare
       +   +      
 + + +   +        
 0 0 0 0 + +   +  
 + + +       + + +
 + + +       + + +
n       +   +      
Table 5: Impact of a 1 percent change
We now consider the impact of a 1% increase in the exogenous parame-
ters on the endogenous variables relative to the baseline results. These are
summarised in Table 5:
The results can be summarised as follows: Since there is a positive re-
lationship between capital and both output and wages, any parameter that
leads to an increase in k, leads to an increase in output and wages. Con-
versely, an increase in capital leads to a fall in the interest rate.
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 and n are negatively related with capital and have exactly the same
impact on the parameters under consideration. A increase in n; which results
in a younger population, leads to a decrease in the tax rate. Moreover, the
increase in n also results in a tilting towards intragenerational redistribution.
This leads to an unambiguous decline in welfare of all the agents concerned.
We can consider the tax rate as an "equilibrating mechanism". An increase
in n results in a lower steady state capital. The fall in the tax rate and the
tilting towards intragenerational redistribution helps to restore k such that
some of the initial fall is reversed.
Increases in ;  and  lead to increases capital . However, the impact
di¤ers so far as taxation is concerned. An increase in  leads to an inn-
itesimal increase in the tax rate. However, increases in both  and  lead
to declines in the tax rate. The latter could be consistent with the fact that
increases in  and  broaden the tax base and as a result the optimal tax rate
falls. Increases in  reduce the productivity gap between the poor and the
rich and this also implies a lower amount of taxation is required. Moreover,
as mentioned earlier, the increase in  and  reduce poverty and inequality
in the economy and as such the need for redistribution falls. Increases in ;
 and  tilt redistribution towards intergenerational, in that ! falls. This
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is consistent with our previous suggestion of the "equilibrating mechanism"
at work and the tilting ensures the economy remains dynamically e¢ cient.
Whilst a marginal 1 percent increase in  leads to a reduction in welfare (pos-
sibly due to the fact that the utility lost out of reduced consumption exceeds
the gain from the increased capital) increases in  and  unambiguously
increase welfare.
Sensitivity Analysis The baseline results gave an overview of the optimal
level of tax rate and ! for the given set of parameters. However, to get a
better understanding of the behaviour of the endogenous variables, we now
allow for the exogenous parameters to vary. This is done with the aim of
getting a better understanding of the tilting the policy variables with respect
to changes in the selected parameters. We have to note that redistribution
only takes place for a given range of parameters, outside which it is no longer
optimal to redistribute.
Proportion of Rich The results on the proportion of rich are as before.
An increase in the proportion of rich has a positive impact on capital and
hence results in higher output and wages with a resulting lower interest rate.
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Figure 11: Impact of changes in Pi (L) and Psi (R)
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However, we also note that as the proportion of rich increases, the tax rate
falls. For instance, when the rich represent only 5 percent of the population,
the tax rate is around 24 percent and this falls to 6.57 percent when the rich
account for 74.5 percent of the population (which is near to the upper bound
for redistribution). It can also be seen that as the proportion of rich increases,
the distribution tilts towards intergenerational redistribution. When  is 5
percent, around 94 percent of the redistribution is intragenerational, but it
falls to only 1 percent when  is 74.5 percent. Consistent with our suggestion
that the optimal tax rate and timing of redistribution act as an equilibrating
device, the tilting in the redistribution between generations leads to a rela-
tively stable capital stock such that the overall impact on the interest rate is
more subdued. The economy thus remains dynamically e¢ cient.
Productivity of Poor The same mechanism applies for the productivity
parameter. As the productivity of the poor increases, the same e¤ects are
noted on capital. The tax rate falls as well - from 24 percent, when the
productivity of the poor is 60 percent that of the rich, to around 10 percent,
when the productivity of the poor rises to 84 percent that of the rich. ! tilts
towards intergenerational redistribution. When  is 0.6, all redistribution is
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intragenerational, when it rises to 0.84 all redistribution is intergenerational.
Welfare improves unambiguously.
The results are consistent with the suggestion that as the productivity
of the poor increases, this reduces the gap between the rich and the poor
thereby resulting in a fall in the tax rate. The fall in the tax rate leads to
an increase in capital but the tilting in ! reverses some of the increase in
capital and ensures the economy remains dynamically e¢ cient. We can see
in Figure 11 that without redistribution, there is potential for the economy
to become dynamically e¢ cient.
Inequality Aversion We initially assumed that the planner attached the
same weight to all agents. We now allow for the fact that the planner can
be averse to inequality (for whatever reason) and attaches a higher weight
to the welfare of the poor. The results are summarised in Figure 12. The
rst thing we note is that as the planner attaches a higher weight to the
utility of the poor, this leads to an increase in the tax rate which rises from
15.21 percent when the planner attaches the same weight to all agents to
26.27 percent when he gives an extra 25 percent weight to the utility of
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Figure 12: Impact of changes in Epsilon (L) and Delta(R)
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the poor. There is also a tilting in redistribution between generations in
that as the inequality aversion of the planner increases, this leads to an
increased emphasis on intragenerational redistribution. However, there is an
interesting result in so far as the overall impact on capital is concerned. Even
though increases in inequality aversion lead to a higher tax rate, this does not
a¤ect overall capital formation and as a result leaves output, wages and the
interest rate unchanged. We suggest this is due to the fact that the higher tax
rate is countered by the shift towards intragenerational redistribution which
mitigates the negative impact on capital. The utility of the rich and the poor
is no longer equalised in that as the planners inequality aversion increases,
the welfare of the rich falls while that of the poor increase unambiguously.
Aggregate welfare is lower as a result of higher inequality aversion.
Discount Factor We initially assume agents do not discount the future
and then allow for the discounting of the future at an increasing rate. The
overall results are in line with expectations and are summarised in Figure 12.
As  falls, this leads to a lowering of capital resulting in the incipient falls
in output and wages and a fall in the interest rate. The tax rate remains in
the region of 15 percent in that as  falls from 1 to 0.8, the tax rate only
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falls by 14 basis points, from 15.22 percent to 15.08 percent. However, there
is a signicant tilt in !. For the same range of ; ! increases from 0.52 to
0.899. This means that as the agents attach a higher weight to consumption
in the rst period, an increasing weight is attached to intragenerational re-
distribution. Thus, an increasing proportion of the benets is given to the
poor agents when they are young. However, this mechanism can be ratio-
nalised on the grounds that intragenerational redistribution has less of an
adverse impact on capital formation as opposed to intergenerational redistri-
bution. In this case, the fall in  is counteracted by the increase in ! such
that the overall impact on capital is reduced, though capital ends up lower.
The impact of  on aggregate welfare suggests that as  initially falls, welfare
increases, however, beyond a certain point, this reaches a turning point and
as  falls further, this is accompanied by a fall in welfare as well. This is due
to fact that, as consumption initially increases, it adds to welfare and beyond
a certain point, this gain in welfare is overturned by the adverse impact on
capital formation.
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Figure 13: Impact of Change in Population Growth Rate
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Population Growth Rate An increase in the population growth rate
reduces capital, output and wages whilst it leads to an increase in the interest
rate. Though there is an innitesimal fall in the tax rate, redistribution
shifts towards intragenerational, albeit at a slower pace. Aggregate welfare
is unambiguously lower in part due to the fall in capital. The fall in the
tax rate and the increased emphasis on intragenerational transfers helps to
reverse some of the fall in capital.
4.5 An Application
We now consider the applicability of the model to a sample of 27 countries
made up as follows: Europe(12) ; America(7), Africa(4), Asia(2), Pacic(2) :
We use the same estimates of ; ; ;  ; and n as previously. The value of 
is then xed to get estimates of  and  for each of the countries. As before,
we assume that the discount factors of the two types of agents are the same
and the only element of heterogeneity is in productivity. Data sources and
denitions are provided in Appendix 3.2. An overview of the endogenous
variables is given in the Table 6 and the results are summarised in Table 7.
150
Country n Alpha Beta Pi Psi R
Arg 1.3 0.26 0.91 0.76 0.50 1.11
Auz 1.3 0.30 0.93 0.75 0.80 1.06
Aus 0.4 0.26 0.95 0.66 0.75 1.05
Blg 0.2 0.26 0.93 0.73 0.63 1.08
Brz 1.7 0.25 0.65 0.58 0.38 1.36
Can 1.1 0.23 0.95 0.75 0.67 1.07
Chl 1.5 0.25 0.90 0.63 0.47 1.16
Egy 2.0 0.25 0.95 0.51 0.47 1.19
Fin 0.4 0.32 0.96 0.68 0.85 1.04
Fra 0.5 0.23 0.95 0.71 0.65 1.08
Ger 0.2 0.27 0.92 0.66 0.53 1.12
Ire 0.8 0.22 0.97 0.65 0.75 1.06
Isr 2.3 0.29 0.86 0.75 0.50 1.13
Ita 0.1 0.27 0.95 0.64 0.95 1.03
Mex 1.6 0.21 0.95 0.58 0.49 1.15
Neth 0.6 0.28 0.95 0.73 0.75 1.06
NZ 1.1 0.29 0.93 0.69 0.74 1.07
Nig 2.7 0.25 0.96 0.41 0.35 1.29
Per 1.8 0.29 0.88 0.76 0.62 1.10
Sng 2.3 0.22 0.95 0.74 0.45 1.11
SA 2.0 0.27 0.96 0.64 0.50 1.13
Spn 0.6 0.22 0.96 0.64 0.64 1.09
Swi 0.6 0.25 0.97 0.72 0.71 1.06
Tur 1.8 0.24 0.96 0.43 0.42 1.24
Ugn 3.2 0.17 0.96 0.23 0.35 1.39
UK 0.3 0.22 0.96 0.75 0.72 1.05
US 1.0 0.27 0.95 0.77 0.65 1.07
Table 6: Parameters Summary
E=1.1 E=1.25 E=1.5 E=2
Country Tau Mu
Brz 0.27 0.69
Chl 0.21 0.27
Egy 0.27 0.42
Fin 0.05 0.64
Ger 0.17 0.32
Isr 0.13 0.60
Nig 0.39 0.74
Per 0.10 0.30
SA 0.19 0.40
Tur 0.34 0.50
Ugn 0.53 0.13
Arg 0.15 0.10
Auz 0.08 0.15
NZ 0.11 0.22
Blg 0.16 0.07
Mex 0.31 0.11
Neth 0.13 0.10
US 0.14 0.04
Aus 0.22 0.23
Sng 0.25 0.12
Spn 0.27 0.02
Swi 0.20 0.04
Can 0.27 0.17
Fra 0.31 0.26
Ire 0.33 0.14
Ita 0.28 0.33
UK 0.26 0.03
E=1
Table 7: Inequality Aversion and Redistribution
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As mentioned earlier, for some range of parameter values and assuming
the planner treats everyone equally so there is no inequality-aversion, it is
not optimal to have redistribution from the rich to the poor. However, as
inequality aversion is introduced, there is an optimal level of tax that is levied
on the rich and this is then redistributed to the poor. In Table 7, as the value
of  increases, so does the inequality aversion of the planner. We nd that
in the rst column, all the agents are treated equally and in that case it is
optimal to redistribute in only 11 of the 27 countries. As inequality aversion
increases, more countries redistribute. For instance for an inequality aversion
of an extra 10 percent, 3 more countries redistribute and with  = 2 all the
27 countries redistribute.
Some of the results can be interpreted as follows: We can see that all
the developing countries in the sample are lumped in the rst column - and
these are the countries where, on average, inequality and the proportion
of poor is highest. Hence, we nd that even without having an inequality
aversion, the planner redistributes. The tax rates vary from 5 percent to 53
percent increasing in line with inequality and the proportion of the poor. The
value of ! varies between a minimum of 13 percent and a high of 74 percent
suggesting that for some countries a higher proportion of the redistribution
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is intergenerational, whilst in others in it is intragenerational. As we allow
for inequality aversion to increase, more of the European (OECD) countries
nd it optimal to redistribute.
One of the main di¤erences in the results this time round is the fact that
redistribution takes place over both periods and the temporal element varies
from one country to the other. We also nd that whilst previously, after
adjusting for ; it was optimal for all the countries to have intragenerational
redistribution, with the introduction of inequality aversion the results are
mixed. We nd that in most cases when redistribution occurs as a result of
inequality aversion, intergenerational redistribution accounts for the highest
proportion.
4.6 Conclusions
We have considered what is the optimal timing of transfers from the rich to
the poor. We assume that the planner has the option of giving a proportion
to the agent when he is young and the remainder in the form of pensions in
retirement. The question that we have addressed is what proportion should
be allocated to the agents in which period of their lifetime and how does this
vary with changes in the economic environment. Our basic results conrm
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that redistribution a¤ects capital formation and the higher the intergenera-
tional component of redistribution the greater the crowding out. However,
redistribution is welfare enhancing in that the benet for the poor more than
exceeds the cost to the rich. Whilst the poor benet from higher taxes and
hence more redistribution, this leads to a decline in the welfare of the rich.
We nd that the higher the inequality and the higher the inequality aversion
of the planner, the higher the tax rate. However, the increase in inequality
through a reduction in the proportion of the rich or a fall in productivity and
the increase in inequality aversion also leads to a tilting towards intragener-
ational redistribution. We attribute this to the fact that the increase in the
tax rate leads to a fall in capital but the tilting in the timing of the redis-
tribution leads to a reversal in the fall in capital. In richer economies, the
tax rate falls but there is a switch towards intergenerational redistribution
which ensures the economy remains dynamically e¢ cient. Increased myopia
leads to an innitesimal change in the tax rate but favours intragenerational
redistribution. Population ageing favours intergenerational redistribution.
Our results suggest that redistribution in the economy acts like an equili-
brating mechanism which ensures that falls (increases) in capital as a result
of changes in the economic environment are reversed through a tilting in the
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timing of redistribution.
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Appendix 4.1
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5 THE THREE PILLARS OF PENSIONS
AND WELFARE
5.1 Introduction
With the ageing of the population of many countries, developed and devel-
oping, the issue of pensions reforms has attracted signicant academic and
policy interest. This was given a further impetus after the wave of pen-
sions reforms that swept through Latin America, starting with Chile, in the
early 1980s. The initial debate focused on a shift from the traditional PAYG
pensions system to a fully-funded scheme, which would in theory be more
suited to population ageing. However, since the publication of the World
Banks (WB) agship report "Averting the Old Age Crisis" (1994), the gen-
eral consensus has been that the best way to provide for pensions is through
a multi-pillar system. The optimal design of pensions system has been in
the limelight ever since. The WB suggested that any pensions scheme had
to achieve 3 objectives and this was the main reason why it proposed the
3-pillars of pensions. Each of the pillars had one objective to fulll:
1. The rst pillar was compulsory and was set with the aim of ensuring
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everyone had a basic level of pensions in retirement. This pillar would
be publicly managed.
2. The second pillar, privately managed, would ensure that everyone is
saving for retirement.
3. The third pillar was set to encourage an element of voluntary savings
that would complement the income from Pillars 1 and 2.
The rst pillar provided a basic level of pensions to the elderly irrespective
of their level of contribution. In this respect, it had a redistributive element.
On the other hand, the second pillar would provide pensions according to
the level of contribution of the agents. The third pillar was considered as
a residual whereby people would undertake savings for retirement such that
their old-age consumption would be complemented with the pensions they
receive under Pillars 1 and 2. "Averting the Old Age Crisis" suggested
that by diversifying the pensions scheme, the risks would be more diversied
and at the same time there are other economic benets that could emerge.
The 3-pillar scheme would be more e¢ cient in that each pillar had clearly
dened objectives that it was meant to satisfy. In turn, the fact that the
benets under pillars 2 and 3 is closely related to the level of contribution
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of the individuals would reduce distortions in the economy. There were also
other benets that the 3-pillars were meant to achieve in terms of increasing
long term saving, deepening capital markets and promoting growth. Such a
system would enable a better diversication of not only economic risks but
also political risks.
However, the WB Report also acknowledged that the three pillar scheme
was best suited to the formal sector and in many developing countries, where
the pensions schemes are not well developed, if existing at all, the informal
sector had a key role to play. As such, everyone might not be covered under
the 3 pillars. In this respect, the WB added 2 further pillars to its scheme.
This was published in another inuential WB Report ("Old-Age Income Sup-
port in the Twenty-rst Century: An International Perspective on Pension
Systems and Reform") in 2005. Two new pillars were added in the form
of Pillar 0 and Pillar 4. Pillar 0 was non-contributory and was meant for
poverty reduction and was meant to be means tested. Pillar 4 reected the
importance of the informal sector in developing and low-income countries.
The ve pillars as proposed by the World Bank are summarised in Table 8.
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Target Group Main Criteria
Pillar Lifetime
Poor
Informal
Sector
Formal
Sector
Characteristics Participation Funding or
Collateral
0 X X x “Basic” or “social pension,” at
least social assistance
(universal or means tested)
Universal
or Mandated
Budget or general
revenues
1 X Public pension plan, publicly
managed (defined benefit or
notional defined contribution)
Mandated Contribution,
perhaps with
some financial
reserves
2 X Occupational or personal
pension plans (fully funded
defined benefit or fully funded
defined contribution)
Mandated Financial assets
3 x X X Occupational or personal
pension plans (partially or
fully funded defined benefit
or funded defined
contribution)
Voluntary Financial assets
4 X X X Access to informal support
(family), other formal social
programs (health care), and
other individual financial and
nonfinancial assets
(homeownership)
Voluntary Financial and
nonfinancial
Assets
Note: The size and appearance of x reflect the importance of each pillar for each target group in the following increasing order
of importance: x, X, X.
Table 8: Multipillar Pension Taxonomy (Source: WB, 2005)
Whilst the reform of pensions systems and its implications for economic
aggregates have attracted a lot of empirical attention since the publication
of "Averting the Old Age Crisis", little has been said on the redistributive
issues both from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Our key contribu-
tion thus comes from the perspective of the welfare issues in the design of
pensions systems. Unsurprisingly, the pensions reforms in Latin America has
attracted a lot of attention. Holzmann (1997) considers the impact of pen-
sion reforms on nancial market development and economic growth in Chile;
Bertranou et al. (2004) look at the impact on poverty reduction in 5 Latin
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American countries; Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) consider the macro-
economic e¤ects of pensions reforms in Chile; Edwards and Cox-Edwards
(2002) look at the impact on labour markets in Chile; Packard (2002) and
Gill et al. (2004) consider the Latin American experience with pensions re-
forms. Yermo (2002) considers the performance of funded pensions systems
in Latin America. Bailliu and Reisen (1997), Bosworth and Burtless (2003)
and Antolin et al. (2004) look at pensions reforms and savings; James et al.
(2003) investigates the gender issues in pensions reforms; Vittas (2000) and
Walker and Lefort (2001) consider reforms and capital market development.
In this paper, we aim to formalise the intuition behind the WB model and
seek to identify the mechanisms through which the pillars a¤ect the macro-
economy and welfare. We also consider some of the redistributive issues
involved with the design of pensions systems and the implications for wel-
fare. Using a two period overlapping generations general equilibrium model,
we design a three-pillar pensions system. The aim is very much as proposed
by the World Bank except for one di¤erence. The model consists of het-
erogeneous agents who di¤er according to their productivity (high/low) and
potentially their discount factors. Each agent pays a proportion of wages
in tax whilst working and expects to receive a pensions in retirement. The
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pensions the agent receives depends on Pillars 1, 2 and 3. Under Pillar 1
all agents receive the same level of pensions, irrespective of their type and
level of contribution. Under Pillar 2 the pensions an agent receives is propor-
tional to his contribution The agent then complements the pensions received
with his own voluntary savings - Pillar 3. Since Pillar 1 is redistributive, the
weight the planner attaches to Pillar 1 depends on his inequality-aversion.
The higher the aversion, the more the weight attached to Pillar 1. The low
productivity agent (the poor) prefers more redistribution than the high pro-
ductivity agent (the rich); he will thus always prefer a higher weight on Pillar
1. On the other hand, the rich agent will prefer Pillar 2. Once the planner
has chosen the weight, it nds the optimal level of tax rate consistent with
the competitive equilibrium.
The only di¤erence with the WB approach is that in this model, the
second Pillar is publicly managed. Those who argue in favour of Pillar 2
being privately managed do so on the premise that returns from the privately
managed portfolio (Pillar 2) tends to be higher than the publicly managed
portfolio (Pillar 1). However, Barr (2001) argues that there is no reason for
the privately managed portfolio to yield a higher return once the risks and
administration costs are included. In this respect, our assumption that Pillar
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1 and Pillar 2 have the same rate of return is not unreasonable and does not
a¤ect our general results in a signicant manner. The model is deliberately
kept simple to allow for analytical tractability in so far as possible.
The key ndings of this chapter can be summarised as follows: The type
of pensions system in place and the weight attached to each pillar can have a
signicant impact for capital formation and the welfare of the agents. Some
of the key results that we are able to derive analytically suggest:
1. An increase in the weight attached to Pillar 1 increases the welfare of
the poor (UP ) but reduces the welfare of the rich (UR). It also hinders
capital accumulation.
2. An increase in the proportion of the rich, and their productivity, leads
to an unambiguous increase in the welfare of the rich, the poor and
aggregate welfare.
3. An increase in the productivity of the poor leads to an unambiguous
increase in the welfare of the rich, the poor and aggregate welfare. The
welfare of the poor increases by more than that of the rich.
4. A decrease in the population growth rate (ageing) leads to an unam-
biguous marginal fall in the welfare of the rich, the poor and aggregate
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welfare.
To derive the optimal tax rate, we take recourse to simulations. The key
nding suggests that, for some plausible range of parameters, whether the
planner decides to attach a higher weight to Pillar 1 or to Pillar 2 makes
a marginal di¤erence to the optimal tax rate. The other ndings can be
summarised as:
1. An increase in the weight attached to Pillar 1 leads to a marginally
higher tax rate and a lower steady state capital. However, since the
welfare of the poor rises by more than the fall in the welfare of the rich,
aggregate welfare increases.
2. As the proportion of rich increases, the tax rate increases (suggesting
richer economies can a¤ord higher pensions). Steady state capital and
the welfare of the rich increase as well.
3. The productivity of the poor is non-linear with respect to the tax rate.
When the productivity of the poor is very low, the tax rate is very high.
However, as the productivity increases, this causes the tax rate to fall
and as the productivity increases further, the tax rate rises gradually.
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As the productivity of the poor increases, capital and aggregate welfare
increase as well.
The economic intuition is as follows: An increase in the tax rate leads
to a fall in steady-state capital but leads to an increase in the utility
of the poor. At low levels of productivity, the increase in the utility of
the poor is greater than the cost in terms of capital formation. Beyond
a certain level, the cost in terms of capital formation exceeds the gains
in the utility of the poor and the tax rate falls. At high levels of
productivity, the increase in the tax rate ensures the economy remains
dynamically e¢ cient.
4. The impact of population ageing on the tax rate is innitesimal. Though
the tax rate changes innitesimally as the population ages and capital
increases, aggregate welfare falls.
5. If both sets of agents are equally impatient, the tax rate and capital
falls whilst aggregate welfare increases. On the other hand, if only the
poor are impatient, there is a non-linear impact on capital. The tax
rate falls and beyond a certain point it is no longer optimal to have a
social security system. Though aggregate welfare increases, this gives
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rise to a situation where the welfare of the poor can exceed that of the
rich.
The rest of this chapter is as follows: in Section 2 we describe the set up
of the economy. Section 3 derives the competitive equilibrium whilst Section
4 considers the planners problem in terms of nding the optimal tax rate.
We then test the model to data from 23 countries. Section 6 concludes and
provides some potential extensions.
5.2 The Economy
We consider an innitely lived overlapping generations economy in the
Samuelson-Diamond spirit. Economic activity takes place over discrete time
t 2 f0; 1:::;1g and there is no uncertainty. The economy consists of two
types of utility maximising agents; h; heterogeneous in their productivity
 and possibly their discounting of the future; prot maximising perfectly
competitive rms; and a welfare maximising social planner. The planner
maximises the welfare of all agents born at time t. At each time t, two
factors, an amount of capital; k; and labour; l; are available as inputs to
production and a homogeneous good; y; is produced.
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5.2.1 Agents
At time t, one young generation and an old generation live simultaneously.
Population grows at a constant rate n: Hence, at any time t, there are (1+n)
more (young) workers than (old) retirees. The population at t can thus be
expressed as: Lt + Lt 1 = (2 + n)Lt: Lt refers to the agents born at t.
Following Samuelson (1958), the distribution of the population is considered
to be stationary. Therefore, the proportions and types of individuals remain
the same across generations.
When young, each agent provides one unit of labour inelastically. When
old the labour endowment is zero. There are two types of agents who di¤er
in terms of their productivity  2 (0; 1] and possibly their discounting of
the future. For some cases, we assume in line with Becker (1990), that the
poor can potentially attach a lower weight to their future consumption than
the rich. In competitive markets, the productivity determines the wages the
agents receive. We classify the high productivity agents as rich and the low
productivity agents as poor. The rich and the poor make up proportions 
and (1  ) of the economy respectively. For ease of manipulation, let us
normalise the productivity of the rich to 1 such that any agent with  < 1
as poor.
167
Agents maximise utility by maximising consumption uh(cht ; c
h
t+1) subject
to the budget constraints over their lifetime. They are non-altruistic: they
are born without any assets and leave no bequests. When young, the agents
choose the levels of consumption and savings which maximise their utility,
whilst when old the agents live o¤ their savings and pensions. For ease of
manipulation, the intertemporal utility function is taken to be additive and
log-linear. The utility function is thus strictly concave, since more consump-
tion is preferred to less, and twice di¤erentiable: u0(c) > 0 and u00(c) < 0.
The function also satises lim
c!0
u0(c) = 1 such that subject to its disposable
income, the household will always choose a positive level of consumption
when maximising life-cycle utility. We can express the utility-maximising
problem of a rich agent as follows:
Max
fcyt ;cot+1;stg
: uh = ln cy;ht + 
h ln co;ht+1 (1)
subject to :
cy;ht =  
hwt (1  )  sht (2)
co;ht+1 = Rt+1s
h
t + P
h
t+1 (3)
Eqn. (1) suggests that the agents maximise utility over both periods of
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their lifetime and future consumption is discounted by a factor h 2 (0; 1)11:
The budget constraints suggest when young, the agent earns a productivity-
related wage  hwt out of which a constant proportion  is taxed. In line with
Diamond (1965), the disposable income is then either consumed or saved.
When old, the agent consumes his savings and the interest rates earned
thereon plus the pensions P ht+1 he receives. P
h
t+1 is based on the weight the
planner allocates to Pillars 1 and Pillars 2. We discuss this further in the
next section.
5.2.2 Firms
A large number of identical rms produce a homogeneous good using an
identical economy-wide Cobb Douglas production function. The production
function can be represented as Y = KL1 ; where  is the share of capital
in production.
In intensive form, this production function reduces to y = k. Firms max-
imise prot by taking factor prices, which are paid their marginal products in
a competitive setting, as given. It is assumed that the labour market clears
such that labour demand equals labour supply and the wages received by a
worker depends on his level of productivity. The economy is endowed with
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an initial capital stock K0 > 0 and capital depreciates fully from one period
to the next. We assume no technological change. The production function
satises the usual conditions such that f(0) = 0, f 0(k) > 0, f 00(k) < 0 and
the Inada conditions: lim
k!0
f 0(k) =1 and lim
k!1
f 0(k) = 0.
5.2.3 Social Planner
The social planner maximises the welfare of all agents born at time t. The
planner chooses to impose a tax on the wages of the young agents working
and allocate the proceeds to those who are retired at time t. The tax is
imposed on both the rich and the poor at a rate  . This rate is assumed to
be constant through time. Hence, the total tax revenue raised by the planner
is T = Ltwt + (1  )Lt wt and this can be expressed as:
Tt = [ + (1  ) ] Ltwt (4)
Under a balanced budget rule, the planner determines which proportions
! 2 (0; 1) to allocate to Pillar 1 and the remainder (1  !) to Pillar 2. !
can be seen as a reection of the degree of inequality aversion of the planner.
The higher the value of !, the higher the perceived inequality aversion, and
the higher the degree of intragenerational redistribution.
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Pillar 1 Pillar 1 ensures that everyone has a minimum level of income in
retirement and it is allocated to all the old agents irrespective of their level
of productivity. Hence, the total amount allocated to Pillar 1 is P 1 and this
is allocated in proportions  and (1  ) to the rst pillar pensions of the
rich (P 1;r = Lt 1p1t ) and the poor (P
1;p = Lt 1p1t ) , respectively:
P 1 = !T = P 1;r + (1  )P 1;p (5)
Hence, each agent is guaranteed to receive p1 in retirement under Pillar
1. Since there is no distinction according to ability, each agent receives the
following in pensions under the rst pillar:
p1t = ! (1 + n) [ + (1  ) ] wt (6)
Pillar 1 has a redistributive component in that although all the agents pay
the taxes on their wages (which is based on their ability), the contribution
is not taken into consideration under Pillar 1. The poor are relatively better
o¤ under this scheme. There is thus an element of intragenerational redistri-
bution that takes place under Pillar 1 since the rich agents, who contribute
more that the poor agents end up receiving the same level of pensions as the
poor.
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Pillar 2 Pillar 2 provides an additional pension to an agent proportional
to his contribution. The contribution rates, , of the rich and the poor can
be expressed as a function of the taxes they paid compared to the total tax
(T ) raised.  can be expressed as:
r =
Ltwt
[ + (1  ) ]Ltwt =

[ + (1  ) ] (7)
p =
(1  ) Ltwt
[ + (1  ) ]Ltwt =
(1  ) 
[ + (1  ) ] (8)
The total payments under pillar 2 is (1  !)T and this is allocated to the
rich and the poor in the proportions of r and p, respectively. Hence, total
pensions paid under Pillar 2, P 2; and the amount received by the old rich,
p2;r; and the poor, p2;p; can be expressed as:
P 2 = (1  !)T =  (1  !)T
[ + (1  ) ] +
(1  ) (1  !)T
[ + (1  ) ] (9)
p2;r =
r (1  !)T
Lt 1
= (1 + n) (1  !) wt (10)
p2;p =
p (1  !)T
(1  )Lt 1 = (1 + n) (1  !)  wt (11)
Under Pillar 2, we note that the pensions the agents receive is a function
of their contribution. Comparing Eqns (10) and (11) above, it can be seen
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that the pensions the agents receive under Pillar 2 is a function of their
abilities. There is no intragenerational redistribution under this pillar.
Pillar 3 Pillar 3 is entirely voluntary and seeks to ensure that the agents
save a proportion of their income voluntarily. Though this could be encour-
aged by allowing for tax deductions or the use of other instruments, we allow
this pillar to be entirely voluntary and dependent on the utility maximisa-
tion decision of the agents. In this framework, government policy does not
provide explicit incentives for the promotion of Pillar 3. However, we cannot
rule out the fact that government policy to promote Pillars 1 and 2 can lead
to a crowding out of Pillar 3.
Total Pensions We restrict the denition of total pensions as that accruing
under Pillars 1 and 2. Pillar 3 is accounted for separately. The total pensions
received by the agents consists of the payments under Pillars 1 and 2. Hence,
P h = p1 + p2;h: The total pensions received by the rich and the poor are:
P rt+1 = [! (1  ) (   1) + 1] (1 + n) wt+1 (12)
P pt+1 = [! (1   ) +  ] (1 + n) wt+1 (13)
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In the above equations, ! determines the extent to which the pensions
system is redistributive. If ! = 1, there is no Pillar 2 and the system is
completely redistributive. On the other hand, if ! = 0, pensions are simply
based on ability - and there is no Pillar 1.
5.3 Competitive Equilibrium
Given the householdsand the rmsobjectives, a competitive equilibrium
for the economy can be dened as a sequence of consumption fcyt ; cotg1t=0
such that:
1. Given a sequence of taxes and transfers, f hwt;Pht g1t=0 , and the pre-
vailing competitive wages, wt, and interest rate, Rt, solve the individ-
uals optimisation problem subject to satisfying the Euler equation;
2. Factors of production are paid their marginal products (wt = (1  
)kt ;Rt = k
 1
t ) and labour and capital markets clear such that
LDt = Lt and St = Kt+1;
3. The planners budget is always balanced hence taxes raised is redistrib-
uted between Pillars 1 and 2: T = P 1 + P 2;
4. The economys resource constraint is always satised. In intensive form,
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the constraint is dened as the allocation of current output, yt, between
consumption for the two generations living simultaneously and savings.
yt = c
y
t +
cot
(1 + n)
+ (1 + n)kt+1 (14)
Given the above denition of competitive equilibrium, we can express the
intertemporal budget constraints for the rich and the poor as:
cy;ht +
co;ht+1
Rt+1
=  hwt(1  ) + P
h
t+1
Rt+1
(15)
We can then write the Lagrangian as:
Max
fcyt ;cot+1g
: ` = ln cy;ht + 
h ln co;ht+1   [co;ht+1  Rt+1
n
 hwt(1  )  cy;ht
o
+ P ht+1]
(16)
and derive the standard Euler equation which dictates the optimal allo-
cation of consumption over the two periods of an agents lifetime. h refers
to the discount factor of the agents. The Euler equation is:
cot+1 = 
hRt+1c
y
t (17)
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We can now proceed to derive the optimal levels of consumption and
savings of both sets of agents. The optimal levels of consumption and savings
of both sets of agents are shown in Appendix 5.1.
The optimal levels of consumption and savings of the agents depend on
their disposable income and the discounted value of the pensions received.
We nd that there is potential crowding out that arises from the provision of
pensions under Pillar 1 which crowds out (private) savings - which determines
Pillar 3. We also note that the higher the value of !, the greater the degree of
crowding out. As such, there is greater crowding out under Pillar 1 - which
is more redistributive - that under Pillar 2. The optimal level of savings of
the agents can be seen in Eqns (18)  (19)
sy;r =
1
[1 + ]

wt(1  )  [! (1  ) (   1) + 1] (1 + n) wt+1
Rt+1

(18)
sy;p =
1
[1 + ]

 wt(1  )  [! (1   ) +  ] (1 + n) wt+1
Rt+1

(19)
Based on Eqns (18)   (19), we can proceed to derive the steady-state
capital stock in the economy. We assume complete depreciation12 of capital
from one period to the next. As such, capital formation is a function of Pillar
3. Hence, although there is crowding out , the aggregate level of savings in
the economy should be positive. We can then characterise capital formation
12In the non-conventional sense: the rich consume capital and the young replenish it.
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as the savings of the young rich and poor, i.e., St = Srt + S
p
t = Kt+1. In
intensive form, this reduces to:
(1 + n) kt+1 = s
r
t + (1  ) spt (20)
Hence, in steady state where kt+1 = kt = k; the capital available per
unit of worker is a function of (; ; ;  ; ; n;  ; !). The steady state capital
k (; ; ;  ; ; n;  ; !) is thus a¤ected not only by the pensions system, but
also by proportions of rich and poor in the economy; the level of productivity,
and the usual parameters pertaining to the discount factor, share of capital
in production; and the population growth rate. When the agents have the
same discount factor such that  =  = ; the capital per unit of worker is:
k =

 f + (1  ) g(1  )(1  )
(1 + n) f(1 + )+ [ + (1  ) ] (1  )g
 1
1 
(21)
In this case, k (; ;  ; ; n; ) and ! does not matter. Hence, when the
agents have the same discount factor, the weight attached to Pillars 1 and 2
does not matter. On the other hand, we can see from eqn. (1) that since !
appears only in the denominator, a fall in ! (that is an increased emphasis
on Pillar 2) leads to an increased level of k:We consider the Eqn. (21) where
agents have the same discount factor to do some comparative statics on k:
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Proposition 12 (a) An increase in  leads to an increase in k
(b) An increase in  leads to an increase in k
(c) An increase in  leads to an increase in k
(d) An increase in  reduces k
(e) An increase in n reduces k
Proof. The Proof is in Appendix 5.1.
We consider the general steady state capital Eqn. 1 (Appendix 5.1) to
consider the impact of ! on k.
Proposition 13 An increase in ! leads to a fall in k if  > : There
is no impact if  = :
Proof. The Proof is in Appendix 5.1.
Since we are only concerned with the case of  >  and  = , an increase
in ! can only lead to a reduction in k or have no impact on k, depending on
 and : This conrms our hypothesis that the higher the weight attached
to Pillar 1, the greater the extent of crowding out.
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5.4 The Planners Problem
For a given aversion to inequality, !; the planner maximises social welfare
by maximising the utility of all agents born at time t. As discussed earlier,
the aversion to inequality is determined by the weight attached to Pillars
1. The higher the inequality aversion of the planner, the greater the extent
of redistribution undertaken and the higher the weight attached to Pillar 1.
To achieve its objective for a given !; the planner considers the competi-
tive equilibrium and chooses  to maximise fcyt ; cot+1; kt+1g1t=0 subject to the
allocation fytg1t=0. In steady state, the planners problem can be expressed
as:
Max :
fg
V =
1X
t=0
t (U (cr) + U (cp)) (22)
We write the planners problem as that of maximising the utility of all
agents born at time t.  6 1 indicates the weight the planner attaches to
future generations. We can then write the welfare function in intensive form
as:
V =  [ln(cy;r) +  ln(co;r)] + (1  ) [ln(cy;p) +  ln(co;p)] (23)
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The rst part of eqn. (23) refers to the proportion of rich born at time
any point in time in the economy. The second part considers the poor and
their weight in the economy. The welfare function can then be expressed as
a function of the lifetime consumption of all the agents. The consumption
levels follow from Appendix 5.1.
We can then express V as a function of the policy-parameters ! and 
and non-policy parameters (; ; ; ;  ; n)
V = U ln [J + [L+M!]  ] + Z ln [N + [O + P!]  ] (24)
+Q [lnA(1  )  ln [B + fG+H!g  ]]
where A; B; G; H; J; Q; U; L; M and Z are all non-policy parameters
and dened in Appendix 5.1.
The impact of ;  and n onWelfare Given the general welfare function
(24), we can consider the impact of ;  and n on aggregate welfare. For
ease of manipulation, we assume that  = ! = 0 and the agents have the
same discount factor  =  = : We can then rewrite the aggregate welfare
function; V; and the utility functions of the rich; UR; and poor, UP; as:
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V = z [ln [ + (1  ) ] + (1 + ) (1  ) ln   ln (1 + n)] + z113
UR = z [ln [ + (1  ) ]  ln (1 + n)] + z214
UP = [ln [ + (1  ) ]  ln (1 + n)] + (1 + ) ln + z315
where z =
h
(1+)+( 1)
(1 )
i
and z1; z2 and z3 refer to parameters indepen-
dent of ;  and n.
Proposition 14 (a) An increase in  increases welfare unambigu-
ously
(b) For ; an increases in  increases welfare of the rich and
the poor by the same extent
Proof. The Proof is in Appendix 5.1.
Although in the case where the agents have the same discount factor,
the increase in the welfare of the rich and the poor is the same when the
proportion of rich increases, this might di¤er if the agents do not have the
same discount factor.
Proposition 15 (a) An increase in  increases aggregate welfare
unambiguously
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(b) For an increase in  ; the welfare of the poor increases by
more than that of the rich.
Proof. The Proof is in Appendix 5.1.
Proposition 16 (a) An increase in n decreases welfare unambigu-
ously
(b) For ; an increase in n reduces the welfare of the rich and
the poor by the same extent
Proof. The Proof is in Appendix 5.1.
The impact of ! and  on Welfare of Rich and Poor From the
aggregate welfare function, still assuming the same discount factor, we can
express the utility of the rich and that of the poor as:
UR =
2664
h
(1+) ( 1)
(1 )
i
[ln(1  )  ln (b+ c)]
+ (1 + ) ln [ [b+ c ] + a [! (1  ) (   1) + 1] (1 + n)  ] + z316
3775
UP =
2664
h
(1+) ( 1)
(1 )
i
[ln(1  )  ln (b+ c)]
+ (1 + ) ln [ [b+ c ] + a [! (1   ) +  ] (1 + n)  ] + z417
3775
where:
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a =  f + (1  ) g(1  );
b = (1 + ) (1 + n);
c = [ + (1  ) ] (1 + n) (1  ):
Proposition 17 The utility of the rich (poor) is decreasing (increas-
ing) in !
Proposition 18 The impact of  depends on whether @UP
@
T @UR
@
:
Proof. The Proof is in Appendix 5.1.
If @UP
@
> @UR
@
; this implies that the increase on the utility of the poor is
higher than that of the rich. Hence, the tax improves aggregate welfare.
5.4.1 The Optimal Level of 
To nd the optimal tax rate consistent with ! and the competitive equilib-
rium, we proceed to di¤erentiate V with respect to  in Eqn. (24) : This
yields:
@V
@
=
U [L+M!]
[J + [L+M!]  ]
+
Z [O + P!]
[N + [O + P!]  ]
  Q
[1   ] 
Q [G+H!]
[B + fG+H!g  ] = 0
(25)
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where the non-policy parameters are dened as before. Given the nature
of the Eqn. (25), we have recourse to simulations to derive the optimal level
of  .
5.4.2 Simulation Results and Sensitivity Analysis
We now consider the behaviour of the model for a given set of parameters.
These parameters have been chosen to initially yield a dynamically e¢ cient
solution and provide plausible values of  for ! 2 (0; 1). We assume the
agents di¤er in terms of their productivity and discount factor, which is taken
to be line in line with values used for macro simulations (see de la Croix and
Michel, 2002; Krueger and Kubler, 2006). We initially set the discount factor
at 0.96 for both agents, though when carrying out the sensitivity analysis we
set the discount factor of the poor to 0.9. The population growth rate is set
at 1 percent. In the baseline, we assume that the poor earn 75 percent of
what the rich earn and we assume that the rich, ; make up 40 percent of the
economy, with the poor accounting for the remaining 60 percent. We carry
out sensitivity analysis on all the parameters.
Baseline Results The baseline results are presented in Table 9:
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Alpha Beta Theta Pi Psi n
0.25 0.96 0.96 0.4 0.75 0.01
Omega Capital Output Wages Interest Tau UR UP V
0 0.14018 0.61189 0.45892 1.0912 0.13184 -2.8203 -3.3841 -3.1586
0.5 0.13944 0.61108 0.45831 1.0956 0.1336 -2.8387 -3.368 -3.1562
1 0.13881 0.61039 0.45779 1.0993 0.13511 -2.8576 -3.3517 -3.154
Alpha Beta Theta Pi Psi n
0.25 0.96 0.9 0.4 0.75 0.01
Omega Capital Output Wages Interest Tau UR UP V
0 0.14044 0.61217 0.45913 1.0897 0.12244 -2.819 -3.2797 -3.0954
0.5 0.13975 0.61142 0.45857 1.0937 0.124 -2.836 -3.2652 -3.0935
1 0.13916 0.61078 0.45808 1.0972 0.12532 -2.8535 -3.2505 -3.0917
Table 9: Baseline Simulations
The rst part of the results in Table 9 consider the situation where the
agents have the same discount factor  =  whilst the second part considers
the case where  > : When ! = 0; there is only Pillar 2 and the pension
is totally ability based. On the other hand, if ! = 1 the pension is under
Pillar 1 and is completely redistributive. For ! = 0:5; an equal weight is
attached to Pillars 1 and 2. In both cases, we nd that as ! tends to 1,
steady state capital falls. Since the weight attached to each pillar a¤ects the
capital stock, it also has implications for output, wages and interest rates.
Hence, an economy with a higher weight to Pillar 1 will tend to have a higher
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interest rate than an economy with a higher weight on Pillar 2. Thus, the
more redistributive the system, the higher the interest rate. We can thus
interpret redistribution as a distortion in a dynamically e¢ cient economy
which hinders capital formation.
We also nd that the tax rate for the current set of parameters is around
12-13 percent. The tax rate is higher when  =  than when  > , and this
is in line with previous ndings. The intuition behind this result follows from
the fact that steady-state capital is greater for  =  than  >  thereby
suggesting a richer economy can a¤ord more generous pensions.
The results in so far as the welfare of the rich and the poor are concerned
suggests that the welfare of the poor is higher the higher the value of !;
ie, the higher the redistributive component of the pensions system. On the
other hand, the welfare of the rich falls as ! increases. These results are
consistent with the earlier proposition suggesting @UR
@!
< 0 and @UP
@!
> 0:
Aggregate welfare is higher as ! increases and  > : The overall impact of
! on welfare can be summarised as follows:
 An increase in ! leads to an increase in the tax rate;
 The increase in ! and the tax rate reduces the capital stock (with
implications for output, wages and the interest rate);
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 The increase in the tax rate reduces the welfare of the rich, whilst
increasing the welfare of the poor (through the redistributive compo-
nent);
 The overall impact depends on whether the welfare loss arising from
the fall in capital and the welfare of the rich is compensated for by the
gain in the welfare of the poor.
Sensitivity Analysis The baseline results gave an overview of the opti-
mal tax rate and implications for welfare for given values of ! and a set of
parameters. However, to get a better understanding of the behaviour of the
endogenous variables, we now allow for the exogenous parameters to vary.
This is done with the aim of getting a better understanding of how the pol-
icy variables behave with respect to changes in the selected parameters. We
change one parameter at a time and keep all the others constant. We note
that for some of the parameters, it is no longer optimal to have a pensions
policy beyond a certain point.
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Figure 14: Impact of changes in Pi
Proportion of Rich When there is an increase in the proportion of rich,
capital increases unambiguously, however, in line with previous propositions,
we notice that for higher levels of !; the capital stock is lower. Hence, as the
proportion of rich increases, the increase in capital leads to higher output
and wages as well as lower interest rates. However, the impact on (capital
and) interest rate is much lower than before in that for instance when the
proportion of rich increases from 1% to 20%, the interest rate falls from
around 15.5% to around 12.3-12.6%. The economy remains dynamically
e¢ cient throughout.
In so far as the tax rate is concerned, as the proportion of rich increases,
the tax rate increases simultaneously. This suggests that richer economies
are able to a¤ord more generous pensions. For instance, when the proportion
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of rich is 1%, the tax rate is around 9.2%. However, as the proportion of rich
rises, the tax rate rises as well, to around 15.6% when the proportion of rich
rises to 99%. The increase in the tax rate can be seen as a mechanism that
ensures the economy remains dynamically e¢ cient at all times even when
the proportion of rich tends to 1. As before, the tax rate remains marginally
higher the higher the redistributive component.
Whilst as the proportion of rich increases welfare increases unambigu-
ously, the welfare of both the rich and the poor initially falls. However,
beyond a certain point, the welfare of both groups increases as the propor-
tion of rich goes up. This turning point is reached faster for the poor than
the rich. We can try and explain some of this mechanism as follows:
 As  increases, the tax rate goes up but so does the capital stock;
 Initially, the increases in the tax rates exceeds the gains from the in-
crease in capital;
 However, for the poor, the increase in tax rates increases aggregate
welfare faster through the redistributive component;
 Eventually, for both groups, the increase in capital eventually exceeds
the rise in taxes.
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Figure 15: Impact of changes in Psi
Productivity of Poor
The productivity of the poor yields some interesting implications in so far
as the key endogenous variables are concerned. In line with our earlier propo-
sition, as the productivity of the poor increases, the capital stock increases
unambiguously. The productivity of the poor has a signicant impact on the
interest rate but the economy remains dynamically e¢ cient throughout. As
before, we note that capital is higher when there is a lower weight on the rst
Pillar. This is in line with our previous discussion suggesting a high level of
redistribution hinders capital accumulation.
Compared to capital, the behaviour of the tax rate is somewhat unex-
pected. When the productivity of the poor is very low the tax rate is fairly
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high (example when the productivity of the poor is 1% that of the rich, the
tax rate varies between a high of 35% for ! = 0:75 and 30% for ! = 0:25).
However, as the productivity of the poor increases to 20% that of the rich,
the tax rate falls in all cases varying between 5.4% and 11.6%. The tax rate
then turns up (at di¤erent points) as the productivity of the poor increases
further. When the productivity of the poor is 99% that of the rich, the
tax rate is around 14.6%. This lends further credence to our suggestion that
richer economies are able to a¤ord more generous pensions. As before, the
tax rate is higher the higher the weight attached to Pillar 1.
As the productivity of the poor increases, aggregate welfare increases
unambiguously and the same applies to the utility of the poor. However
whilst the utility of the rich initially improves due to the falling taxes, it
then falls for a while (as the tax starts to rise) before picking up when the
productivity of the poor is fairly high. The increase in the welfare of the rich
suggest the gains from the increases in capital exceed the cost of the rising
taxes. Unlike the poor, we note that the welfare of the rich is highest when a
higher weight is attached to Pillar 2 (could also be due to the fact that this
yields a lower tax rate). The mechanism could be as follows:
 As  increases, the capital stock rises gradually whilst the tax rate
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initially falls and this increases the welfare of the rich;
 However, the tax rate then starts to rise gradually and this exceeds the
gain from the rise in capital;
 Eventually, as the capital stock continues to rise, this exceeds the cost
of higher taxes and the welfare of the rich picks up again.
Population Growth Rate One of the main reasons the World Bank sug-
gested the introduction of a three-pillar based pensions system was to miti-
gate some of the adverse e¤ects of an ageing population on the scal position
of governments. Though this model considers a balanced budget rule, we
can also consider the implications of an ageing population on taxation and
aggregate welfare. With an ageing population, there is a marginal increase
in capital available per worker and this in turn results in a decrease in the
interest rate. Output and wages increase marginally. However, the results
pertaining to the tax rate yield some interesting insights. The ageing pop-
ulation does not have any (major) impact on the tax rate. In fact as the
population ages, the tax rate falls innitesimally. The earlier results in so far
as welfare is concerned continue to hold in that the higher the redistributive
component, the higher the welfare of the poor whilst the welfare of the rich
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Figure 16: Impact of Change in Population Growth Rate
is lower. However, as the population ages, the welfare of both the rich and
the poor falls innitesimally. Aggregate welfare is also innitesimally lower.
Some of the results can be explained as follows:
 As n falls, k rises marginally with an accompanying fall in the interest
rate.
 However, the tax rate falls innitesimally. The impact on welfare of
both agents is innitesimal as well.
Discount Factor In so far we have assumed that (= 0:96) > (= 0:9):
We now allow for these values to di¤er.
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Figure 17: Impact of Change in Discount Factors (Same discount factor)
Firstly, we consider the case where the agents have the same discount
factor . We initially assume that all the agents have perfect foresight such
that  = 1 and then allow for myopia to set in. The agents then discount the
future at a higher rate. When both agents discount the future at a higher
rate, this leads to a decline in capital available per worker, initially at a slow
rate but this rate eventually accelerates. This leads to a similar rise in the
rate of interest. As before we note that the capital stock remains higher when
a lower weight is attached to !, that is, the less redistribution there is in the
system.
We also note that, as the agents discount the future at a higher rate, this
leads to a fall in the tax rate. The tax rate is initially around 14%, with the
tax rate still higher under redistribution. However, as the agents discount
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the future at a higher rate, this leads to a fall in the tax rate such that
when  = 0:6; the tax rate falls to between 0 and 2%. The lower tax rate
compensates for some of the fall arising in steady state capital as a result of
the higher discounting of the future.
The welfare levels of all the agents, as well as aggregate welfare, increase
as the agents discount the future at a higher rate. We can explain the results
as follows:
 As the agents discount the future at a higher rate, this has an adverse
impact on the capital stock
 However, part of this is reversed as the tax rate falls as well
 The utility gains to the consumers is higher as a result of the higher
level of consumption enjoyed as well as the lower tax rate combine to
exceed the impact of the reduction in capital.
It can also be seen that as  falls under 0.6, then the tax rate falls further
and beyond a certain point, it is optimal to have no pensions policy in place.
In the second set of experiments, we allow for the rich to be "life-cyclers"
such that they do not discount the future whilst allowing for the poor to
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Figure 18: Impact of Change in Discount Factors (Di¤ering Discount factors)
su¤er from increasing levels of myopia such that  > : As the poor discount
the future at a higher rate, this has the e¤ect of reducing the tax rate and
this e¤ect dominates the resulting reduction in capital as a result of lower
saving, such that the capital stock initially rises.
In the early stages, we note that the tax rate is still higher the higher
the weight attached to Pillar 1 but these results are overturned beyond a
certain point. The tax rate keeps on falling as increasing levels of myopia set
in. However, beyond a certain point, the resulting fall in capital from the
decline in capital from the higher discounting of the poor results in a lower
capital (despite the tax rate falling). At high levels of myopia, it is optimal
to have no pensions at all.
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The welfare of the rich improves as the poor discount the future at higher
rates. This is in part due to the falling tax rate. The poor benet from the
fact that their consumption is higher. Beyond a certain point, the welfare of
the poor is higher than that of the rich. Aggregate welfare rises as well. The
results can be summarised as:
 Capital falls as poor discount at higher rate, but the tax rate falls as
well;
 This initially leads to an increase in capital. However, beyond a certain
point, even the fall in the tax rate cannot compensate for the fall in
capital;
 The welfare of the rich improves as a result of lower taxes;
 The poor benet from higher consumption.
5.5 An Application
We now test the model to a sample of 23 countries. The sample consists
of 10 European countries (inc. Turkey); 6 countries in America (5 Latin
America); 3 African countries and the others made up of Israel, Singapore,
Australia and New Zealand. Though the World Bank introduced the 3 pillars
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Country n Alpha Beta Pi Psi
Arg 1.3 0.26 0.91 0.76 0.50
Auz 1.3 0.30 0.93 0.75 0.80
Blg 0.2 0.26 0.93 0.73 0.63
Brz 1.7 0.25 0.65 0.58 0.38
Chl 1.5 0.25 0.90 0.63 0.47
Egy 2.0 0.25 0.95 0.51 0.47
Fin 0.4 0.32 0.96 0.68 0.85
Fra 0.5 0.23 0.95 0.71 0.65
Ger 0.2 0.27 0.92 0.66 0.53
Ire 0.8 0.22 0.97 0.65 0.75
Isr 2.3 0.29 0.86 0.75 0.50
Ita 0.1 0.27 0.95 0.64 0.95
Mex 1.6 0.21 0.95 0.58 0.49
Neth 0.6 0.28 0.95 0.73 0.75
NZ 1.1 0.29 0.93 0.69 0.74
Nig 2.7 0.25 0.96 0.41 0.35
Per 1.8 0.29 0.88 0.76 0.62
Sng 2.3 0.22 0.95 0.74 0.45
SA 2.0 0.27 0.96 0.64 0.50
Swi 0.6 0.25 0.97 0.72 0.71
Tur 1.8 0.24 0.96 0.43 0.42
UK 0.3 0.22 0.96 0.75 0.72
US 1.0 0.27 0.95 0.77 0.65
Table 10: Parameter Summary
of pensions with the aim of reducing the stress on the rst pillar due to an
ageing population, one of the concerns raised (see Gill et al. (2004) and Boeri
et al. (2006)) is that the rst pillar still has a very high weight in the scheme
and the third pillar is almost non-existent. In this section, we assume that
! = 0:75, that is 75% of the pensions scheme is through the rst pillar. We
estimate probable values for ; ; ;  ; and n as before and assume that the
agents have the same discount factor. Agents thus di¤er according to their
productivity only. An overview of the parameters is given in Table 10.
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Country k R Tau UR UP V
Arg 0.141 1.105 0.116 -2.814 -4.006 -3.100
Auz 0.169 1.042 0.044 -3.022 -3.438 -3.126
Blg 0.147 1.077 0.119 -2.843 -3.650 -3.061
Brz 0.114 1.271 0.038 -2.342 -3.893 -2.993
Chl 0.128 1.170 0.123 -2.759 -4.056 -3.239
Egy 0.120 1.227 0.123 -2.833 -4.179 -3.492
Fin 0.179 1.031 0.009 -3.165 -3.481 -3.266
Fra 0.136 1.067 0.179 -2.739 -3.460 -2.948
Ger 0.142 1.121 0.091 -2.877 -4.009 -3.262
Ire 0.134 1.056 0.202 -2.717 -3.197 -2.885
Isr 0.148 1.127 0.041 -2.863 -4.107 -3.174
Ita 0.164 1.010 0.114 -2.912 -3.003 -2.945
Mex 0.114 1.167 0.206 -2.664 -3.840 -3.158
Neth 0.160 1.046 0.088 -2.963 -3.486 -3.104
NZ 0.161 1.061 0.060 -2.977 -3.532 -3.149
Nig 0.101 1.401 0.108 -2.828 -4.750 -3.962
Per 0.156 1.082 0.047 -2.896 -3.760 -3.103
Sng 0.123 1.130 0.199 -2.695 -3.985 -3.031
SA 0.136 1.161 0.100 -2.937 -4.190 -3.388
Swi 0.147 1.054 0.150 -2.857 -3.453 -3.024
Tur 0.109 1.297 0.134 -2.802 -4.356 -3.688
UK 0.136 1.042 0.202 -2.701 -3.242 -2.836
US 0.153 1.063 0.108 -2.918 -3.684 -3.094
Table 11: Results Summary for omega=0.75
Based on the above parameters, we can derive the optimal tax rate for
the countries and also consider the implications for the other endogenous
parameters. The results for ! = 0:75 are shown in Table 11.
We nd that for ! = 0:75, the tax rate varies between 0.9% for Finland
and 20.6% for Mexico with an average of 11.3% for the sample. All the
economies are dynamically e¢ cient for the given parameters with the interest
rate being 1% for Italy and 40% for Nigeria with an average of 12% for
the sample. Allowing ! to fall, that is putting a higher weight on Pillar 2
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increases capital and reduces the interest rate; the tax rate falls marginally
and the welfare of the rich increase but the welfare of the poor and aggregate
welfare falls.
5.6 Conclusions
The issue of pensions and pensions reforms is likely to remain on the policy
agenda for a while. Given the economic and political ramications it entails,
the design of an optimal pensions policy has to take into account the various
parameters in the economy and the extent of inequality. In this paper, we
have formalised the intuition behind the WB model and designed a pensions
system based on 3 pillars with the triple objectives of achieving redistribution,
consumption-smoothing and promoting voluntary savings. We extend a pay-
as-you-go pensions system to include the two pillars as suggested by the
World Bank (1994). One of our key results suggests that the weight the
planner attaches to Pillar 1 or Pillar 2 will be inuenced by his inequality
aversion. However, this does not have a signicant impact on the tax rate. A
more redistributive pensions system hinders capital accumulation. The poor
will prefer a higher weight on Pillar 1 due to its redistributive nature. On
the other hand, the rich will prefer Pillar 2 since it is closely related to ability
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and contribution rates. Our other results suggest that a richer economy is
able to a¤ord a higher level of pensions in that as the proportion of rich
increases, the tax rate increases. Similarly, the smaller the di¤erence in the
productivity of the rich and the poor, the higher the tax rate. One of the key
policy ndings emanating from our model is that as the population ages, the
tax rate is not a¤ected to a large extent. This has important implications for
scal policy in face of an ageing population. However, this result needs to
be qualied in that there is no debt in our model and the pensions payment
is allowed to vary.
Though this model had been kept deliberately simple for analytical tractabil-
ity, there are two natural extensions that could follow. Including a fully-
funded second pillar would bring the model closer to the World Banks (1994)
initial proposal, however, as we have mentioned the private sector should not
necessarily yield a higher return than the public sector once the administra-
tive costs and risks are considered (Barr, 2001). The other extension would
be to include the three pillars as proposed by the World Bank (2005) and
include Pillar 0 and Pillar 4. This would include an element of means-tested
pensions (Pillar 0) and include an element of altruism in the model to account
for the informal forms of pensions (Pillar 4).
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Appendix 5.1
The optimal level of consumption and savings of the rich is given as:
cy;r =
1
[1 + ]

wt(1  ) + [! (1  ) (   1) + 1] (1 + n) wt+1
Rt+1

co;r =
Rt+1
[1 + ]

wt(1  ) + [! (1  ) (   1) + 1] (1 + n) wt+1
Rt+1

sy;r =
1
[1 + ]

wt(1  )  [! (1  ) (   1) + 1] (1 + n) wt+1
Rt+1

That of the poor is as follows:
cy;p =
1
[1 + ]

 wt(1  ) + [! (1   ) +  ] (1 + n) wt+1
Rt+1

co;p =
Rt+1
[1 + ]

 wt(1  ) + [! (1   ) +  ] (1 + n) wt+1
Rt+1

sy;p =
1
[1 + ]

 wt(1  )  [! (1   ) +  ] (1 + n) wt+1
Rt+1

The steady-state capital is given by:

k =
h
f(1+)+(1+)(1 ) g(1 )(1 )
(1+n)f(1+)(1+)+f(1+)[!(1 )(  1)+1]+(1+)(1 )[!(1  )+ ]g(1 )g
i 1
1 

(1)
In intensive form, the welfare function can be expressed as
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V =  [ln(cy;r) +  ln(co;r)] + (1  ) [ln(cy;p) +  ln(co;p)] (2)
We can then express V as a function of the policy-parameters ! and 
and non-policy parameters (; ; ; ;  ; n)
V = U ln [J + [L+M!]  ]+Z ln [N + [O + P!]  ]+Q [lnA(1  )  ln [B + fG+H!g  ]]
where A; B; G; H; J; Q; U; L; M and Z are all non-policy parameters.
and dened as:
A = (  (1 + )   + (1 + )    (1  )   )    (1  )
B = (1 + )  (1 + )  (1 + n)  
C = (1 + )    (1 + n)  (1  )
D = (1  )  (   1)
E = (1 + )  (1  )  (1 + n)  (1  )
F =   (1   )
G = C + E   
H = (E  F + C D)
J =  B
L =  G+ A  (1 + n)
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M =  H + A  (1 + n)  (1  )  (   1)
N = B     
O = G     + A  (1 + n)   
P = H     + A  (1 + n)    (1   )
Q =
h
(((1+) ( 1))+(1 )((1+) ( 1)))
(1 )
i
U = (1 + )  
Z = (1  )  (1 + )
Proof of Proposition 12 (Based on Eqn. (21))
(1a) : @k
@
= 1
1 
h
f+[+(1 ) ](1 )g[f+(1 ) g(1 )(1 )]
(1+n)[f(1+)+[+(1 ) ](1 )g]2
i 
1 
> 0
(1b) : @k
@
= 1
1 
h
(1+)(1 )2(1  )(1 )
(1+n)[f(1+)+[+(1 ) ](1 )g]2
i 
1 
> 0
(1c) : @k
@ 
= 1
1 
h
(1+)(1 )2(1 )(1 )
(1+n)[f(1+)+[+(1 ) ](1 )g]2
i 
1 
> 0
(1d) : @k
@
= 1
1 
h
 [(1 )f+(1 ) g[(1+)+(1 )f+(1 ) g]]
(1+n)[f(1+)+[+(1 ) ](1 )g]2
i 
1 
< 0
(1e) : @k
@n
= 1
1 
h
 [f+(1 ) g(1 )(1 )f(1+)+[+(1 ) ](1 )g]
[(1+n)f(1+)+[+(1 ) ](1 )g]2
i 
1 
< 0
Proof of Proposition 13 (Based on Eqn. (1))
@k
@!
=
1
1  
  AE
fB + !Eg2
 
1 
< 0 for  > 
@k
@!
=
1
1  
  AE
fB + !Eg2
 
1 
= 0 for  = 
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where :
A = f (1 + )+(1 + )  (1  ) g(1  )(1  ) > 0
B =(1 + n) [(1 + ) (1 + )+ f[(1 + ) +  (1 + ) (1  )] (1  )g]> 0
E = [   ] (1   ) (1  ) (1 + n) (1  ) >0 for >
=0 for =
Since we are only concerned with the case of  >  and  = , an increase
in ! can only lead to a reduction in k or have no impact on k, depending on
 and :
Proof of Proposition 14
(3a) :
@V
@
=

(1 + )   (1  )
(1  )
 
(1   )
[ + (1  ) ]

  (1 + ) ln > 0
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@UR
@
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@UP
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
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+  (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[ + (1  ) ]

> 0
Proof of Proposition 15
(4a) :
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=
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
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
> 0
(4b) :
@UR
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=

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+  (  1)
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)
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
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(4c) :
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=
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)
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
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> 0
Proof of Proposition 16
(5) :
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(1 + )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) (1 + n)

< 0
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Proof to Proposition 17
(6) :
@UR
@!
=
  a (1   ) (1 + ) (1  ) (1 + n) 
[ [b+ c ] + a [! (1  ) (   1) + 1] (1 + n)  ]

< 0
(6) :
@UP
@!
=

a (1 + ) (1   ) (1 + n) 
[ [b+ c ] + a [! (1   ) +  ] (1 + n)  ]

> 0
Proof of Proposition 18
(7) :
@UR
@
=
2664  
h
(1+) ( 1)
(1 )
i h
1
(1 ) +
c
(b+c)
i
+
h
(1+)[c+a[!(1 )(  1)+1](1+n)]
[[b+c ]+a[!(1 )(  1)+1](1+n) ]
i
3775 =  A2 +B2
(7) :
@UP
@
=
2664  
h
(1+) ( 1)
(1 )
i h
1
(1 ) +
c
(b+c)
i
+
h
(1+)[ c+a[!(1  )+ ](1+n)]
[ [b+c ]+a[!(1  )+ ](1+n) ]
i
3775 =  A2 +B3
where:
a =  f + (1  ) g(1  );
b = (1 + ) (1 + n);
c = [ + (1  ) ] (1 + n) (1  ):
From the above, the utility of the rich increases if B2 >  A2. On the
other hand, the utility of the poor increases if B3 >  A2. UR and UP will
di¤er if B2 6= B3: If B3 > B2, then @UP
@
> @UR
@
:
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE EXTEN-
SIONS
6.1 Conclusions
Whilts the issue of pensions reforms has temporarily taken the backseat due
to the global crisis, it is bound to be back in the limelight due to the nancial
and economic implications an ageing population entails. One of the crucial
issues policymakers will have to deal with is ensure how the elderly can be
catered for without jeopardizing nancial and scal sustainability. As things
stand, without reforms, many of the PAYG pensions systems are expected to
go bust. The problems have been compounded by the economic crisis which
has caused the value of many pensions funds to fall, or in some cases collapse.
The scal stimulus put in place in the wake of the crisis has also weakened
the scal positions of many economies.
This thesis has considered the ageing problem and considered how best
the pensions systems can be reformed to maximise aggregate social welfare.
We developed a standard two-period OLG model in a general equilibrium
framework with heterogeneous agents, prot-maximising rms and a benev-
olent social welfare maximiser, and considered how the pensions system in
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place a¤ects the level of welfare. We considered which of the PAYG and FF
schemes are optimal, or whether a hybrid system with a combination of both
the PAYG and FF might be most appropriate. In particular, we considered
the consumption-smoothing and redistributive role of pensions by investigat-
ing whether pensions should be ability-based or should there be a transfer
from the rich to the poor. We considered a combination of redistributive
mechanisms: in some cases, only the rich fund for the pensions whilst it is
optional for the poor; whilst the poor always benet when a pensions system
is in place, this is not necessarily the case for the rich.
Our key result, consistent with Samuelson (1975) and Feldstein (1985),
suggests that the pensions system in place has major implications for capital
formation. The pensions system determines capital accumulation, which in
turn has implications for output, the interest rate, wages, consumption and
by extension welfare. Compared to a PAYG system, capital is always higher
under a FF system due to the crowding out induced under the PAYG. Feld-
stein (1985), had shown the existence of an optimal PAYG pensions system
in a dynamically e¢ cient economy. By extending his model to a general
equilibrium framework, we were able to show that a PAYG yields a much
lower welfare than the FF scheme. Consistent with Aaron (1966), we also
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nd that in so far as an economy is dynamically e¢ cient, a FF system is
optimal for consumption smoothing purposes. We nd that there is a higher
possibility of dynamic ine¢ ciency arising under a FF as there is a higher po-
tential for over accumulation of capital. Dynamic e¢ ciency can be restored
in a dynamically ine¢ cient economy by introducing a PAYG pensions sys-
tem, which leads to a reduction in capital. However, one of our key ndings
departs from Aaron, in that there is room for a PAYG pensions system in a
dynamically e¢ cient economy that is approaching dynamic ine¢ ciency, that
is, there is a potential for over-accumulation of capital. The introduction of
a PAYG in such an economy will ensure the economy remains dynamically
e¢ cient. This results needs to be qualied in that it only holds for a small
range of parameter values when the economy is approaching dynamic ine¢ -
ciency. We also nd that in the models where the agents di¤er in terms of
productivity, richer economies characterised by a higher proportion of high
productivity agents tend to have a higher level of capital and welfare.
In the heterogeneous framework, we considered a combination of the re-
distributive or consumption-smoothing roles of pensions. The pensions could
be FF or PAYG, or there could be a hybrid system in place. We nd that
in a dynamically e¢ cient economy, by and large, a FF scheme is optimal,
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except for the case when there is a potential for capital over-accumulation.
When rich economies over-accumulate capital, a PAYG pensions system cou-
pled with intragenerational redistribution can lead the economy to dynamic
e¢ ciency. However, when redistribution is e¤ected through pensions, it has
an adverse impact on capital formation when the poor discount the future
at a higher rate. The poor always prefer a higher level of redistribution than
the rich, although in our framework, redistribution always leads to higher
aggregate welfare. Our other results suggest that a rich economy require less
redistribution but can a¤ord to be more generous. We also nd that there
are ranges of parameter values for which the role of pensions is best restricted
to consumption smoothing and redistribution is best e¤ected through instru-
ments other than pensions.
In line with Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2005), we also considered both in-
ter and intragenerational redistribution simultaneously, with an element of
inequality aversion from the planner. We nd that when the agents have
the same discount factor, the tax rate and the timing of redistribution tilt
in such a way to ensure that capital does not change signicantly and the
economy remains dynamically e¢ cient at all times. With higher inequality,
the tax rate is higher and intragenerational transfers are preferred. Richer
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economies require less redistribution but can a¤ord intergenerational trans-
fers. The tilting in the timing of redistribution mitigates the adverse impact
of the higher tax rate on capital formation. We also nd that as popula-
tion ages, intergenerational redistribution is preferred since it counters the
increase in capital per worker and ensures the economy remains dynami-
cally e¢ cient. Both inter and intra generational redistribution are supported
only within a range; outside this range only one instrument is optimal, that
is, intragenerational redistribution for poor economies and intergenerational
redistribution for rich economies.
In line with the World Banks "Averting the Old Age Crisis" (1994),
we formalised the intuition behind the World Bank model and designed a
pensions system with three pillars. Pillar 1 is redistributive, Pillar 2 is ability
based and Pillar 3 is optional. The results are consistent with our previous
ndings whereby the higher the redistributive component of the pensions
system, the higher (lower) the welfare of the poor (rich) but aggregate welfare
increases. However, whether the planner chooses Pillar 1 or Pillar 2 makes a
marginal di¤erence to the optimal tax rate.
While we have discussed the policy issues in the individual chapters, some
of the main ones need highlighting. As discussed, the issue of pensions re-
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forms is likely to remain on the policy agenda for the foreseeable future. In
this regard, it is important that the reforms, whether parametric or whole-
sale, are implemented in a way to ensure economic and social e¢ ciency whilst
considering long-term sustainability. One of our key ndings suggests that in
a dynamically e¢ cient economy, the FF scheme is optimal. However, the de-
sign of the pensions system should also take into account the whole range of
redistributive issues associated with such a reform, especially when transiting
from a PAYG to a FF system. The need to redistribute to tackle inequality
and poverty as well as ensuring as broad a coverage of the social safety nets
also need attention. These are some of the key issues that future research
needs to investigate further.
6.2 Future Extensions
To ensure analytical tractability and ease of manipulation, we have had re-
course to a range of simplifying assumptions. The key assumptions driving
our results pertain to the loglinear utility function and Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function. Agents live for two-periods, with certainty, and there are
no bequests. In line with Becker (1990), the poor discount the future at
a higher rate than the rich. The other assumptions imply that there is
212
no adverse impact of pensions on labour supply since one unit of labour is
provided inelastically. Moreover, we did not consider the transition cost of
moving from a PAYG to a FF system, which might be signicant. Implicitly,
we assumed full coverage of pensions and all the economic activities took
place in the formal sector. We also assumed that the switch in the pensions
system would be based solely on economic considerations and there were
no political economy issues involved. Whilst some of the results, especially
those pertaining to capital formation, will continue to hold under di¤erent
frameworks, those on welfare will change depending on the framework used.
We next consider how some of the assumptions can be relaxed and how the
research can be extended further.
Utility Functions
The loglinear utility function, coupled with the Cobb Douglas produc-
tion function, ensure the existence of the competitive equilibrium as dened.
Given the nature of the OLG models, analytical tractability is lost very
quickly with other general functions. The loglinear utility function is one
way of keeping the model manageable (Balasko and Shell, 1981). However,
these assumptions could be relaxed by introducing more general utility func-
tions. The main way in which it would a¤ect our existing result is that in
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the current set up the transfer from the rich to the poor always increases
aggregate welfare because the utility of the poor increases by more than the
fall in that of the rich due to the concave function. However, this would not
be the case with convex functions.
Ageing through increased Longevity
In this thesis, we have considered ageing through an exogenous popu-
lation growth rate, whereby a fall in the population growth rate leads to
an increase in the dependency ratio, or ratio of retirees to workers. How-
ever, another dimension through which population ageing is taking place is
through increased longevity. In our framework, agents live for two periods
with certainty. One could consider adding the longevity element a la Blan-
chard (1985) continuous-time model with age invariant mortality rates.
More general demographic structures have also been considered by Lau
(2009). Bringing in a risk of mortality outside the specic periods in the
Diamond spirit will extend the model and ageing process in another dimen-
sion. Whilst we have considered one period as one year, this could be easily
extended to longer periods with one generation being 20-30 years, as in Feld-
stein (1984). Other models have gone beyond the traditional two-period (see
de la Croix and Michel, 2002), and included additional nite periods (Auer-
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bach and Kotliko¤, 1987), with a probability of survival into the additional
periods.
Impact of Social Security on Labour Supply
We have also assumed that agents supply one unit of labour inelastically
and their choice is not a¤ected by the provision of pensions. However, there
is evidence (Hu, 1979) that if transfers are tied to the retirement decision, the
pensions system introduces distortions into the labour supply choice. This
is something we have not considered in our model. Introducing this element
will increase the cost of having a PAYG pensions system beyond the crowding
out of capital we have considered.
Fertility and Bequests
A related element pertains to the exogenous population growth rate.
Barro and Becker (1989) and Becker and Mulligan (1997) have considered
how fertility choice could be endogenised and introducing this in an OLG
model with pensions could provide for a richer analytical environment. Stay-
ing within the structure of the model, the agents are not altruists and do not
leave any bequests for the next generation. However, bequests, whether al-
truistic or accidental, are important (Becker, 1974; Abel, 1985). Introducing
bequests would provide another dimension in which the environment could
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be enriched. What bequests will do is mitigate the crowding out induced
by the PAYG pensions system. Hence, we could have additional interactions
with implications for capital formation whereby the reduction in labour sup-
ply and the bequests would increase capital whereas the increased fertility
will dilute capital. The overall impact will of course depend on which of the
e¤ects dominate.
Steady State, Transition Costs, Political Economy Issues
The current analysis has been carried out in steady state. What we have
not considered is how the transition from a PAYG to a FF system takes place
and how to deal with the associated transition cost, which is an important
and highly debated issue. Funding the transition cost, either by accumulating
debt or using the proceeds of privatization, has attracted signicant attention
since the pensions reforms in Latin America and Averting the Old Age
Crisis. Notwithstanding the economic ramications, there are signicant
political economy issues at play (see for example, Conde Ruiz and Galasso,
2005, Galasso and Profetta, 2002, 2004). These political economy issues
are one of the major factors hindering the reforms of pensions systems, even
unsustainable ones. Further research in the political economy issues will shed
light on why pensions systems are delayed.
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Market Imperfections
Finally, the economic environment could be enriched further. Whilst we
have assumed perfect capital markets, the real world is characterised by mar-
ket imperfections. For instance, households could be credit constrained and
this will hinder their ability to borrow. Markets may not always clear such
that there can be an excess of labour supply thereby leading to unemploy-
ment. Moreover, we have assumed there is no informal sector and everyone
is covered by the pensions system in place. However, evidence suggests that
the issue of coverage is important, especially in developing countries (Gill
et al., 2004). More recently, the nancial crisis has shown that there are
previously unforeseen risks that the FF system might be subject to and this
can a¤ect the value of pensions households will receive.
We have used a simple framework to demonstrate which pensions system
is optimal and maximises welfare per head. One of our key results has shown
that a hybrid system with both a FF and a PAYG element, with the latter
catering for redistribution, is optimal. However, there are various other issues
which we have not considered, but highlighted above. Taking into account
those factors, while undeniably increasing the complexity and tractability of
the model, could provide additional insights into pensions reforms.
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